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Plans by utility standards organizations and privately-owned companies to 
transition control and monitoring of the US power grid and other utility infrastructures 
from simple, proprietary protocols to open, IP-based architectures and standards will 
reduce operating costs and expand customer support options but will also face several 
serious obstacles to implementation.  First, TCP/IP and the Internet were never designed 
for the hard real-time packet delivery required by SCADA systems.  Second, the 
alarming rise each year in reported corporate downtime, financial loss, and espionage 
from insiders and Internet attackers, often using widely available exploits, foreshadows 
an increasing vulnerability of utility data and control systems.  With the swift move to 
embrace IP-based control systems, there is surprisingly little available research regarding 
means to ensure continuous, safe, and secure operation of these critical infrastructures in 
the face of determined cyber threats.  
 This thesis investigates network security policies and mechanisms for control 
system networks using a mix of TCP and UDP transport protocols over IP.  It 
recommends flexible, scalable, modular, and cost-effective security solutions that can be 
added in strategic locations to protect existing legacy architectures and accommodate 
transition to IP standards.  User-definable rules and responses enact the unique policies of 
organizations that must operate with zero failures in environments with varying levels of 
uncertainty and trust.   
 This thesis proposes and evaluates a comprehensive and collaborative security 
concept, defined as a trust system, that is based on a best-of-breed application of 
standard IT network security mechanisms and IP protocols.  The trust system provides 
seamless, automated command and control for suppression of network attacks and other 
 
vi 
suspicious events.  It also supplies access control, format validation, event analysis, 
alerting, blocking, and event logging at any network-level and can do so on behalf of any 
system that does not have the resources to perform these functions itself.   
 This thesis simulates layering mechanisms for encryption, authentication, traffic 
filtering, content checks, and event correlation over real-time data acquisition, control, 
and protection signaling in order to mitigate malicious activities from both internal and 
external sources.   Latency calculations are used to estimate limits of applicability within 
a company and between geographically separated company and area control centers, 
scalable to hierarchical regional and national implementations.   
A successful solution at any level requires balancing the protection of private 
communities of interest while fostering a combination of centralized and distributed 
emergency prediction, mitigation, detection, and response.  To achieve this, while 
meeting strict time constraints, secure and dynamic peer-to-peer mechanisms are assisted 
by bandwidth guarantee algorithms in automatically sharing critical status information 
within and between organizations to enhance real-time situational awareness and prevent 
catastrophic power outages that would otherwise cascade across large control and 
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COLLABORATIVE, TRUST-BASED SECURITY MECHANISMS  
FOR A NATIONAL UTILITY INTRANET 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 The U.S. utility industry operates and maintains a significant portion of national  
critical infrastructure, supplying electrical generation and transmission, nuclear power 
production, water and waste management, oil and gas, and other critical services to 
consumers; seaports, airports, and other transportation systems; and numerous 
manufacturing plants, government offices, and businesses throughout the country.  
 Systems used to manage these complex networks, often with thousands of  
monitored nodes, have to be capable of reliable and accurate hard real-time or near real-
time responses to fluctuations and emergency situations.  Traditionally, each company 
purchased and installed its own proprietary systems and protocols from various vendors 
with no overall guiding interoperability standards adhered to by the community 
as a whole.   
 In system design, interoperability and security were often of a lower priority than 
efficiency and functionality.  Many companies took comfort in the uniqueness and 
complexity of their systems as a means of security from would-be attackers.  The need 
for interoperability was not critical for larger companies that could control the cradle-to-
grave supply of services, from generation to transmission and distribution, to meet 
customer demands for an entire metropolitan area. 
 In the electrical power industry, deregulation has resulted in fragmenting many of  
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the previously held monopolies so that each privately-owned company specializes in only 
one function of the power grid (i.e. generation, transmission, distribution, etc.) with less 
wide-area visibility.  It has also served to increase competition among these companies 
resulting in a greater need for management efficiencies and protection of company-
sensitive data from unauthorized disclosure to competitors.  These new trends point to a 
need for greater collaboration and situational awareness while providing strict network 
security in an environment prone to variable trust relationships. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
In recent years, the utility community has drifted away from the proprietary 
systems and protocols that once dominated the industry toward adoption of more 
open, networked communication standards for control and data acquisition, patterned 
after the efficiencies and lower cost of technologies seen in the Internet.  The increased 
competition has made the lower cost and interoperability of IP-based, plug-and-play, 
Commercial-of-the Shelf (COTS) technologies attractive.  These signs point to the 
eventual development of a Utility-specific Intranet, patterned after, yet unconnected to, 
the global Internet. 
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), riding upon the Internet Protocol (IP) 
is the most common Internet standard for reliable information transfer with delivery 
confirmation.  In November 1999, the TCP/IP framework was mandated by the 
International Electro-Technical Committee (IEC), a standards organization for the 
community, so that every modern computer and operating system integrated into the 
SCADA network will have a TCP/IP network stack.   
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Whether the legacy proprietary protocols were any less vulnerable to attack 
because of their obscurity is unlikely, however with the shift to IP-standards and common 
control system operating systems (e.g. Windows®, Linux®, Solaris®, UNIX®) it is certain 
that they are becoming more vulnerable to a wider audience of skilled and amateur 
attackers, familiar with the numerous IP-based exploits, techniques, and attack tools 
freely downloadable from the Internet [1].   
Power engineers wanting to maintain strict processes and speed of operation 
claim that the vast majority of common IT security mechanisms will upset the delicate 
balance and cannot be applied to SCADA networks.  IT personnel familiar with the 
security mechanisms used to defend more delay-tolerant office networks see these as the 
most secure measures for protecting computer systems against the potential threats from 
malicious code and online exploits for which they are all too familiar.  Both parties are at 
odds as to the role, priority, and best implementation of security countermeasures.   
1.3 Research Objectives, Questions, and Hypotheses 
The purpose of this thesis research is to investigate the claims from both sides 
regarding employment of common, delay-inducing network security mechanisms to real-
time SCADA and near real-time wide-area measurement systems (WAMS).   
It is the hypothesis of this author that an acceptable, low-cost form of standard IT 
security measures may be applied to a Utility Intranet to secure communications from 
potential attackers, provide automated responses to identified attacks and suspicious 
activity, and increase situational awareness throughout the network within the real-time 
reaction timelines for SCADA operations.   
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1.4 Research Focus 
The focus of this research has been on security for electrical power grid devices 
within a company.  The concepts and results, however, are applicable to all levels of the 
Utility Intranet from company-level substation automation and control center operations 
to area-wide, regional, and even National Interconnection organizations (or any non-
utility communications network for that matter).  
1.5 Investigative Questions 
Research was designed to answer the following questions: 
1. What delay will be induced by each security component? 
2. What accidental and malicious actions can the security mechanisms identify 
and mitigate? 
3. Which mechanisms are the most appropriate for each possible operational 
configuration and each envisioned attack scenario? 
1.6 Methodology 
To begin with, it was assumed that future Utility Intranet SCADA networks will 
resemble IT network architecture.  A collaborative trust system capability has been 
derived as a hybrid solution comprised of the most secure IT security mechanisms and 
standard IP protocols while focusing on the distinct requirements of the SCADA 
community.   
To test the hypotheses specified in Section 1.3, a C++ implementation of a 
simplistic trust system was created that could evaluate and respond to incoming 
messages read in from a scenario file.  The delays for processing at the trust system were 
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measured and summed with the delays for sender-to-receiver encryption, transmission, 
and propagation, to render the total per-packet and per-scenario latency values.  
1.7 Assumptions and Limitations 
The delays for router queuing and processing as well as encryption and decryption 
were estimated based on measurements presented in the literature.  While these 
occurrences are responsible for the greatest amount of end-to-end delay, they do not 
detract from the trust system functionality and delay, which is in addition to transit delay 
that already exists in a SCADA network. 
Detailed IEC 61850 message structure was not available for this thesis research.  
Message types for scenarios were selected only to illustrate the types of messages that 
might be present in a Utility Intranet but do not necessarily duplicate the IEC standards 
format.  The messages chosen, however, are likely to be larger than SCADA messages 
for the same purpose because of full-character representation of some data vice integer 
representations and abbreviations likely with real-world optimizations to keep packets as 
small as possible.  The messages defined for use in this thesis also contain the additional 
overhead of TCP, IP, larger IPV6 address, and encryption.  The trust system results 
accurately represent the delay for trust system evaluation of real-world messages of the 
same general size.  
1.8 Implications 
This thesis research shows that, even with TCP/IP and UDP/IP communications, 
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) encryption, firewall rules, format check, and access 
control functions, the recommended security schema can perform within near real-time 
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and at the high end of real-time response time constraints.  It is therefore deduced that 
with further optimizations, the same schema can be improved to perform satisfactorily in 
many real-time scenarios. 
1.9 Preview 
Chapter 2 describes requirements of real-time SCADA network communications 
and the challenges facing those who attempt to secure them.  It also presents the results of 
investigating on-going research in the field related to SCADA security.  Finally it 
suggests the ways in which the trust system concept can solve existing security 
problems. 
Chapter 3 describes the recommended trust system implementation in detail. 
Chapter 4 demonstrates functionality of the trust system simulation and presents 
several realistic scenarios for attacks against a SCADA network.  It also presents the 
calculated delay estimates for each scenario.  
Chapter 5 concludes this thesis with recommendations for future research in trust 




II.  Literature Review 
2.1. Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to present relevant background material and 
existing research as the foundation for investigative questions, assumptions, and direction 
guiding this thesis work. 
2.2  Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Overview 
In North America, the term Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
is only applied to either a central system that monitors and controls a complete site or a 
system spread out over a long distance (i.e. on the order of kilometers or miles) for large-
scale distributed measurement and control [2].  It is interesting to note that that 
throughout the rest of the world, even a single system that performs supervisory control 
and data acquisition functions, regardless of its size or geographical distribution, is 
referred to as a SCADA system, including those that only monitor without performing 
control functions [2]. 
There is a distinction between supervisory control and real-time (or process) 
control.  Whereas, the real-time control system within a utility provides automated 
control of a process that is external to the SCADA system, the supervisory control 
function is implemented by a SCADA system that is overlaid onto the automated real-
time control system.  SCADA servers provide a human operator with alarms, status, 
performance data, and statistics of the real-time process.  The SCADA system is typically 
not critical to controlling the industrial process in real-time, because the separate (or 
integrated) real-time automated control system is designed to respond quickly enough to 
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compensate for process changes within the time-constraints of the process.  The SCADA 
system, however, allows the operator to poll for information or issue commands in the 
event of a failure in the automated process and must still meet stringent time constraints.   
SCADA systems are found throughout the public utility industry and are integral 
to operation of our national critical infrastructure.  SCADA systems are used to monitor 
and control geographically separated utility sites such as oil and gas pipelines and 
refineries, electrical power generation facilities and transmission grids, air traffic control 
towers, railways,  maritime ports, water and waste management facilities, chemical 
plants,  manufacturing facilities, and telephone and cell phone networks, including 911 
emergency services [3, 4].  Due the mission critical nature of a large number of SCADA 
computer systems, attacks could result, directly or indirectly, in massive financial and 
sensitive data losses, destruction of facilities, or loss of life. 
Scenarios such as massive power blackouts, oil refinery explosions, or waste 
mixed with drinking water due to SCADA system compromise, failure, or degradation 
have the potential to inflict significant damage to human life and critical infrastructure at 
local, regional, or national levels.  If synchronized with a physical attack or the aftermath 
of a natural disaster, cyber attacks on SCADA systems could greatly escalate fatalities in 
a region already rendered unable to coordinate a timely response or ill-prepared to offer 
necessary shelter, clean water, and contamination control, perfect methods for inciting 
terror once again in America. 
One can imagine the disastrous, synergistic effect of an explosion in a nuclear 
facility releasing nuclear contamination in the vicinity of a large population area 
immediately following a winter storm or summer hurricane that limits traversal of major 
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roadways and at the same time that the city’s water system has been contaminated with 
sewage or bacteria and its electricity blacked out for well over a week.   The combination 
of prolonged extreme (either sub-freezing or above 100 degree) temperatures, disease, 
and radioactivity would account for numerous deaths.  The effects of Hurricane Katrina 
alone, in 2005, resulted in well over 1400 confirmed deaths, this amidst early warning 
and active emergency response efforts [5].    
Meticulously planned and well-executed cyber attacks, whether conducted solely 
by remote network access or in conjunction with a malicious insider, is not an impossible 
scenario.  What if similar actions were coordinated by terrorist agents to attack multiple 
cities within a region simultaneously?  
2.3 The Threat to Utility Operations  
 2.3.1 Threat Sources. 
 Potential sources for cyber attacks and operational disruptions (whether accidental 
or intentional) on SCADA and other utility resources are listed in Table 1.   
 
Table 1.  Sources and Motivations for Utility Disruptions and Attack [6] 
Source Reason 
Industrial sabotage  
or theft 
Financial advantage in insider trading or competing vendor partnerships 
Concentrated physical  
and cyber attack 
Destruction, terror, or activism  
Vendor compromise Easier to target the supplier than the defended infrastructure itself [7] 
Technical design error 
or environmental 
influence 
Hardware or code; network design, installation and configuration; or 
interferences from other technologies in the environment  
Natural disasters Earthquakes, tornadoes, volcanoes, fire, thunderstorms, and snow storms  
Operator error  
 
Misjudgment, misconfiguration, or failure to remember operational details, 




 2.3.2 Specific Threats.  
 Theoretical scenarios abound; however, many businesses and engineers are 
incredulous or simply lack the resources or technical expertise to plan and maintain 
security upgrades that might eat into company profits or potentially affect performance.  
There is also an “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” mentality that can still be found regarding 
modifying or rethinking control system operations and cyber security implementations.  




























































































X X X   X Improper application of software patches 
X X X X X X 
Plant shutdown for maintenance and start-up after 
maintenance (many harmful events occur as a result of 
plant maintenance shutdown and start-up) 
X X X   X Access lock-out (locked accounts, admin usernames and passwords changed) 
X X X   X Removal or misconfiguration of connectivity paths 
X X X  X X Physical destruction of systems, resources, or infrastructure 
X X X   X 
Downloading malicious code (i.e. autonomous worms 
randomly searching for propagation paths, viruses, 
Trojan horses, etc.) 
X X X   X 
Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed-denial-of-
service (DDoS) attacks, such as those that overwhelm 
network bandwidth 
X X X    Control message spoofing 
X X X    
Data acquisition message spoofing so everything looks 
normal to prevent response or bad to prompt dangerous 
responses 
X X X    Password or message sniffing 
X X X    Installation of backdoors to the network 
X X X    
Unauthorized data or code access, use, theft, 
modification, 
re-routing, and/or deletion 
X X X    Unauthorized access to or modification of audit logs, firewall logs, and IDSs signatures/alerts 
X X X    GPS timeserver corruption 
X X X X   Electromagnetic interference (EMI) and radio frequency interference (RFI) 
   X   Noise on power lines 










Table 3 details potential avenues of attack or disruption in today’s utility networks that 
require either elimination or defenses.  It also lists the specific trust system functions 
that can be applied as a defense-in-depth strategy along these pathways. 
 
Table 3.  Potential Attack Routes Requiring Elimination or Defenses [1] 
Attack Routes Trust System Mitigating Functions 
Internet connections Firewall rules 
Business or enterprise network connections Firewall rules, network Access Control Matrix 
(ACM) 
IT/Vendor connections to SCADA framework[6] Firewall rules,  network ACM 
Connections to other networks Firewall rules, network ACM 
Compromised VPNs Network logon enforcement, nodal and network-
level ACMs, Suspicious Event Handler 
Back-door connections through dial-up modems Nodal and network-level ACMs, source tracking 
Unsecured wireless connections discovered by war-
driving laptop users 
ACM, source tracking, encryption and 
authentication enforcement, network logon 
enforcement 
Malformed IP packets, in which packet header 
information conflicts with actual packet data 
Packet format analysis, Suspicious Event 
Handler 
IP fragmentation attacks, where a small fragment is 
transmitted that forces some of the TCP header field 
into a second fragment 
Packet format analysis, Suspicious Event 
Handler 
Vulnerabilities in SNMP, which is used to gather 
network information and provide notification of 
network events 
Packet format analysis, Suspicious Event 
Handler 
Open computer ports, such as UDP and TCP ports 
that are unprotected or left open unnecessarily 
Firewall rules 
Weak authentication protocols in SCADA elements Encryption and authentication enforcement 
Maintenance hooks or trap doors, which are means to 
circumvent security controls during SCADA system 
development, testing, and maintenance 
Nodal and network-level ACMs 
E-mail transactions on control network Traffic prioritization, antivirus scans, DoS 
detection and blocking, firewall rules 
Buffer overflow attacks on SCADA control servers, 
which are accessed by PLCs and SCADA HMIs 
Packet format analysis, Suspicious Event 
Handler 
Leased, private telephone lines Nodal ACM 
GPS conditioned timeserver Firewall rules, packet format analysis, trust 
systems’ collaboration synchronized off of 
network-level trust system internal clock as 




2.3.3 Open Source Intelligence. 
 Even for legacy control systems with proprietary hardware and software, the 
knowledge needed to cause a widespread power blackout is readily available on the 
Internet, where SCADA vendor websites post manuals, downloadable software, and 
source code for major applications [8].  Vendor sites often list well-known customers 
with detailed case studies of how these customers have implemented their systems and 
which products they have.  In fact, it has been found that “over 90% of major SCADA 
and automation vendors have all of their technical manuals and specifications available 
on-line to the general public” [8].   
 Many corporate websites list their training materials and operating manuals, 
presentations about vulnerabilities and what they think hackers could do, firewall 
policies, network diagrams, spreadsheets listing accounts and DNS or IP addresses, 
backup and sample configuration files for the control systems, protocol documentation, 
as well as documentation of simple penetration testing techniques, examples, and hacker 
scripts  [8].   
 2.3.4 Real-world Incidents.   
There have been several well-known, real-world incidents affecting SCADA 
systems, and very likely many others never publicized, that clearly illustrate the 
vulnerability of our critical infrastructure [7].   
 1. During the Cold War, the US provided Trojan firmware to the Soviet Union, 
causing a pipeline to explode in one of the world’s largest non-nuclear explosions [7].  
SCADA software, hardware, or firmware can be maliciously produced and sold to US 
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companies by foreign or domestic entities with the intent to destroy the power supply to a 
region.   
 2. In 1992, a former Chevron employee disabled its emergency alert system in 22 
states, which wasn’t discovered until an emergency happened that needed alerting [7]. 
 3. In 1997, a teenager broke into the NYNEX telephone network and cut off 
Massachusetts’ Worcester Airport for six hours, affecting air and ground communications 
[7]. 
 4. In 2000, former employee Vitek Boden, exploited a wireless link to the 
SCADA system for the Queensland, Australia, Maroochy Shire sewage control system, 
releasing a million liters of sewage into the coastal waterways over a period of four 
months [7]. 
 5. Also in 2000, the Russian government announced that hackers, acting together 
with a company insider, succeeded in bypassing Gazprom security measures and gained 
control of the system regulating gas flows for the world’s largest natural gas pipeline 
network [7].   
 6. Some computers and manuals seized from Al Qaeda terrorist safe houses in 
Afghanistan contained SCADA information regarding dams and related structures, but no 
implementation plan [7].  Terrorists have been searching for critical infrastructure targets-
of-opportunity for many years. 
 7.  In 2001, hackers broke into CAL-ISO, California’s primary electric power grid 
operator, and weren’t discovered for 17 days [3:75].   
 8. In 2003, the Ohio Davis-Besse nuclear power plant safety monitoring system 
was offline for five hours due to the Slammer Worm [7]. 
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 9. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina disrupted a few refineries in the southern coast of 
the US, affecting gasoline prices world-wide [7].  Shutdown by cyber attack has the 
potential to affect supplies of gasoline, electricity, or water and corresponding global 
stock prices. 
2.4 Changes in the SCADA Environment 
 SCADA systems evolved from proprietary hardware and software platforms used 
in the 1960s to acquire data from and control real-time systems.  The networks and 
protocols used in SCADA systems were also proprietary and customized to meet the 
specific needs of the industrial world [1].   
There was no Internet or World Wide Web (WWW) at the time, and the SCADA 
systems were self-contained, so they were generally considered safe against malicious 
intrusions from the outside, but have always been vulnerable to threats from the inside.  
Even when the Internet emerged and SCADA systems began to incorporate standard 
hardware and software platforms that had known vulnerabilities, the mentality of most 
SCADA operators and managers remained the same.  The SCADA community believed 
that external hackers were not interested in their applications and probably did not know 
much about the existence and configuration of SCADA systems.  Even in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, most documented SCADA security incidents were either initiated by 
disgruntled employees or were the result of accidents.  SCADA systems were not even 
considered IT systems, and were assumed to be relatively less vulnerable to IT-type cyber 
attacks.  Even to this day, many SCADA systems are perceived as either nearly 
invulnerable to cyber attacks or uninteresting to potential hackers [1].   
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Within the last few years, several changes have begun to impact SCADA system 
operation, design, communications, and security—increasing the risks, vulnerabilities, 
and the complexity of defining network security measures for this unique environment.   
The restructuring of the utility industry has increased competition while driving 
the need for more efficient operations and better coordination among utility companies.  
Two major elements are involved. The first element of restructuring is regulatory.  Using 
the electric power industry as an example, power grids, historically, were centrally 
controlled and operated.  Changes in the regulatory structure now encourage independent 
ownership of generators and favor the emergence of competitive mechanisms by which 
organizations can enter into bilateral or multilateral power generation contracts.  The 
second element in restructuring is a consequence of the first, involving large-scale 
operation of the grid. In the past, this was a centralized task. In the restructured climate, a 
number of competing power producers must coordinate their actions through a set of 
independent service operators (ISO).  The process of restructuring has occurred 
incrementally.  In its earliest stages, large monopoly-style utilities that might have owned 
beginning-to-end power production and delivery processes were broken into smaller 
companies with typically specialized roles in only generation, transmission, or 
distribution. At the same time, there has been a slow but steady growth in the numbers of 
long-distance contracts.  
Stress on the electric power grid continues to rise in the current deregulated 
environment as the demand for power grows with increasing population and infusion of 
technology into businesses and homes.  With increasing demands world-wide for electric 
power, the grid is being operated closer and closer to its limits.  Despite this reality, the 
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generation and transmission capacity of the grid has not been widely upgraded to 
accommodate greater output and flows.  Deregulation has served to exacerbate this 
situation.   
The deregulated utilities have been forced to split into separate companies, each 
devoted to different aspects of the power grid, in place of the vertically integrated 
structure that existed in the past.  Generation, distribution, and transmission systems all 
have separate owners under this new arrangement.  The transmission system, in 
particular, is typically owned and controlled now by the ISO in each region of the grid.  
This operating arrangement is problematic in the sense that none of these entities has an 
incentive to upgrade the transmission infrastructure.  Ostensibly, this is the responsibility 
of the ISO, but they lack an economic incentive for adding new transmission lines in the 
same way that a generation company has a clear motive to add new power plants to the 
grid.   
The new structure of the power grid has led to increased competition between 
utilities that might have cooperated with one another in the past.  This complicates the 
proper detection and response to faults that occur in the electric power grid since 
information that might have been shared in the past is seen as proprietary for economic 
reasons [9]. 
There is also an emerging trend in many organizations comprising SCADA and 
conventional IT systems toward consolidating overlapping activities.  For example, 
control engineering might be absorbed or closely integrated with the corporate IT 
department.  In addition, integrating SCADA data collection and monitoring with 
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corporate financial and customer data provides management with an increased ability to 
run the organization more efficiently and effectively [1].  
This drive for efficiency and cost savings has led SCADA system and architecture 
designers to begin patterning utility communications after the rapid changes occurring in 
the larger Information Technology (IT) and networking industry by becoming more open 
and at the same time more interconnected.  For economic and efficiency reasons, the 
primitive legacy systems are being upgraded using Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) 
hardware and software, and are being migrated from isolated in-plant networks using 
proprietary hardware and software to standard data formats and network protocols, 
particularly Transport Control Protocol (TCP) for end-to-end control. This trend is 
motivated by cost savings achieved by consolidating disparate platforms, networks, 
software, and maintenance tools [10].  The downside of this transition has been to expose 
SCADA operating systems to the same vulnerabilities and threats that plague Windows 
and Linux-based PCs and their associated networks connected to the Internet.   
2.5 A Future Utility Intranet 
Most researchers anticipate that an Internet-like Utility Intranet (also referred to 
as a Utilities Network or Superstructure), dedicated to the power grid and mostly isolated 
from the public Internet, will emerge in the coming decade, with TCP likely to be the 
primary transport protocol [10].  Another reason SCADA is likely to migrate to a Utility 
Intranet is due to the higher polling rates that would be possible with the increased 
bandwidth available in the new communications infrastructure [9].  Given the stricter 
response thresholds of SCADA systems, this presents an extreme challenge in providing 
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for their security in an environment where connections to the Internet (whether known or 
not) are almost certain to exist, providing a tempting avenue for attempted cyber attacks.  
The move to a universal protocol among all utilities is slow at best but will 
probably be dominated by the use of Ethernet as a common carrier for data because of the 
ease of use and low cost of Ethernet LAN systems.  Many newly developed SCADA 
applications and many future variants will use various protocols but ride over IP [11]. 
The power industry is turning towards next-generation communications systems 
in order to meet the increased demands that are being placed on the electric power grid.  
These standards point toward the future adoption of a private Utility Intranet based on 
Internet technology to improve the efficiency and reliability of the power grid.  The 
Utility Intranet is likely to begin as an effort to improve upon the monitoring, protection, 
and control of individual utilities and, with communication standards, will lead to the 
interconnection of the utilities’ data networks in the same way that the electric power grid 
has become integrated over time.  The introduction of a Utility Intranet has many 
potential benefits such as increased information sharing, greater protection and control of 
the grid, and the enhanced ability to share power in complex situations such as bilateral 
load following.  However, great care must be taken to ensure that network capacities, 
communication protocols, security, and quality of service (QoS) requirements are 
appropriately managed to ensure that the Utility Intranet will be able to meet the demands 
that are placed on it by increasing consumption rates [9].  
Traditionally, SCADA systems and corporate IT systems have focused on very 
different information assurance priorities. Whereas IT system priorities are 
confidentiality, authentication, integrity, availability, and non-repudiation, SCADA 
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systems emphasize reliability, real-time response, tolerance of emergency situations, 
personnel safety, product quality, and plant safety, usually to the exclusion of any 
security mechanism that might hinder these.   
Now, with the compatibility and overlap of the two networks, both SCADA and 
corporate IT will have to develop complementary security models.   Current issues such 
as dial-in modems connected to one system compromising the other, the possibility of 
unprotected, rogue corporate Internet connections rexposing the SCADA network, the 
real-time deterministic requirements of SCADA systems, and 24/7 operations require 
deconfliction of the disparate cultures of SCADA and IT [1].  A good example of this 
sort of problem is the routinely scheduled downtime for IT organizations to upgrade, 
patch vulnerabilities, perform backups, and so on [1].    Such downtime cannot be 
tolerated for most SCADA systems [1]. 
 Throughout this transition to a Utility Intranet, SCADA system networks must be 
well defended yet maintain the same level of service required by their customers [3].  
Blindly layering standard IT security mechanisms on top of SCADA networks will not 
work without accounting for their unique requirements and time constraints; therefore, it 
is important to first understand current and future SCADA architectures and operational 
philosophies. 
2.6 Substation Integration and Automation  
 The electrical power substation integration and automation system is the 
combination of equipment and communications infrastructure by which raw data 
measurements and system health status updates are processed and transmitted from 
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remote substation equipment to SCADA systems and historical databases for human 
interaction.  It is also the means by which commands or polls for information are 
communicated in the reverse direction.   
 Substation integration involves integrating protection, control, and data 
acquisition functions into a minimal number of platforms to reduce capital and operating 
costs, reduce panel and control room space, and eliminate redundant equipment and 
databases [7]. 
 Substation automation (SA) involves the deployment of substation and feeder 
operating functions and applications ranging from SCADA and alarm processing to 
integrated volt/Var control in order to optimize the management of capital assets and 
enhance operation and maintenance efficiencies with minimal human intervention [7]. 
 Substation integration and automation can be broken down into five levels. The 
lowest level is the power system equipment, such as transformers and circuit breakers. 
The middle three levels are Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) implementation, IED 
integration, and substation automation applications.  The focus today is on the integration 
of the IEDs. Once this is done, the focus will shift to what automation applications should 
run at the substation level [7].  
 The highest level of substation integration and automation is the utility enterprise.  
There are three primary functional data paths from the substation to the utility enterprise: 
 1. Operational data to the SCADA system 
 2. Non-operational data to the data warehouse   
 3. Remote access to the IED 
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2.7 Operational Data to the SCADA System   
2.7.1   SCADA System Components. 
 Historically substation field devices had no standardized way to present 
information to an operator.  They were distributed across a plant, making it difficult to 
gather data from all of them manually, therefore, the purpose of the SCADA system was 
to gather information from the field devices and other controllers, then present it to the 
human operator in easy to understand graphics.   
 The most common substation automation data path is conveying this operational 
data from the substation to the utility’s SCADA system every 2 to 4 s. Operational data 
(also called SCADA data) includes instantaneous values of power system analog and 
status points such as volts, amps, MW, MVAR, circuit breaker status, and switch 
position. This data is time critical for the utility’s dispatchers to monitor and control the 
power system (e.g., opening circuit breakers, changing tap settings, equipment failure 
indication, etc.).  The operational data path to the SCADA system uses the 
communication protocol presently supported by the SCADA system [7].  The SCADA 
system itself has the following four components:   
 1. Multiple field devices (i.e. power equipment, IEDs, RTUs, and PLCs) 
 2. Substation data concentrator  
 3. SCADA master station, HMI, and databases 
 4. Communications infrastructure   
 The first two components are within the substations themselves.  The third 
component interfaces to the company control center, engineering center, and corporate 
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offices.  The communications infrastructure is the interconnecting transport mechanism 
that ties the SCADA system together 
2.7.2   Traditional Field Devices. 
 The bulk of supervisory control and data acquisition is performed automatically at 
the substation level [2].  For years, Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and Remote 
Terminal Units (RTUs) carried the load. 
 The first PLCs used simple software to duplicate the functionality of a rack of 
interconnected relays [12].  In the last few years higher end models have been 
supplemented with analog inputs and outputs (I/O). The low end PLCs are not even 
addressable (i.e. they cannot be used as a slave to another device or as a component in a 
control system) [12].   
 PLCs scan their I/O by electrically reading each I/O point. In a system with lots of 
I/O points it can take some time to completely scan all the points.  PLCs can be used as 
stand-alone devices but they are difficult to configure, requiring ladder logic 
programming [12].  When a substation contains lots of I/O that must be monitored or 
controlled, PLCs are not the best choice, because they are not usable as the master 
controller in a control system, neither are they appropriate for use as protocol converters 
or for controlling other IEDs [12]. 
 RTUs are more sophisticated than PLCs and have the intelligence needed to 
control a process (or multiple processes) without intervention from a more intelligent 
controller or master [12].  RTUs offer interrupt driven digital inputs, time stamped 
sequence of events, data logging, intelligent communications, multitasking sequential 
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control, process identification control, alarm logging, modular construction, and easier 
programming than PLCs [12].  Additionally, an RTU can serve both as the master 
controller or a slave controller--in fact, it can be used as both a slave and master 
simultaneously in a “vertically deployed control system” [12]. An RTU can be used in 
conjunction with IEDs as a protocol converter or controller for the IEDs [12]. 
 Because of today’s advancements in microprocessor technology, a single IED is 
capable of performing numerous protection, control, auto-reclose, self-monitoring, and 
communication functions that used to require separate RTU and PLC devices [13].   
 2.7.3   Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) Implementation and Integration. 
 IEDs are a key component of substation integration and automation technology.  
An IED is any device that incorporates one or more processors with the capability to 
receive or send data/control from or to an external source (e.g., electronic multifunction 
meters, digital relays, controllers, and regulators).  Their primary function is to process 
the incoming analog signals, convert the values directly to a digital form, and forward the 
information via their communications link to a substation automation (SA) controller 
(also known as a data concentrator).  IED technologies help utilities improve reliability, 
gain operational efficiencies, and enable asset management programs including predictive 
maintenance, life extensions and improved planning. IEDs can also issue control 
commands, such as tripping circuit breakers to maintain a steady state if they sense 
anomalies or dangerous changes in voltage, current, or frequency.  Many IEDs are now 
capable of peer-to-peer communications for high-speed protection functions in which any 
node can initiate sessions and is able to poll or answer polls from other devices [7:7-6]. 
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 Nearly all electric utilities are implementing IEDs in their substations. New 
substations will typically have many IEDs for different functions, and the vast majority of 
operational data for the SCADA system will come from these IEDs, with a smaller 
amount of direct (i.e. hardwired) input acquired by PLCs.   
 Typically, there are no conventional RTUs in new substations. Instead, the RTU 
functionality is addressed with a mix of IEDs and PLCs using digital communications.  
Older substations, that still have a conventional RTU installed, can integrate the RTU 
with IEDs, integrate the RTU as just another IED, or retire the RTU altogether and use a 
combination of IEDs and PLCs as with new substations [7]. 
 IEDs being implemented in substations today contain valuable information, both 
operational and non-operational, needed by many user groups within the utility.  Each 
device has some internal memory to store data such as analog values, status changes, 
sequence of events, and power quality, usually in a first-in, first-out (FIFO) queue, and is 
integrated with digital two-way communications [7]. 
2.7.4 Substation Data Concentrator. 
 The data concentrator polls each IED or PLC for updates according to the utility’s 
SCADA data collection rates (e.g. status points every 2 sec, tie line and generator analogs 
every 2 sec, and remaining analog values every 2 to 10 sec).  Current systems must 
perform protocol translation, converting all of the IED protocols from the various IED 
suppliers.  Some experts believe that, “even with the protocol standardization efforts 




 The substation controller collates the data received from the IEDs, performs logic 
calculations, time synchronization, filtering, and pre-processing or reformatting of the 
substation data to meet presentation requirements of the master control station, operator 
workstation clients, or other intended data receivers [14].  The substation controller will 
usually have a PC-based substation host processor, or substation HMI, that supports an 
archival relational database, GUI, and Windows® Office-like applications.  It stores all 
analog and status information available for the substation that is required for both 
operational and non-operational purposes (e.g. fault-event logs, oscillography, etc.).  
 The substation host processor and substation controller are optional--either, none, 
or both may be present [14].  A substation controller may be PC-based (in which case the 
substation controller itself would be the host processor).  It could also be a PLC, data 
concentrator, or hybrid combination of any of these options [14].   
 In a truly flat architecture, where substation-level data collation and re-formatting 
functions are not required, the IEDs may communicate directly with the remote SCADA 
operator clients.  The remote clients can then conduct the same data selection tasks by 
polling, requesting, or browsing only the specific data required from a particular IED 
[14]. 
 Small, secondary substations may have only a data concentrator with no host 
processor for user interface or historical data collection.  In this case, IED data is sent to a 
larger primary substation, which has a complete substation integration and automation 
system, to combine the information and interface with the SCADA system. 
 It is expected that future technological improvements in substation devices will 
continue to increase the decentralized gathering/processing of data and alarm 
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handling/filtering at the field device (rather than the master control station), direct IED 
communications with multiple master stations and databases (reducing the need for data 
concentrators), and peer-to-peer status sensing/reaction by neighboring field devices. 
 2.7.5 SCADA Master Control Station and Human Machine Interface. 
 The data concentrator forwards all data required for operational purposes to the 
SCADA system.  The operational data is then compiled and formatted in such a way that 
a control room operator can make appropriate supervisory decisions that may be required 
to adjust or over-ride normal PLC or IED controls.  
 A Human-Machine Interface (HMI) computer presents the process data to a 
human operator and is the standardized means through which the human operator 
monitors, controls, and interacts with the industrial process and its multiple remote 
substation field devices.   A typical SCADA operator screen shot is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Example SCADA HMI Control Screen [15] 
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 A master control station (or simply master station) is compromised of the 
supervisory servers and software responsible for communicating with the field devices in 
substations and then to the HMI software running on client workstations in the control 
center.  In smaller SCADA systems, the master control station can be composed of a 
single PC.  In larger SCADA systems, the master control station may include multiple 
servers, distributed software applications, and geographically separated disaster recovery 
sites.  Today, most major operating systems (e.g. Windows®, Linux®, Solaris®, UNIX®, 
etc.) are used for both master control station servers and HMI workstations [2]. 
 SCADA host control functions are almost always restricted to basic site over-ride 
or supervisory-level capability.  For example, an IED may govern the generation rate of a 
generator in a power plant, but the SCADA system may allow an operator to change the 
control set point for the current and effective load on the generator, and will allow any 
alarm conditions such as extreme frequency or voltage fluctuations to be recorded and 
displayed. While the feedback control loop is closed through the IED, the SCADA 
system monitors the overall performance of that loop. 
 Use of newer IEDs and intelligent PLCs, capable of autonomously executing 
simple logic processes, is increasing [2].   Instead of relying on operator intervention, or 
master control station automation, IEDs may now be required to operate almost entirely 
on their own to react to emergencies and perform safety-related tasks [2].   
 2.7.6 SCADA Databases. 
 SCADA systems typically implement a distributed operational database, 
commonly referred to as a tag database, which contains data elements called tags (or 
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points) [2]. A point represents a single input or output value monitored or controlled by 
the SCADA system [2].  Point values are normally stored as value-timestamp 
combinations (i.e. the value and the timestamp when the value was recorded or 
calculated) [2]. A series of value-timestamp combinations is the history of that point [2]. 
It's also common to store additional metadata with tags such as path-to-field-device and 
register, design time comments, and alarm information [2].  Data may also be correlated 
by a Historian, often built on a COTS database management system, to allow historical 
trending and other analytical work [2]. 
 2.7.7 Communications Infrastructure and Transmission Media. 
 A system to meet hard real-time or near real-time detection, decision, and reaction 
times is strongly dependent on a robust, reliable communications architecture. The 
internal substation integration and automation infrastructure and the connections between 
utility organizations will become increasingly critical data highways for situational 
awareness and response, requiring attention to security, reliability, and, most of all, low 
latency.  Specific intra-company design criteria include high bandwidth, low bit error 
rate, multi-point access, and some degree of redundancy [16].   
Electrical utilities have employed a wide range of transmission means to meet 
short and long-range communication needs, driven more by cost-efficiency than security.  
SCADA systems traditionally relied upon radio or direct serial and modem connections 
for communications with substations.   Now there is a growing trend in the use of spread-
spectrum satellite and inherently non-secure wireless technologies such as Wi-Fi/Wi-
MAX, General Packet Radio Service, Enhanced Data rates for Global Evolution, CDMA 
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Data Service, and home-grown 900MHz radio solutions.  Power line carrier, microwave, 
and fiber optics systems are the most popular technologies for wide area protection [16].  
Optical fiber is an ideal solution for Utility Intranet communications. Thousands 
of miles of optical fiber have already been installed as part of the power line facilities 
[16].  Since optical fiber is immune to electromagnetic and radio frequency interference 
and crosstalk present in power plants, substations, and powerline transmission paths, 
fiber-based LANs reduce error rates from a few errors per minute (with copper) to only a 
few errors per month, even at data rates above one gigabit per second (Gbps) [17].  
Optical fiber's low attenuation and high bandwidth also provide the ability to transmit 
signals over long distances.   
Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) systems present a new alternative for 
optical fiber network connectivity with much greater advantages in cost, flexibility, and 
scalability.  Since light waves of different lengths do not interfere with one another, 
multiple wavelength signals can be transmitted through the same optical fiber without 
error [17]. By allowing multiple high-speed communications applications to share the 
same fiber simultaneously, WDM opens the door to optical fiber's tremendous bandwidth 
capability allowing transmission and propagation speeds of more than one Terabit per 
second [17].   WDM systems create completely independent, fully transparent paths over 
each fiber[17]. This allows the combination of multiple application protocols over the 
same fiber without any issues of latency, speed, proprietorship, or software setup [17].  A 
multi-channel WDM link behaves as multiple virtual fiber pairs, letting utilities mix and 
reconfigure protocols as needed [17].    
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2.8 Non-Operational Data to the Corporate Data Warehouse 
 The most challenging data path is conveying the non-operational data to the 
utility’s data warehouse.  The non-operational data path to the data warehouse conveys 
the IED non-operational data from the substation automation system to the data 
warehouse, either being pulled by a data warehouse application from the SA system or 
being pushed from the SA system to the data warehouse based on an event trigger or 
time. Non-operational data consists of files and waveforms such as event summaries, 
oscillographic event reports, or sequential events records, in addition to SCADA-like 
points (e.g., status and analog points) that have a logical state or a numerical value. This 
non-operational data is not needed by the SCADA dispatchers to monitor and control the 
power system [7]. 
 The trend in IP-capable utility operations is for the data concentrator to send both 
operational and non-operational data through a firewall, separating the operational and 
corporate LANS, to the corporate Intranet, to be maintained in a corporate data 
warehouse for common, client-server or mainframe access by various company user 
groups such as operations, planning, engineering, SCADA, protection, distribution 
automation, metering, substation maintenance, and IT personnel.  This setup provides 
multi-user simultaneous access, throughout the organization, for up-to-date information. 
2.9 Remote IED Access 
The remote access path to the substation traditionally uses either a dial-in 
telephone connection or a network connection.  There are interfaces to substation IEDs to 
acquire data, determine the operating status of each IED, support all communication 
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protocols used by the IEDs, and support standard protocols being developed. There may 
be an interface to the Energy Management System (EMS) that allows system operators to 
monitor and control each substation and the EMS to receive data from the substation 
integration and automation system at different periodicities. There may be an interface to 
the Distribution Management System (DMS) with the same capabilities as the EMS 
interface [7]. 
2.10 Time Constraints 
 Timeliness of message delivery is critical to the electrical grid.   Traditional short 
circuit protection systems measure local signals and respond in 4-40ms to disturbances in 
the local area. For the purposes of this paper, 4ms is considered as a benchmark for 
worst-case response time requirements in local protection. 
Wide Area Protection and Control (WAPaC) systems gather information from 
multiple locations on the system and issue wide area controls as necessary to respond to 
disturbances in a somewhat longer time frame.  Depending upon the distance from the 
origin of the disturbance and type of disturbance, there may be a time lag on the order of 
seconds before the disturbance reaches systems that are hundreds of miles away.  If high-
speed communication channels are available for signaling, it would be possible to get an 
early warning of an impending disturbance in time to set some supervisory control 
strategies in place.  Today’s wide area communication topologies, are capable of 
delivering messages from one area of a power system to multiple nodes on the system in 
as little as 6 ms. Assuming a decision calculation time of 50 ms, a disturbance on a 
system could be detected and a corrective response delivered in less than 200 ms [16].  
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Even assuming as much as 200 milliseconds delay in transmission and processing, 
enough early warning would be available in most cases so that supervisory control of 
critical functions could be implemented. If, in addition, the nature of the disturbance was 
known, each key control and protection system could be switched to a defensive posture 
appropriate for the particular problem [16].   Table 4 summarizes typical time constraint 
thresholds that must be met for SCADA and utility protection responses. 
 
Table 4.  Time Constraints for Electric Utility Operations 
Systems Situation Response Time 
Routine power equipment signal 
measurement 
Every 2-4ms 
< 4ms from event detection to sending  
notification [14] 




Local-area disturbance [6] 
 
4 - 40 ms automatic response time 
Transient voltage instability 
 
Often < 180 ms to convey 14+ trip signals to 
disconnect generators at the top generating  
station [16] 
Frequency instability, must 
respond faster than generator 
governors to trip generators 
instantaneously 
Could require < 300ms response time (by load 
shedding) for high rates of frequency decay; 
requires detection within 100ms to allow 
operator response in 150 to 300ms [16] 
Dynamic instability A few seconds 
Poorly damped or un-damped 
oscillations 
Several seconds 









Thermal overload Several minutes for severe overloads, rarely less 
than a few seconds for minor occurrences [16] 
Emergency event notification < 6 ms 
Routine transactions < 540 ms [3] 
SCADA 
Routine HMI status polling from 
substation field devices 





2.11 SCADA Protocols and Standards 
 2.11.1  Legacy Proprietary Protocols. 
SCADA protocols have always been designed to be very compact and efficient, 
however, RTUs and other automatic controller devices were being developed before the 
advent of industry-wide standards for interoperability.  As a result, manufacturers 
invented a multitude of SCADA and control system protocols.  Especially among the 
larger vendors, there was the incentive to create their own proprietary protocol to "lock 
in" their customer base.  It wasn’t until the late 1990’s that manufacturers began to shift 
toward more open communications like Modicon MODBUS over RS-485.  By 2000 most 
vendors offered completely open interfacing such as Modicon MODBUS over TCP/IP.  
 2.11.2 Transition to Open Protocols. 
 The development of Distributed Network Protocol (DNP) 3 was a comprehensive 
effort to achieve open, standards-based interoperability between substation computers, 
RTUs, IEDs, and master stations (except inter-master-station communications) for the 
electric utility industry.  It is still used within US utilities such as water companies and 
electricity suppliers for the exchange of data and control instructions between master 
control stations and substation controllers [1].     
In the early 1990s, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) decided that an 
effort was needed to define a more robust standard than DNP3 to serve the SCADA 




In 1999, UCA 2.0 migrated to International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 
Standard IEC 61850 for Substation Automation.  Both are networkable and object-
oriented, which makes it possible for a device to describe its attributes when asked [18].  
This capability allows self-discovery and pick-list configuration of SCADA systems [18].  
IEC 61850 is part of the Common Information Model (CIM) developed by IEC Technical 
Committee (TC) 57 that also includes the utility communications standards listed in 
Table 5 and visually depicted in Figure 2 [1].  
 
Table 5.  Sample of Standards Comprising the Common Information Model  
IEC Standard Title 
IEC 61970 Power Systems and Programming Interfaces for Integrating Utility 
Applications 
IEC 61968 Distribution Equipment and Processes 
IEC 61334 Distribution Automation Using Distribution Line Carrier Systems 
IEC 60870-5 Distribution 
IEC 60870-5-103 Telecontrol Equipment and Systems: Transmission Protocols - Companion 
Standard for the Informative Interface of Protection Equipment 
IEC 60870-6 Transmission 
IEC 60870-6-101/104 Telecontrol Protocols Compatible with ISO and ITU-T Recommendations 
IEC 60870-6-TASE.2 Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol (ICCP) 
IEC 61850 Communication Networks and Systems in Substations 




    
Figure 2.  TC57 Standards Used in Substation and Control Center Communications [19] 
2.11.3 IEC 61850, Communication Networks and Systems in Substations. 
The IEC 61850 standard defines common data formats and communication 
methodologies to allow devices to communicate across IP-based networks [9].  IEC 
61850 is a layered architecture that separates the functionality required for electric utility 
applications from the lower-level networking tasks [1].   
IEC 61850 defines a total of 13 different Logical Groupings of data that could 





Figure 3.  IEC 61850 Logical Node Groups and Group Designators [14] 
 
 
Each of the Logical Groups are further subdivided into Logical Nodes (86 total), 
each composed of data that represent some application-specific meaning and intended to 








Logical Nodes are comprised of Data Classes (355 total), which are divided 
among seven categories as detailed in Figure 5 [14]. 
 
 
Figure 5.  IEC 61850 Data Class Categories [14] 
 
The container is the Physical Device (network address), and contains one or more 
Logical Devices.  Each Logical Device contains one or more Logical Nodes.  Each 
Logical Node then contains a pre-defined set of Data Classes, each of which contains 
data [14].  Figure 6, depicts the multiple functions supported by IED-1. 
 
 




Because IEC 61850 supports self-description, an operator can see what data a 
device has by communicating with it and browsing its contents. Control center personnel, 
via the HMI, browse the devices directly and subscribe to the data they require – there is 
no need for an intermediate cross-reference of data.  Figure 7 depicts the ability to drill 
down through folders on the IED for data values. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Example of Browsing IED-1 for Data [14] 
 
 2.11.4 GOOSE and GSSE. 
 Generic Object Orientated System-wide (Substation in some literature) Events 
(GOOSE) and Generic Sub-Station Event (GSSE) define a high-speed, Ethernet-based, 
object-model protocol to be used for high-speed multi-device communications between 
protection devices. The GOOSE and GSSE services are used for fast multicast 
communication between a publisher and one or more subscribers.  The abstract services 
are used for such operations such as protection event notification.  Upon detecting an 
event, the IED(s) use a multi-cast transmission to notify those devices that have 
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registered to receive the data [6].  Collisions are quite possible in an Ethernet network in 
this scenario, so the GOOSE messages are re-transmitted multiple times by each IED 
[14].  “IEC 61850 supports both client-server and peer-to-peer communications. “It is the 
peer-to-peer communications ability that is used to exchange GOOSE messages between 
IEDs” [14].  GOOSE requires peer-to-peer communications between relays, quite 
possibly from different vendors. Configuring the requisite publisher/subscriber model 
could be a very daunting task, especially when each vendor will have their own 
proprietary configuration program [14].  Because of this, IED vendors are required to 
provide a descriptor file for their IEDs in Extensible Markup Language (XML) format.  
The eventual goal is for the devices to transmit their configuration in XML upon request. 
The use of XML and the substation configuration language defined by IEC 61850 will 
provide visibility into the data available from any vendor [14]. 
  There is still great room for improvement.  IED suppliers acknowledge that their 
expertise is in the IED itself – not in two-way communications capability, the 
communications protocol, or added IED functionality from a remote user. Though the 
industry has made some effort to add communications capability to the IEDs, each IED 
supplier has been concerned that any increased functionality would compromise 
performance and drive the IED cost so high that no utility would buy it. Therefore, the 
industry has vowed make  competitive cost and high performance as priorities over 
network security enhancements as standardization is incorporated into the IED [18]. 
 Figure 8 illustrates GOOSE, GSSE and other substation-level communications 




Figure 8.  Ethernet as the Foundation for All Future Substation Communications [19] 
 2.11.5 Problems with TCP/IP for Time-constrained Traffic.   
TCP as a transport protocol has several undesirable properties that make its 
deployment problematic in situations and applications that have time dependencies. 
TCP’s tightly integrated congestion control mechanism, designed to work well 
when transmitting large quantities of data, can interfere with time-critical transmissions. 
TCP slow-start and congestion control will induce instability during periods of peak 
message traffic, such as emergency situations, precisely when guaranteed delivery of 
urgent information is required [10]. Unless a nonstandard TCP implementation is selected 
or bandwidth guarantees are provided, standard TCP functionality will be intolerable for 
real-time traffic [10].  
 TCP is a primarily point-to-point protocol that is inefficient in many types of 
monitoring applications where the same message needs to be shared with multiple other 
nodes [10].   
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 The large overhead associated with TCP headers and the three packet handshake, 
required to establish a connection, creates significant delay.   The congestion in the 
network will increase by several magnitudes as the number of simultaneously 
communicating sensor nodes increases over time along with the resulting number of 
systems monitoring them.  If the network grows large enough, this could become a 
significant cost [10]. 
 TCP lacks any provision for priorities.  Messages are delivered in a strict first-in-
first-out (FIFO) order without exception.  A Utility Intranet will support many 
applications and message types, some having lower priority, and many shipping very 
large files. Because TCP lacks any notion of priority, low priority file transfers compete 
for the same resources as do high-priority, urgent notifications.  If several TCP 
connections are all transmitting relatively unimportant non-operational information 
across a section of the network and a new TCP connection is initiated with extremely 
important emergency information, the most important connection will only receive its 
“fair share” of the connection rather than the high priority that it deserves.   
 TCP’s behavior results in a network with very high utilization rates that are 
shared in what can loosely be described as a fair manner between TCP connections that 
are making use of it.  This high utilization makes it difficult to initiate a new TCP 
connection or to ramp up an existing connection if new time-critical information becomes 
available when network utilization is high.  The lengthy connection re-establishment and 
re-send times could result in time-critical data finally arriving stale to its intended 
destination.   
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 The greedy bandwidth consumption approach underlying TCP ensures that when 
this happens, routers will become overloaded, a common occurrence in the modern 
Internet, resulting in further incoming packets being dropped until space in the router’s 
incoming queue is cleared [10].  The back-off and slow-start that this priority connection 
will undergo attempting to establish a connection under congested conditions will also 
add significant delay [9]. 
   2.11.6 UDP/IP Research Approaches. 
Some messages forwarded within a Utility Intranet are not strictly real-time.  
Monitoring and assessing the impact of an evolving power shortage or some other slower 
contingency involves tracking data that escalates over periods measured in minutes. Still 
other forms of data such as power generation statistics and consumer usage data can 
change over hours or days [10]. 
In the case of non-real-time but still time-dependent communications, in the range 
of minutes, one solution is to investigate new or real-time protocols, middleware 
mechanisms, or a better use of existing transport protocols to seek to overcome these 
problems.  Hopkinson, et al., have proposed the use of what are termed epidemic 
communication schemes, built upon UDP, for coordinated,  wide-area SCADA protection 
using primary and backup wide-area agents [20].  Their assumption was that delays due 
to TCP/IP delivery guarantees and packet overhead would be intolerable.  With less 
overhead than the same message employing TCP headers, no connection establishment or 
teardown, and no slow start and congestion avoidance, UDP messaging alleviates much 
of the overall traffic congestion on the same network for non-real-time (i.e. one minute or 
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greater) updates [10].  The point-to-multipoint efficiency of UDP also lends itself to 
decentralized peer-to-peer communications [20].   
In the new protection system they propose, software agents would be embedded 
in each of the conventional protection components (i.e. an IED) to construct component 
information into informational messages or commands to trip breakers.  Each agent 
would proactively search for relevant information about known primary and remote 
faults, then relay misoperations (e.g. breaker failures) and fault responses by 
communicating peer-to-peer with any other available agents at the same substation or at 
remote substations or control centers. In all test cases, the agent sharing and group 
awareness approach allowed the same information to be learned much faster and more 
reliably than standalone alternatives.  Agent interactions could compensate for problems 
with better performance, even in the face of system malfunctions, increased traffic 
loading, and decreasing bandwidth, than in traditional TCP schemes or point-to-point 
legacy protocols [20]. 
In their simulations, three types of agents were envisioned and implemented: 
primary agents, backup agents, and load agents. Primary agents were responsible for the 
first zone protection, 100% of the transmission line, and backup agents for the third zone 
protection (i.e. the first zone plus all the transmission lines connected to the remote end 
of the first zone).  Load agents were only responsible for sending their current state, 
usually their current phasors, to the backup agents. An agent, at initialization, could either 
receive a list of the agents in its own protection zone with which it could communicate 




An IED, for example, could be loaded with software agents that perform control 
and/or protection functions.  Agents embedded within an IED perceive their environment 
through local sensors and act upon it through the IED's actuators.  Sensor inputs might 
include local measurements of the current, voltage, and breaker status. Actuator outputs 
might include breaker trip signals, adjusting transformer tap settings, and switching 
signals in capacitor banks.  Agents might even interface with systems such as SCADA 
master stations. 
Primary and backup agents followed a differential philosophy to detect a fault.  At 
every time-step, they read their local current phasors and sent this information to their 
agent counterparts. Once an agent received the phasors from its protection zone’s remote 
end, or ends, it calculated the differential current and decided whether a fault occurred or 
not.  After detecting a fault, the agents took action based on preset rules [20].   
One drawback to the software agent scheme proposed is that, while newer, 
processor-based IEDs might have sufficient embedded memory, disk, and computational 
capacity to be loaded with and effectively use these agents, most older systems have such 
limited resources that they could not.   
An interim solution to be used with slower legacy systems might be a separate 
low-cost, computer or other PC-based box attached at key points in the infrastructure to 
gather these inputs and perform calculations on behalf of the protection components 
themselves.  This box could then issue messages directly to other equivalent boxes that 
would translate them into simplistic, understandable instructions to protection 
components or directly to the protection components themselves that supported this 
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scheme.  The latency for computational analysis, message formulation, and transmission 
must then be figured into estimated response times.   
A similar software agent concept is central to the trust system security 
functionality proposed and evaluated in Chapters III and IV of this thesis. 
 2.11.7 TCP/IP Research Approaches. 
The greatest difficulty with applying common network protocols for SCADA 
communications is meeting the strict time constraints.  In SCADA systems, “the shortest 
deadlines are seen in relay control algorithms for equipment protection systems, which 
must react to events within fractions of a second.  For near real-time response (i.e. less 
than one second) delivery guarantees are attractive.  Since UDP does not provide this 
guarantee, TCP/IP alternatives can be investigated.   
A Virginia Tech research team has proposed a scheme that they have called PS-
TCP/IP because it is a fully TCP/IP-compatible power system communication network 
[21].  The PS-TCP/IP concept envisioned a utility TCP-IP network (separated either 
physically from the Internet, or possibly behind a NAT proxy and firewall for security) 
with IP addresses assigned to each power system device and an undefined but assumed 
method for management of traffic flows to lessen congestion.  The team made two 
fundamental assumptions.  First, they assumed that “only utility applications will be 
running on the PS-TCP/IP, so network traffic planning and congestion control can be 
well managed and the response time can be guaranteed” [21].  Second, they assumed that, 
“since it is a private network, the security issue can be well managed” [21].  The paper’s 
caveat is that “utility companies can build PS-TCP/IP together with their original 
Intranet; however, a "firewall" must be installed to ensure the security of utility 
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communications” [21].  In reality, the security situation may be more complex than that 
and must be evaluated organization by organization.  Many companies have begun to mix 
e-mail and office automation traffic on the same network, making it more difficult to 
identify malicious packets in a mix of thousands of web interactions and e-mails. 
For the purpose of this thesis, it was necessary to make similar assumptions and 
recommendations for the most ideal security posture necessary for basic analysis before 
progressing to a more complex state, namely bandwidth guarantees and a Utility Intranet 
primarily separate from the Internet.  In a similar manner, IP addresses were assigned to 
each system in the simulation network but did not follow the team’s recommended 
address assignment schema and were chosen as larger IPV6, versus IPV4, addresses. 
2.12 Current State of SCADA System Protection 
The old paradigm was to install a system, let it run unattended, and replace it in 
about five years or more.  For newer PC-based systems, utility companies have to wrestle 
to cope with more dynamic operating procedures and financial planning (i.e. install a 
system, patch it at least every week, perform backups and virus scans, upgrade or replace 
incremental capabilities each year, and train personnel on the changes) without impacting 
24/7 operations and quarterly profits [7]. 
On the positive side, the SCADA constituency is becoming increasingly aware of 
their systems’ vulnerabilities and is taking action through increased emphasis on 
information systems security peculiar to the needs of SCADA users.  In addition, 
standards organizations concerned with data acquisition and control are developing 
guidelines and standards for the security of SCADA systems.  National laboratories have 
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established SCADA test beds to evaluate the most effective security measures.  
Organizations such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) have 
initiated programs focusing on SCADA security [1].  The negative side is that these 
standards, guidelines, and security measures have not been universally applied to critical 
infrastructure applications because of lack of funds, management apathy, other issues 
perceived as higher priority, and lack of guidance in some sectors [1]. 
Conventional IT cyber security approaches generally focus on standalone 
products (i.e. firewalls, IDSs, router ACLs, etc.) that are associated with individual 
devices on a network.  This point-oriented security approach is vulnerable to attacks that 
circumvent the one particular security control.  In addition, other parts of the network 
might be unaware that an attack is occurring.  Security researchers have noted that what 
is needed is a coordinated security paradigm that takes advantage of the capabilities of 
devices such as routers and switches that are cognizant of network activities on a larger 
scale.  What is necessary is to develop an adaptive network and application-aware 
solutions that address security as a collaboration of defense mechanisms operating as a 
defense system to identify threats and respond accordingly [1].   
The future power grid will begin to support higher levels of integration and 
federated systems services [22].  The trust system concept was intended to support the 






Table 6.  Requirements for Current SCADA Systems 
Requirement Description 
Quality of Service 
(QoS) 
SCADA systems are deterministic.  QoS, precise interrupt timing, reliability, 
and low latency are more critical than throughput [6]. 
High Availability 
 
Real-time SCADA systems cannot afford delays that may be caused by 
information security software and that interfere with critical control decisions 
affecting personnel safety, product quality, and operating costs.   
Security 
 
Security in the utility community has a very unique meaning which is quite 
different to that used in IT networking.  NERC Form 715 defines [1] security 
as “a system’s capability to withstand system disturbances arising from faults 
and unscheduled removal of bulk power supply elements without further loss 
of facilities or cascading outages.”  If the NERC definitions of adequacy and 
security were modified to apply to SCADA systems in general, they might 
read as follows: Security: A system’s capability to withstand system 
disturbances arising from faults or unauthorized internal or external actions 
without further loss of facilities, compromise of human safety, and loss of 
production [1]. 
Legacy device interface Most plant components in existence today have minimal computing 
resources.  They do not usually have excess memory capacity that can 
accommodate relatively large programs associated with security monitoring 
activities [1]. 
Self-describing Available data is discoverable 
Automated Advancements in systems are requiring fewer operators and more automated 
SCADA control.  As the master station software is more and more capable of 




Table 7.  Goals for Future SCADA Systems [22] 
Goal Description 
Self-healing/adaptive Correct problems before they become emergencies 
Dynamic Interactive with consumers and markets 
Optimized Make the best use of resources and equipment 
Predictive rather than 
reactive 




Share resources across geographical and organizational boundaries 
Integrated Merge all critical information 







2.13 Specific Challenges to SCADA Security and Recommended Solutions 
 2.13.1  Per-User Authentication and Access Control. 
  2.13.1.1   SCADA Security Issues.  
 In the SCADA environment, a control operator might need to enter a password to 
gain access to a device in an emergency.  If the operator types in the password incorrectly 
a few times, a conventional IT security paradigm, which presumes an intruder trying to 
guess the password, will lock out the operator.  Locking out the operator is not a good 
thing in real-time control environments [7].   
 Many systems require no authentication at all.  When accounts do exist, username 
and password information is almost always sent in the clear in both human-to-machine 
and machine-to-machine applications [7].  In practice, SCADA systems or consoles tend 
to be configured with the same username and password or with standard defaults like 
console, administrator, or anonymous.   
 RTU test sets, used to issue commands to an RTU, are commonly available on the 
market.  The systems don’t authenticate and have little to no data validity checking. 
   2.13.1.2   Recommendations from Literature  
 For operators on local control devices, passwords might be eliminated or made 
extremely simple [1].  In situations where the passwords might be subject to interception 
when transmitted over networks, encryption should be considered to protect the password 
from compromise. 
 Access controls should be implemented for all SCADA systems.  Role-based 
access controls might be used at the supervisory level of SCADA operations [1]. 
 
51 
In addition, access might also be restricted based on two-factor authentication and digital 
certificates or challenge-response tokens [1].   Options include biometrics, smart card 
identification, and other authentication technologies. 
 Procedures should be implemented to monitor access controls for authorized 
access, un-authorized access, and unsuccessful un-authorized access attempts. 
   2.13.1.3   Objections and Questions from Utilities. 
 Currently, biometrics are not completely reliable. Depending on the characteristic 
being examined, there might be a high number of false rejections or false acceptances.  
There are also issues possible with throughput, human factors, or system compromises. 
 Given the real-time nature of SCADA operations, how would password policies 
be applied to prevent lockout in emergency situations?  In addition, how would rights be 
managed for each person that may need to perform multiple, changing roles?  
 It is costly to keep access control lists (ACLs) of who should connect to whom 
up-to-date as the network evolves over time.  It may not be practical to reconfigure all 
monitoring systems rapidly when a problem arises unless there are automated 
communications to push updates to each affected node in the network [10]. 
   2.13.1.4   Trust System Solutions. 
 The trust system interacts with an existing authentication mechanism such as a 
logon server to enforce multi-level, role-based access based on the success or failure of 
credentials provided by the one that is logging in.  For this thesis, the most restrictive 
policy was assumed and is suggested, requiring initial logon of every new user as well as 
every system that is coming back online.  By tracking the time, conditions, and status of 
all logons and monitoring, correlating, and even blocking suspicious logon activity 
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(tracked by username, IP address, credentials, and distance), the trust system provides 
comprehensive logon state and security situational awareness. 
 The trust system also relaxes standards in situations where it has a greater level 
of trust that the user (or system) is who they say they are, based on the quantity and 
reliability of the credentials provided to logon and the source of the logon.  It differs from 
most IT security schemas by providing more chances to a user who, after one or two tries, 
is highly close to being correct, but appears to have simply forgotten or mistyped a few 
characters of their password.  It also simplifies access in emergency situations by 
assuming that any logon is a priority, to speed this process, and by implementing a one-
time network logon which is good for any system or data in the local network enclave to 
which the individual is entitled, based on their assigned role, instead of separate logons 
for different systems or higher-level roles when the user is still at the same computer.  
The pre-defined user role and the access level, calculated from the credentials provided, 
are used to allow and disallow access to systems, folders, files, and data elements for 
each user.  In the event of lost, misplaced or forgotten credentials, the trust system can 
allow an elevation request from the user to another user with the same logged-on access 
level desired by the requestor.   In this way, assuming proper (preferably visual) 
verification occurs, they can be approved temporary access at the higher access level 
required to perform their job.  This might be the case if, for instance, they accidentally 
left their smart card at home or experience biometric read errors and cannot otherwise 
gain root (or other level) access with only a username and password.   Use of this feature, 
of course, should be the exception and not the norm. 
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 The trust system can perform data and validity checking on incoming commands 
and messages on behalf of field equipment (i.e. from an RTU, PLC, or IED test set or 
admin laptop); however, access control at the SCADA field equipment, first, and then 
authentication at the network logon server (i.e. a network-level logon) is preferred before 
any further communication is allowed with the SCADA node.  This can be facilitated by 
the trust system.  Authentication by any device connected to the IED requires an IP port 
on the SCADA field device for connection and an IP-enabled test set or laptop 
(preferably using encryption) capable of supplying authentication credentials. 
 Distribution of trust agents throughout the network allows a much more 
decentralized and efficient implementation of this authentication scheme and all other 
trust system functions. 
 2.13.2   Prevention of Data Interception or Alteration.   
   2.13.2.1   SCADA Security Issues. 
 
 Traditional RTUs, PLCs, and IEDs are designed for efficiency to prioritize task 
execution using microprocessors with limited memory and computational capacity, 
stringent real-time constraints, low bandwidth links, and minimal attention to security 
policies [18].  They typically send information without transmission security and many 
use wireless connections  susceptible to interception [1].   
 Packet-based SCADA protocols usually provide message integrity checking at the 
data link layer to find errors caused by electrical noise and other transmission errors [18].  
Since these checks do not include encryption technology, to protect against malicious 
interference with data flow, and their algorithms are well-documented and publicly 
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available, they only provide protection against inadvertent packet corruption caused by 
hardware or data channel failures [18].    
   2.13.2.2   Recommendations from Literature. 
  Digital certificates and cryptographic keys should be used and managed for 
encryption and digital signatures relating to SCADA system elements [1]. 
 Transmission errors are best detected and handled close to the source or physical 
medium (i.e. at the data link layer) while protection from network content alteration is 
best achieved as close to the application layer as possible (i.e. the network layer or above) 
[18].    
 When packets are routed through a corporate LAN or Utility Intranet, message IP 
addresses must be visible for each router and switch along the way to read and select the 
appropriate path to route it to its destination.  Traditional security solutions implemented 
at the network layer or above are usually proprietary VPN schemes or standards-based 
(e.g. IPsec) protection schemes” [18].  For these public-key cryptosystems, key 
management, including certification that the public key actually belongs to the person 
named, is an important issue that has to be handled by the organization.  More 
importantly, they can require relatively long processing times that may be incompatible 
with the real-time requirements of SCADA control systems [1].   
 As a result, symmetric-key cryptosystems, which can perform much faster, may 
be more suitable for use in the SCADA environment, however, key management 
becomes much more difficult.  Although, symmetric-key cryptography has not yet been 
widely applied to SCADA systems, it is applicable to data transmitted over a long-
distance SCADA network and could be added to protect its most critical portions [1].   
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   2.13.2.3  Objections and Questions from Utilities. 
 Older systems can’t support the computational burden of block encryption [18].  
 Encryption, configuration control, and other strong security measures usually 
reduce the ease of management of SCADA systems.  Complexity is the bane of efficient 
SCADA operations.    
 IP already adds nearly 30% more overhead to SCADA communications, 
encryption will add too much latency.   
 The TCP security model, SSL, permits a client of a server to authenticate a server 
and then encrypt sensitive data such as a credit card number, but that capability does not 
account for the varying levels of trust and other issues that arise between mutually 
suspicious operators [10]. 
 2.13.2.4   Trust System Solutions. 
 Research for this thesis, indicates that IPsec public key encryption can be used in 
some cases for non-real-time communications and has the potential, with faster 
processing, to reduce latency to the point where it could be applied to real-time 
communications.   
 For legacy systems and applications that do not, or cannot, provide encryption at 
the IP-level or above, the trust system in gateway-configuration, with IPsec tunnel 
mode, can act as an encryption gateway.  This can occur by encrypting the unencrypted 
incoming packets, adding an IP header with destination address of the next trust system 
along the way to the destination, and forwarding it.  When the packet is received by the 
trust system closest to the destination, it strips the address, decrypts the packet revealing 
the destination address, and forwards it, unencrypted, to the destination.   
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 For systems that can be loaded with software trust system agents, the agent 
middleware can interact to package the data with IPsec encryption at the host before it is 
passed on to the physical/data link layer for transmission. 
 IPsec delay is highly processor-dependent.  Until technological improvements are 
made in the SCADA hardware installed in utility networks to allow fast enough 
processing and less queuing delay, stand-alone symmetric key hardware can be added to 
the network to encrypt packets after they leave the source, switch, and possibly the first 
router, at the physical layer, and decrypt the packet before passing it to the destination 
router, switch, and recipient. In that case, the basic IP-to-IP firewall rules checks of the 
trust system could still be performed on a packet in transit and fixed-length message-
types could be deduced.  However, unless the trust system itself were implementing the 
symmetric key encryption, the trust system’s format module and some access control 
matrix checks would be negated because it could not see the encrypted data inside the 
packets, including the message type.  Once the data was decrypted, though, full trust 
system checks could be performed at the host level, catching at delivery instead of 
stopping malicious activity closer to the source. 
 2.13.3   System Hardening. 
   2.13.3.1   SCADA Security Issues. 
 Once SCADA systems are installed in an operational production network, they 
are rarely, if ever, patched.  SCADA system device banners are rarely disabled, giving 
out device and software names, versions, and manufacturers (important sources for 
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manuals of technical and operational information that could be used to attack and 
compromise them). 
   2.13.3.2   Recommendations from Literature. 
 Unused physical ports, banners, and network services should be disabled and patches 
should be kept up to date [23].  Operating system and application patches should be 
applied as they are made available, always testing for negative impacts on system 
functionality first [23]. 
   2.13.3.3   Objections and Questions from Utilities. 
 The Microsoft Service Pack 2 fix for the Blaster worm turned off anonymous 
logons by default for the DCOM service, requiring authentication.  The OPC standard for 
data transfer runs without authentication.  Blindly implementing SP2 would have broken 
SCADA systems running OPC that was not designed for logons [7].  This illustrates the 
complexity of transitioning to COTS products where one-size-fits-all vendor patches may 
not always work for unique, partially legacy-based, and time-critical control 
configurations. 
   2.13.3.4   Trust System Solutions. 
 While it is assumed that unused ports are disabled by default by SCADA 
administrators, to supplement interface-level defenses, the trust system software agent 
on a system, acting as middleware between the transport and physical/data-link layers, 
can perform interface-level access control via its ACM for useable ports that are 
configured ON (or OFF) yet for which connection and access should be restricted only to 
specific IP addresses and authorized user/role combinations. 
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 A developmental testbed must be established (either within each company or at 
area or regional level for economy) to duplicate utility systems down to the company 
substation level for the purposes of testing COTS patches, software, and upgrades prior to 
deploying them to the production network.  This could also be a role for the NSTB in 
conjunction with a regional or national utility control center. 
 Most utilities employ redundant servers for reliability.  After testing and approval 
have occurred on developmental duplicates of operational configurations, patches should 
be loaded onto an offline production system within the company that will be employing 
the patch and functionality verified prior to rotating the offline system back into 
operation.  This procedure can also be used to regularly exercise the company’s backup 
systems and restoral procedures or to run antivirus scans. 
 Oversight and accountability for testing, approval, assigning suspense dates, and 
tracking compliance for patches must be established at regional and national levels to 
ensure continuity of security posture across the entire Utility Intranet. 
 Throughout changes from primary to backup, the trust system must have all 
systems configured in its ACM.  Trust system ACMs require each network node to log 
on and off of the network as they connect, shutdown, or are disconnected.  The trust 
systems then update one another as they learn that one system has gone offline and 





 2.13.4   Secure Software Engineering.   
   2.13.4.1   SCADA Security Issues. 
 Security is often an afterthought or not even considered in SCADA operating 
system design and implementation, hence secure coding practices are not required.  They 
usually have no input validation, non-secure programming syntax and commands, and are 
vulnerable to buffer overflow, memory dump, etc.   
 Manufacturers haven’t been forced to improve SCADA security and there is little 
incentive for vendors or developers to do so on their own [18].  Telecommunications 
equipment and services sold to utilities is “big business, averaging 3.5 million dollars 
annually and rising, according to UTC Research” [22].  It’s hard for manufacturers to 
financially justify investing extra manpower and dollars to develop, implement, and 
maintain additional security features and practices that don’t make them any more 
competitive or increase profits over their peers who don’t.    
   2.13.4.2   Recommendations from Literature. 
 Development of an open, yet secure real-time operating system is encouraged, 
along with a review of existing SCADA protocols and IEC standards for security. 
 Federal and state governments should provide sufficient incentives to encourage 
private sector investment and development in SCADA security. 
   2.13.4.3   Potential Solutions. 
 Requirements documents for new systems, protocols, standards, and software 
should explicitly state security capabilities required and secure coding practices expected 
to prevent such avoidable security mistakes prior to new software development and 
marketing.   
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 The trust system can only question or stop potentially malicious commands and 
input in packets created by deployed code or intended to exploit known vulnerabilities in 
deployed code.  Any source code purchased or downloaded for utility systems should be 
scanned for examples of non-secure code and associated vulnerabilities in order to 
determine specific signatures for the trust system or other intrusion detection systems to 
look for.  This is not easy and there are few, if any, automated tools for this purpose, 
however, it is reasonable to assume that such a tool could be developed to search for 
instances of potentially bad practices to narrow the examination in source code.  
Economy would be achieved by performing this function once per application at a 
national or regional level, even after deployment, and going back to vendors to re-code 
specific sections more securely.    
 An advocate on behalf of utility companies could be established at the national 
interconnect level to perform vulnerability scans, penetration tests, and code reviews in 
conjunction with fly-off tests of vendor solutions.  The same entity should also 
consolidate community requirements and hold vendors accountable for developing 
solutions that meet not only time, safety, and reliability, but security specifications as 
well, in their designs. 
  2.13.5   Non-secure, Backdoor Connections.  
   2.13.5.1   SCADA Security Issues. 
 SCADA administrators and industrial automation analysts are often deceived into 
thinking that because their industrial networks are on separate systems from the corporate 
network, which is often connected to the Internet, they are safe from outside attacks.   
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 Security is most easily compromised at the SCADA host (master station and 
HMI) or control room level.  If the SCADA computers are logging data out to some 
back-office data repository like SQL server, Oracle, or PI Historian, then the SCADA 
computers must be on the same network as they are or have a path to access them.  This 
means there is a path to the SCADA systems and eventually to the remote substation field 
equipment through the corporate network.  Often these connections are left open 24x7 to 
allow full-time logging, which provides an always available path through the network for 
someone to attack [8]. 
 A data concentrator or substation host processor at a substation mediates all 
communications to and from IEDs by forwarding the message to the appropriate IED and 
routing the response back to the original caller.  
 Modems are commonly imbedded in substation end device equipment such as 
IEDs, PLCs, and RTUs to allow vendors to poll them over dial-in phone lines to support 
the product or as an easy way to retrieve non-real-time data from them.  These modems 
will often have default usernames and passwords that aren’t changed or backdoor 
usernames and passwords that can’t be easily changed by the customer. Some will accept 
calls from any source that knows their number. 
 Though there is no access control, monitoring, or authentication employed on 
these connections by the utilities themselves, company employees often have a false 
sense of security because they assume these end devices are protected by the non-
corporate vendor network connections [1].   
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 Unsecured remote desktop applications like X-Terminal,  PC Anywhere, and 
Exceed are frequently used for remote visibility and administration within utilities and 
over the Internet from home or vendor offices [18].   
 Many IEDs are IP-enabled with much of the data to and from them traversing 
non-secure wireless networks [18].   
   2.13.5.2   Recommendations from Literature. 
 It is best to not to allow any communications to the substation from outside the 
secure utility network [18].     
 For existing dial-up lines either require strong user authentication, encrypt 
communications, or eliminate them altogether [18].  Dial-back modems should, at a 
minimum, implement separate lines for incoming and outgoing call back.  This helps 
protect the integrity of the phone switch [18]. 
 Eliminate all connections to the Internet from the SCADA network.  Do not 
enable Web-mail for remote e-mail access.  Instead, maintain accounts and servers for 
outside communications on a physically separate office LAN that does not connect to the 
SCADA network.  Also, implement a secure VPN solution for any remote desktop access 
from either network.    
 For corporate connections to the SCADA network, consider web-based thin client 
solutions that enable plant, management, production, and maintenance personnel to view 
read-only, real-time process graphics from a remote location [11].  A user can use a 
standard web browser and Utility Intranet connection to see animated displays of 
manufacturing activity, thus allowing a more informed decision-making process [11].  At 
the same time, thin clients can protect data by not allowing users to change values.   
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The US military has gone to great efforts to ensure that its classified networks are 
in no way connected to the Internet or to its unclassified systems.  Classified digital 
information is encrypted to the highest level in-transit and hard drives are locked in safes 
with two-person integrity checks on the lock when not in use or attended.  Buildings 
where classified information is processed implement strict physical access control and 
require positive identification and need to know for entrance.    They also use metal 
sheets or mesh in the walls and are designed without windows to prevent unencrypted 
electromagnetic emanations from computer workstations and screens from being 
detectable or visible from outside the building. Operational security is strictly enforced 
and trained at least annually so employees recognize sensitive information and even sets 
of data that, by themselves are unclassified, but when linked together, can give 
indications of classified operations or intentions.   
Though it is not necessary to employ the exact same measures as for national 
security secrets, critical infrastructures must be seriously evaluated and approached with 
the same well-planned, deliberate, security-conscious mindset.   
   2.13.5.3   Trust System Solutions. 
 One main function of the trust system is to implement a firewall.   Whether 
loaded onto its own server (as a hardware firewall) or as a software agent running on a 
SCADA node (as a software firewall) the trust system filters out unauthorized packets, 
adding security to any incoming connections to which it is attached based on a whitelist 
of known to-be-authorized traffic by source and destination addresses, port, protocol, and 
message type.  This is in contrast to more typical and more error-prone blacklist rules, 
which attempt to account for every type of traffic that would not be authorized.  
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 This is easier to do with a controlled network where only a finite number of 
message types, protocols, and source-destination IP address pairs is possible.  Accurately 
defining authorized traffic for web searches, e-mail, and other unpredictable common 
office exchanges that occur with numerous Internet servers, clients, and applications is 
nearly impossible as most Internet-connected business networks can attest from seeing 
their share of viruses, compromises, and zero-day exploits.   
 Keeping e-mails and coordination between utility organizations on a separate 
network may be more of a hassle (potentially two separate client computers—one 
connected to the SCADA Utility Intranet and the other to the Internet for WWW 
searches, coordination with vendors, etc.) but is the most secure configuration for the 
operational network. On a Utility Intranet, separate from the Internet, a global address list 
and DNS servers can be maintained within areas and regions to feed legitimate e-mail 
addresses and IP lookup information for utility-specific clients and e-mail servers.  
Unless this separate Utility Intranet is compromised by an insider (maliciously or through 
infected disks or thumb drives) the only outside avenue of attack would be through a 
rogue connection to the Internet, a wireless access point, or dial-in through the telephone 
network.    
  2.13.6   Systems In Need of Maintenance. 
   2.13.6.1   SCADA Security Challenges. 
 Many critical infrastructure systems have a history of deferred maintenance that 




   2.13.6.2   Trust System Solutions. 
 Implementing trust systems in gateway configuration such that they only interact 
with each other, or with nodes that can support trust system agents, adds security to a 
network that is seamless to any nodes that cannot yet be loaded with a trust system agent 
themselves.  
 2.13.7   Timely Detection and Elimination of Malicious Code. 
   2.13.7.1   SCADA Security Challenges. 
 SCADA systems do not use antivirus software.     
   2.13.7.2   Recommendations from Literature. 
 Antivirus software should be implemented wherever possible [24], [25]. 
   2.13.7.3  Objections and Questions from Utilities. 
 The computational overhead associated with running antivirus software, updating 
virus signature databases, and quarantining or deleting malicious code require computing 
cycles that might seriously affect the real-time performance of SCADA system 
components.  Automatically updating virus databases from Internet antivirus sites 
exposes SCADA systems to more viruses and attacks. 
   2.13.7.4   Trust System Solutions. 
 As a rule of thumb in SCADA systems, scans (antivirus or otherwise) should be 
conducted on systems rotated temporarily offline and only returned to service when 
discovered discrepancies are remediated, for minimal impact to operations.  Regularly 
rotating a system offline (replaced by its backup) for scans is also a way to exercise 
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backup contingency plans ensuring hot spares will always be functional in an emergency 
situation. 
 The trust system can be loaded with or call antivirus software to run virus scans 
on e-mails and their attachments traversing the company’s piece of the Utility Intranet. 
 Antivirus updates can be downloaded to media manually from the Internet on a 
separate network.  After scanning the media, it can be hand carried for loading onto the 
Utility Intranet and distribution.  Another solution might be to work with antivirus 
vendors to mail or ship disks regularly with the latest updates.  It is also important to fully 
test any update on developmental (or test) SCADA systems before loading onto the 
utility production network, to ensure patches and antivirus detection/cleanup actions will 
not accidentally break SCADA applications. 
  2.13.8   Resource Exhaustion Attacks. 
   2.13.8.1   SCADA Security Issues. 
 A denial-of-service (DoS) attack is an attempt to either temporarily or indefinitely 
disable a network system or resource or simply it make it unavailable to legitimate users.    
 Methods of attack can include flooding a link to prevent legitimate network traffic, 
preventing a particular individual from accessing a service, or disrupting service to a 
specific system or person.  A DoS attack is the greatest problem during times of peak 
loading like an emergency[18].   
 A DoS can disrupt a server by sending more requests than it can handle, thereby 
preventing access to a service; consume computational resources, such as bandwidth, 
disk space, or CPU time; disrupt configuration information, such as routing information; 
or disrupt physical network components.,               
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.  A DoS attack may include execution of malware intended to max out the CPU's 
usage, trigger errors in the microcode of the machine, trigger errors in the sequencing of 
instructions, to force the computer into an unstable state or lock-up, exploit errors in the 
operating system to cause resource starvation and/or thrashing, or crash the operating 
system itself.  
   2.13.8.2   Recommendations from Literature. 
  First, there are fewer avenues of attack from the outside on networks that are 
physically isolated from the Internet [18].  Perimeter defenses with appropriately 
configured alternate routes can provide some defense (i.e. relief) in the face of DoS 
attacks, presuming that the alternate links do not become saturated [3].  
  “Defense on telephone system requires managing QoS by giving preferential dial 
tone to critical users while denying peak-load service to ordinary users” [18]. 
 Filtering is often ineffective, as the route to the filter will normally be swamped 
so only a trickle of traffic will survive. However, by using an extremely resilient stateful 
packet filter that will inexpensively drop any unwanted packets, surviving a DDoS attack 
becomes much easier. When such a high performance packet-filtering server is attached 
to an ultra high bandwidth connection, communication with the outside world will be 
unimpaired so long as not all of the available bandwidth is saturated, and performance 
behind the packet filter will remain normal as long as the packet filter drops all DDoS 
packets. 
 Having a separate, emergency block of IP addresses for critical servers, with a 
separate route can be invaluable. A separate route can also be cost effective because it 
can be used for load balancing or sharing under normal circumstances and switched to 
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emergency mode in the event of an attack.  WAN-link failover will work as long as both 
links have DoS/DDoS prevention mechanisms. 
 SYN cookies modify the TCP protocol handling of the server by delaying 
allocation of resources until the client address has been verified. This seems to be the 
most powerful defense against SYN attacks. SYN floods can also be prevented using 
delayed binding or TCP splicing [26].  
 Content-based DoS can be prevented using deep packet inspection. Attacks 
originating from dark addresses or going to dark addresses can be prevented using bogon 
(bogus IP) filtering.  
 Automatic rate filtering can work as long as rate-thresholds are set correctly and 
granularly. Routers have some manually-set rate-limiting and ACL capability. Most 
routers can be easily overwhelmed under DoS attack. If rules are added to take flow 
statistics out of the router during the DoS attacks, they further slow down and complicate 
the matter. 
 Application front end hardware is intelligent hardware placed on the network 
before traffic reaches the servers [26]. It can be used on networks in conjunction with 
routers and switches. Application front end hardware analyzes data packets as they enter 
the system, and then identifies them as priority, regular, or dangerous [26].  
 Intrusion-prevention systems are effective if the attacks have signatures 
associated with them. However, the trend among the attacks is to have legitimate content 
but bad intent.  IPSs which work on content recognition cannot block behavior based 
DoS attacks.  An Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) based IPS can detect 
and block denial of service attacks because they have the processing power and the 
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granularity to analyze the attacks and act like a circuit breaker in an automated way.  A 
rate-based IPS (RBIPS) must analyze traffic granularly and continuously monitor the 
traffic pattern to determine if there is a traffic anomaly [26]. 
   2.13.8.3   Trust System Solutions.  
 A trust system at the network perimeter can enforce encryption and 
authentication policies for packets entering the network, requiring a malicious DoS 
packet to have the proper key in order to stand any chance of entering the protected 
enclave.   The packet must also meet the trust system firewall rules for source IP 
address, destination IP address, destination port, and authorized message type 
combinations.  In the case of an encrypted DoS (less likely from an outside source than a 
misconfigured or malfunctioning system) the packet would enter the network but 
repeated identical or similar packets in a very short period of time would be detected as a 
potential DoS suspicious event and blocked very shortly after beginning.  To prevent 
resource exhaustion of the trust system itself, the trust system is capable of 
communicating further down the line to query other trust systems to identify the path the 
packet has traveled and notify them to discover and block similar activity closer to the 
source. 
  2.13.9   Cyber Intrusion Detection. 
   2.13.9.1   SCADA Security Challenges.  
 
 Lack of network security countermeasures in many utility networks makes it 
nearly impossible to detect cyber intrusions.   Current substations generally do not have 
firewalls or intrusion detection systems (IDS) installed, so it is not possible for those 
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companies to know if, when, and by whom they are being targeted [18].  Those that do 
have some IDS capabilities often do not update or monitor them regularly.  They also 
rarely have the expertise to use them effectively unless they hire security specialists.   
 Because of the varying ages and sophistication of some SCADA system 
components, many do not even have logging capabilities. Available audit trails are 
usually not turned on because of the drain on processor performance and limited memory.  
In general, substation automation systems that do have logging enabled don’t log who is 
attempting to obtain access to them [18].  With no logs or audit trails, activities of 
malicious insiders are effectively untraceable and there is no easy way to define security 
policies and traffic filtering for what is usual or unusual activity in the SCADA network 
[18].  In many cases if an incident occurred there would be no way to tell if it were 
malicious or accidental [7]. 
 There are few SCADA-aware firewalls and, though the National SCADA Testbed 
at Idaho National Lab is working to develop intrusion detection capabilities for existing 
control systems, it is not the SCADA system developers’ priority [18]. 
 
   2.13.9.2   Recommendations from Literature. 
 Utility organizations should implement network rings (or layers) of defense, also 
known as defense-in-depth [8].   
 To start with, there should be perimeter monitoring on remote, unattended 
SCADA system elements [1]. 
 Firewalls can be used to screen message traffic between a corporate IT network 
and a SCADA network on the Utility Intranet. This configuration can protect SCADA 
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systems from penetrations that have occurred on the corporate side.  Some issues that 
have to be considered when applying firewalls to SCADA systems are the delays 
introduced into data transmissions, the skill and overhead required to set up and manage 
firewalls, and the lack of firewalls designed to interface with some popular SCADA 
protocols [1].  While most firewalls do not support SCADA protocols, this situation is 
being researched by a number of organizations and some SCADA-aware firewalls are 
under development [1]. 
 Perimeter defenses should employ two layers of firewalls that will conduct 
stateful data inspection.  One firewall would be installed between the Utility Intranet 
wide-area-network (WAN) side and your corporate LAN and a second strong firewall 
would wall off the organization’s SCADA networking systems from both the internal 
corporate network, with its preponderance of non-real-time e-mail, web, and office 
automation traffic, and the mixed content traversing the external Intranet between utility 
organizations.  This would provide at least two layers of firewalls between the SCADA 
networking systems and the external Utility Intranet [8]. Only trusted connections will be 
allowed to link into the SCADA system behind the outer firewall in the outer trusted 
zone, but will also have to pass the scrutiny of the inner firewall policy sets as an added 
layer of protection from compromise [3]. Firewalls must be SCADA-aware to recognize 
and protect critical traffic to and from SCADA supervisory control elements [1]. 
 The perimeter router can compliment these defensive systems by implementing 
strict access control lists to deny all access and only allow access by exception rules (i.e. 
a whitelist of authorized traffic).   
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 The SCADA network must also employ tightly managed subnetting to ensure an 
exclusively private network, which will effectively hide the SCADA system from outside 
entities and the utility’s public network in general [3].  If IPsec is used, care must be 
taken to deconflict incompatibilities with Network Address Translation.  
 The network connections and any DMZ should be equipped with several types of 
intrusion detection systems.  Network IDS devices should monitor the traffic on the 
network links and in the DMZ.  Host-based IDSs should ensure that key files on critical 
systems and DMZ servers are not manipulated [3].  
 After-the-fact analysis of audit trails is a useful means to detect past events.  To 
aid response measures, it is best to record as much of the communications traffic, as 
possible, however disk storage is very expensive and often cost prohibitive.  Monitoring, 
on the other hand, implies real-time capture of data as a system is operating.  Both 
techniques are successfully employed in IT systems and will yield similar benefits in 
SCADA networks [1].   For the logging of data on every packet, or even just the 
suspicious ones, to be practical, low-cost, high capacity storage and an IDS that can 
distinguish legitimate SCADA messages from unauthorized and malicious counterfeits 
[18]. 
   2.13.9.3   Objections and Questions from Utilities. 
 IDSs, firewalls, and antivirus software might slow down certain SCADA 
operations.  Their benefits to SCADA need to be proven to outweigh the potential 
negative affects on efficiency, safety, and ROI of operations [1]. 
 Oftentimes, SCADA systems go down due to other internal software tools or 
employees that accidentally gain access into the SCADA network.   Any time a system 
 
73 
goes down, even for maintenance, there’s no certainty it will come back online smoothly.  
Adding more complex software to interact with these finicky systems could prove more 
disastrous. 
 At this time, IDSs are not available for some SCADA protocols [1]. 
   2.13.9.4   Trust System Solutions. 
 The trust system performs firewall and IDS functions at any level of the network, 
even on individual systems (i.e. host-level).   
 Simulations have shown that trust system firewall rules and format module 
delays are sufficiently small enough to be a relative non-factor even for near real-time 
(less than one second delivery time) communications. 
 The trust system logs suspicious event details.  Because it can unpackage and 
inspect each packet that crosses its path, the trust system can easily log all packets 
(suspicious or not) on behalf of any system that cannot implement logging or audit trails 
itself (assuming sufficient storage is available), significantly improving historical 
reconstruction of network events, including low-and-slow attacks that escalate over days, 
weeks, or months. 
  2.13.10   Insider Threat. 
   2.13.10.1   Objections and Questions from Utilities. 
 Privacy rights issues inhibit screening and profiling of some individuals. 
   2.13.10.2   Trust System Solutions. 
 Regardless of company hiring policies, as long as employees are required to 
acknowledge and authorize “consent to monitor”, the trust system can track and log all 
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actions, suspicious or not, that cross its path and attribute them to an authenticated 
username and source system.  If an individual’s action are authorized by the trust system 
but later determined to be malicious, historical records will allow the piecing together of 
the individual’s time-stamped actions.  
 Consent to monitor should be outlined and signed off by each employee in 
contracts at the time of hiring and can also be setup as a reminder (and to cover any non-
company vendors, etc. that be on the network) by displaying a logon banner with the 
legal phrasing to which the user must click an agreement button in order to connect.   The 
same banner would also allow the documentation of actions for legal prosecution should 
an attacker attempt to conduct malicious actions. 
 The trust system logs are much more complete when a trust system agent is 
loaded onto each SCADA node vice two trust systems in tunnel mode, which might only 
see the traffic between them and not node-to-node traffic at the edges (e.g. between two 
nodes on the same switch).  
 2.13.11  Limited physical security. 
   2.13.11.1   SCADA Security Challenges. 
 Whether due to budget restraints or to low priority, many substations and other 
remote sites are left with inadequate or lackadaisical physical security procedures, 
assuming that no one would really be that interested in SCADA equipment [1].   Un-
locked and un-guarded facilities can allow an attacker to simply scale a fence to enter an 
equipment room and plug in to access the SCADA network.  
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2.13.11.2   Recommendations from Literature. 
 Fences, locks, motion-detectors, and security cameras can provide greater 
physical security for facilities and remote substation yards.  Tamper-resistant or tamper-
proof enclosures for SCADA system components are a good second line of defense to 
prevent unwanted meddling, compromise, or damage [1].   The use of authenticated entry 
and metal detectors is highly recommended for control centers and substations.  In 
addition, emergency action plans should be updated with procedures for dealing with 
armed entry attempts and those procedures regularly exercised. 
   2.13.11.3   Objections and Questions from Utilities. 
 No one would really be interested in SCADA equipment and most of our 
substation yards have fences around them.  Even if someone could get in, they wouldn’t 
even know what to do with the equipment or have passwords to logon. 
   2.13.11.4   Trust System Solutions. 
 The trust system ACM module’s logon credentials check can require smart card, 
voice recognition, biometric, or other physical credentials for logon authentication before 
granting network access, supplementing enforcement of physical security for network 
actions. 
 The trust system can also notice and alert on the loss of an expected message 
from a specific node or connectivity loss that might have resulted from disconnection or 
damage to network components, aiding  rapid recognition and recovery. 
It is difficult to defend even the most conscientiously monitored IP networks with 
highly trained analysts, especially when the ability to dictate and monitor every crucial 
update and configuration of installations throughout the US is not available and 
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determined attackers are constantly crafting and testing new ways to steal information or 
disrupt operations.  Even with its best efforts, a large, highly targeted company can 
expect multiple system compromises each year, and those are just the ones they catch.  
 The US military has gone to great efforts to ensure that its classified networks are 
in no way connected to the Internet or to its unclassified systems.  Classified digital 
information is encrypted to the highest level in-transit and hard drives are locked in safes 
with two-person integrity checks on the lock when not in use or attended.  Buildings 
where classified information is processed implement strict physical access control and 
require positive identification and need to know for entrance.    They also use metal 
sheets or mesh in the walls and are designed without windows to prevent unencrypted 
electromagnetic emanations from computer workstations and screens from being 
detectable or visible from outside the building. Operational security guidelines are strictly 
enforced and refreshed at least annually so employees can recognize sensitive 
information and sets of data, that by themselves are unclassified, but when linked 
together, can give indications of classified operations or intentions.   
Though it is not necessary to employ the exact same measures as for national 
security secrets, critical infrastructure operations and sensitive information must be 
seriously evaluated and approached with the same well-planned, deliberate, security-





 2.13.12   Proactive Vulnerability Assessment. 
   2.13.12.1  SCADA Security Issues. 
 Few, if any, proactive deception measures, vulnerability discovery, or 
fingerprinting of attackers, attack techniques, and zero-day exploits is conducted by 
companies. 
   2.13.12.2  Recommendations from Literature. 
 Regular  vulnerability scans and analysis should be conducted and best practices 
from the SCADA Honeynet Project should be implemented on the Utility Intranet [1]. 
   2.13.12.3  Trust System Solutions.  
 As a rule of thumb in SCADA systems, scans (vulnerability or otherwise) should 
be conducted on systems rotated temporarily offline.  Scanned system may be returned to 
service when discovered discrepancies are remediated.  
 Vulnerability scanning would be a separate function from the trust system, but 
the schedule for legitimate scans that traverse the network must be updated in trust 
system rules so they are not assumed malicious and blocked.   
 The results of vulnerability scans should be used to improve the security posture 
of the scanned systems and to identify temporary security holes in the network that may 
require new trust system rules or signatures until a more permanent patch or upgrade to 
remove the vulnerability can be implemented. 
 The trust system could also be loaded with and run vulnerability scanner 
software, in limited instances, to gather additional information for its analysis of a 
suspicious event.  Examples might be a port scan to a single port to determine its open or 
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closed status or to send a test message that should be blocked and result in the return of a 
RST/ACK, in order to verify proper functionality of a trust agent’s defenses. 
  2.13.13  Lack of Centralized System Administration.   
   2.13.13.1  SCADA Security Issues. 
 Most utility companies have no single entity responsible for network 
administration.  Users are usually their own system administrators (with root-level 
access) often with no reason to have those privileges [18]. 
   2.13.13.2  Recommendations from Literature. 
 The principle of least privilege “should be applied in granting system access 
permissions to users and applications and in allowing access to files” [23].   
 Assign specific, certified individuals with roles and responsibilities as operations 
network administrators to monitor, modify, and maintain overall SCADA system and 
network health.  They should work hand-in-hand with administrators of corporate LAN 
systems, perimeter IT devices, and security administrators if they are not the same 
individuals. 
 Restrict root-level access only to administrators and engineers that need higher 
level privileges (e.g. root) to perform their jobs.  Normal IT practice is for administrators 
to logon as a regular user when they aren’t performing immediate administrative 
functions.   When administrative actions requiring root-level access are required, they 
should then either elevate their privilege with another password or logon with a different 
username and password to the specific system they need to access.   Use of the root-level 
privilege should be reserved only for specific functions that require that privilege and 
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only for as long as that higher privilege is necessary, then the individual should logoff as 
root or return to a lower-level privilege. 
   2.13.13.3  Objections and Questions from Utilities. 
 Which of the 300 corporate personnel can monitor, control, and be certified on the 
more than 10,000 devices in the network, especially if an operator is the only one 
working on an evening shift and an emergency occurs—it’s just easier for everyone to 
have the same rights and to be their own administrators. 
  2.13.13.4  Trust System Solutions. 
 The trust system does not provide administration but automatically enforces a 
well-planned access control policy.  It tracks access attempts, generating detailed records 
of actions that occurred on the network which support network management and reduce 
the burden on human administrators, allowing companies to do more with less. 
 An alert correlator would bring synergy and speed as well as comprehensive 
situational awareness, management, and control to network security, administration, and 
operations personnel in response to all types of alerts, through its filterable, combined 
displays.  
 Unique specialties in SCADA, IT, and security administration within and 
organization, working together, creates a resident body of expertise, confidence, and trust 
that can proactively and continuously assess and improve the overall security posture of 
systems and network design.  This capability is crucial to defining efficient security 




  2.13.14    Integration of Security into Network Design and Planning.   
   2.13.14.1  SCADA Security Issues. 
 SCADA networks were designed for efficiency and simplicity without initial 
consideration for security.  Security, if given any real concern at all, was often a low-
priority afterthought.  
   2.13.14.2  Recommendations from Literature. 
 Employ a demilitarized zone (DMZ). Access to SCADA data summations from 
substations and sensors, if made publicly available to the Utility Intranet, should be 
redundantly ported to special web-enabled database servers, which live exclusively in the 
DMZ. Additionally, the remote sensors and substations should remain isolated. DMZ 
servers merely reflect the collected data concatenated and stored in core database servers 
and should be alternately available via application servers in the heart of the next 
generation security enclave to decision makers in the central SCADA control center, so 
no critical system resources will be lost [3].  
 SCADA networks should be segmented off into their own IP segment and use 
proper subnet masking techniques to protect the Industrial Automation environment from 
other network traffic like file and print commands. [8].  
 A company’s SCADA and internal intranet IP addressing schemes should be 
separated from the company’s public (to the Utility Intranet) network and from each 
other if possible. 
 If trusted connections link into the SCADA system behind the outer firewall in 
the outer trusted zone, they must still have to pass the scrutiny of the inner firewall policy 
sets as an added layer of protection from compromise. [3]   
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 Additionally, the SCADA network must employ tightly managed sub-netting to 
ensure an exclusively private network, which will effectively hide the SCADA system 
from outside entities in the Utility Intranet and the utility’s public network in general [3]. 
 Use smart switches instead of hubs. 
  “Data mining out at the edges leaves administrators with the power to configure a 
security policy appropriate to their installation; deciding what data to share with others 
and what forms of authorization will be required before access is permitted. For example, 
a policy might dictate that normally, Node A limits itself to reporting voltage data and the 
phase- angle of the power phasor, measured locally, but when the ISO announces a 
“contingency,” Node A may be willing to report far more detailed data. Node A would 
require a configuration certificate authorizing contingency-mode reporting, and could log 
this information for subsequent audit” [10]. 
 Do not allow wireless connections if at all possible.  Those that remain should 
require authentication and strong encryption added (not inherent WEP, which is easily 
cracked). 
 In addition to technical and administrative security controls, various physical 
security measures can be applied to protect SCADA systems. Backup, duplicate, 
geographically separated control centers can provide redundancy and, therefore, 
protection against human attacks and natural disasters. On a smaller scale, a hot backup 
standby SCADA system at the supervisory control center provides a means to continue 
operating if the primary system is disabled. As an additional security layer, the SCADA 




   2.13.14.3  Trust System Solutions.  
 The trust system enforces access restrictions between IP addresses that should not 
be allowed to communicate with one another via specific message types and interfaces. 
Because the trust system analyzes and reassembles packets, it can, where necessary, 
replace IP addresses and provide network address translation for the purposes of hiding 
or making routable, IP addresses of nodes behind it. 
  2.13.15  Security Policies and Procedures.   
   2.13.15.1  SCADA Security Challenges. 
 Policies and procedures constitute the foundation of security policy 
infrastructures. Implementing effective policies and procedures can reduce liabilities and 
ensure subsequent prosecution of violations.  Unfortunately, developing, documenting, 
and enforcing effective security policies are some of the most difficult measures to 
manage.  Only a conscious, ongoing, proactive network security program can have 
realistic success over the long term [8].  Most utility companies lack effective, 
enforceable security policies and procedures. 
   2.13.15.2  Recommendations from Literature. 
 Utility organizations at all levels of the Utility Intranet, from the smallest SCADA 
office to regional and area control centers, should implement comprehensive, flexible, 
and testable security policies for each environment and for their interactions with other 
entities (i.e. between SCADA and corporate, inter-company, company to area control 
center, etc.).  These policies should not be drafted in a vacuum, but instead with input 
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from all stakeholders (e.g. operators, engineers, IT, and management).   Finally, plan and 
implement security policy management and assign responsibility and oversight. 
 It is important for SCADA operators, engineers, and administrators to work with 
IT departments to develop well thought out system operation and contingency plans in 
the event of problems, including the gamut of potential network security incidents [16].  
Over the years, information system security professionals have developed a number of 
generally accepted best practices to protect networks and computing infrastructures from 
malicious attacks.  They are an excellent starting point, however, these practices cannot 
be applied directly to SCADA systems without accounting for the different requirements 
of SCADA as compared to IT systems. 
   2.13.15.3  Trust System Solutions. 
 The trust system enforces the security policy with which it is configured.  It also 
learns and proactively implements blocks or suggests new firewall rules, to security 
analysts, for suspicious activity not originally anticipated.  
 Security logs generated by the trust system document suspicious events and trust 
system response details for after action review, analysis of security policy for updates, 
and trust system configuration changes.  
  2.13.16  Cybersecurity Priorities. 
   2.13.16.1  SCADA Security Issues.  
 Cybersecurity is a low priority to most utility owners because of long-held  
misconceptions of invulnerability.  First, there is industry denial about how much they 
are actually connected to the Internet.  There is an increasing trend in connections from 
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the corporate network to the SCADA network for activity and performance reports.  The 
same corporate offices are connected to the Internet for e-mail and web access.  Remote 
login over the Internet and telephone lines for monitoring and administration of SCADA 
systems has also been growing in popularity for years.  In the very beginning, control 
systems were less visible than IT systems and many were not even connected to external 
networks.  Their components required detailed technological knowledge to implement 
and operate, so the myth of security-through-obscurity had some basis in fact, but that is 
not so anymore.   
 Fear of economic impact has resulted in isolationism (i.e. reluctance to ask for 
help or report network security incidents).  A press release out of Washington, dated 
April 7, 2002, stated that, according to an FBI survey, most large corporations and 
government agencies have been attacked by computer hackers, but more often and more 
frequently they do not inform authorities of the breaches.  The survey found about 90% 
of respondents detected computer security breaches within the previous year but only 
34% reported those attacks to authorities.  Many respondents cited fear of bad publicity 
about computer security.   There is much more illegal and unauthorized activity going on 
in cyberspace than corporations admit to their clients, stockholders, and business partners 
or report to law enforcement [8].   
   2.13.16.2  Recommendations from Literature. 
 Education of decision makers in the industry is key to dispelling the myths. 
Vulnerability assessments have already demonstrated unauthorized access to SCADA 
and Distributed Control Systems.  Examples from contracted penetration testing, using no 
zero day exploits, indicate the level of naivety among SCADA users.  A common 
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misperception among SCADA operators and managers is that “the threat is low because 
outsiders know nothing about our systems”. “They were appalled to then learn that teams 
were able to, in a matter of minutes, gain access to the SCADA control network through 
unsecured Wi-Fi access from the neighborhood, unknown and unprotected dialup lines, 
and the Internet.  Although organizations were adamant about the fact that their 
operations network was not connected to the Internet, the teams more often than not 
identified an interconnection between the production and office network, with no airgap, 
and the office network then connected to the Internet. The teams discovered network 
diagrams that in many cases didn’t match reality and laptops, not tracked or accounted 
for, allowed to connect to the production network from the outside (spreading viruses and 
worms) [7]. 
  A combination of scheduled vulnerability assessments to include remote and 
internal scans (even lab results can suffice), human engineering analysis (i.e. looking for 
written-down passwords, accessible network equipment, phishing techniques, etc.), and 
operational security assessments (i.e. searching for and piecing together sensitive 
information from public websites and records), can prove just how vulnerable a particular 
network or system is and can demonstrate the negative operational impact that could be 
created by an attacker.     
   2.13.16.3  Objections and Questions from Utilities. 
 A well known CIO stated in the 2002 issue of CIO magazine that “most public 
utilities rely on a highly customized SCADA system.  No two are the same, so hacking 
them requires specific knowledge,”  referring to the company’s unique design and access 
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to that customized software [1]. He also stated that “cyber terrorism may not be nearly as 
worrisome as some would make it.  That’s because it’s utterly defensible”  [1].   
   2.13.16.4  Trust System Solutions. 
  Even with technical training, regular application of the latest patches, security 
software and hardware, and dedicated specialists for round-the-clock monitoring, even 
the most heavily defended IT networks see their share of system compromises throughout 
the year from Internet connections. 
 The trust system records suspicious event details useful for IT and security 
personnel to prove to management the types and quantities of attacks attempted against 
the network when suggesting investment in security purchases.  
 Unnecessary ports, obviously, should be closed.  As another line of defense, 
though, the trust system protects the unprotected (i.e. systems that for one reason or 
another have open ports which for which there should be no communication).  In this 
case, the trust system blocks incoming packets destined for that port and IP address 
combination. 
 Institution of a national utility certification program that ranks companies and 
areas on their production, training, efficiency, environmental impact, rates, customer 
satisfaction, and security performance would increase healthy competition for customers 
now able to pick and choose their energy sources.   
 A certification program, coupled with external vulnerability assessments and  
mandatory incident reporting, would reward companies with good management, policy, 
and security measures, encouraging network security investment.   
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 It would soon become apparent that the number of attacks on a company is 
irrelevant as compared to the ability to quickly and consistently detect and prevent 
breaches, which are the hallmarks of a security conscious organization. 
 The trust system makes it easy to gather and analyze attack data for reporting and 
proving successful mitigation by a company, allowing it better protect its operations 
while gaining a higher security certification than its peers, and potentially higher profits 
due to consumer confidence. 
  2.13.17   Economics and Return on Investment. 
   2.13.17.1  SCADA Security Issues. 
 Deregulation has resulted in a greater focus on efficiency and return on 
investment (ROI) rather than on security.  Industry consolidation, increased competition, 
and low profit margins in some sectors have reduced investment in technology and 
production upgrades.  Utilities are now operating closer and closer to their limits as they 
attempt to keep up with growing energy demands.  The minimal reserve capacity, such as 
in the electric utility industry, has resulted in systems that are less resilient to accidents 
and attacks. 
   Obviously, corporate management officers are truly concerned about the safety 
of their country and the nation’s critical infrastructure, but, when they have to make 
budgetary and commitment decisions for their own organizations, these security concerns 
can be easily superseded by multiple economic, cultural, and financial issues.  Budget 
meetings revolve around maximizing profits while juggling other pressing investments 
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required to out-perform lower cost competition, fund deferred maintenance, and achieve 
harmony between conflicting institutional cultures and priorities [1]. 
 Most senior managers of utility companies view security costs as a competitive 
economic issue.  They do not see a market incentive for spending large amounts of 
capital on information security technology.  Just as some companies assert that 
regulations requiring expenditures for pollution controls negatively impact their bottom 
line, many claim that the costs of SCADA security will put them at a competitive 
disadvantage with companies that do not implement similar measures.  In addition, many 
managers do not see investments in their individual organizations having much effect on 
the overall public welfare.   
 Few senior managers think of securing SCADA systems as more than just 
purchasing and installing hardware and software.  More importantly, an organization has 
to invest in hiring qualified personnel, instituting an on-going training program so 
individuals remain current in a highly dynamic field, developing and managing flexible 
security policies, daily monitoring network traffic, and continuously assessing and 
improving security measures.  Without those who can properly operate and maintain 
security systems, and provide the human operational understanding and on-the-fly 
decision-making for which no machine can adequately substitute, security hardware and 
software, by itself does them little good.   
    2.13.17.2  Recommendations from Literature. 
 To level the playing field, the government must develop and enforce standards for 
securing SCADA systems that apply to all organizations in an industry so that all the 
participants bear the costs equally [1].    
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   2.13.17.3  Objections and Questions from Utilities. 
 A utility consists of dozens to hundreds of substations, each with many IEDS, 
enterprise-wide upgrades, re-programming, or replacement for IEDs and legacy systems 
is too costly [18].   
   2.13.17.4  Trust System Solutions. 
 The trust system concept recognizes the needs and financial resources of various 
organizations can be quite different.  It focuses on minimizing cost and maximizing 
flexibility in implementation.   
 As a caveat, the trust system does require a particular amount of hard disk 
storage for its applications and performs better, especially when conducting more security 
functions, with faster processors and larger/faster memory, so there are some limits to the 
modular add-on capability without also upgrading memory, hard disk, and processing 
capacity. 
 Simulations for this thesis were conducted on a personal computer (PC) to 
evaluate performance by the most simple, cost-effect COTS hardware solution, however, 
the trust system would be an open software solution that can be added to any user 
hardware (better hardware just performs better) and interact with any existing operating 
system or protocol.  All trust system modules are software programs that work either 
together or alone, so a company that does not need all of the trust system functions can 
simply pick-and-choose and purchase only what they need.  The idea is that is the 
company already has a good firewall or IDS that they could interact with the trust 
system (or vice versa) to keep up to date on their discoveries and actions.  In this way, 
the trust system is more of a security manager. 
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 The same is true for a company that needs to invest in one or two modules now 
and add additional functionality later.  Trust system software would be easily 
upgradeable by simply installing additional, add-on software modules or upgrades to 
existing modules. 
 While the trust system provides a security framework, companies themselves 
implement their own security policies and can enable, add, or tweak security thresholds 
and rules unique to their organization. 
 Until a company is able to transition fully to processor-based, IP-enabled master 
stations and field equipment that can implement distributed trust system agents on all 
critical nodes, the trust system, loaded onto separate security boxes in the network (i.e. 
systems, such as a trust PC, server, or router) provides security functionality on behalf 
of the limited-capacity legacy systems that send traffic across its path. 
 Server memory and SCSI drives are recommended for extended operation, even 
in workstations and HMIs.  When defining hardware purchase requirements, 
organizations should plan for excess memory and disk space upfront or ensure servers 
and workstations have plenty of expansion capacity to accommodate future performance 
enhancing memory, disk, and processor upgrades as technology improves and costs 
decrease. 
  2.13.18  Information Security Expertise and Responsibility.   
   2.13.18.1  SCADA Security Issues. 
 SCADA maintenance and administration are fractured with no single cyber 
security overseer [18].  SCADA and distributed control systems have traditionally been 
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the exclusive domain of electrical engineers.  With the transition to standard hardware 
and software platforms, Internet protocols, and connections to corporate enterprise 
networks, IT personnel are becoming more involved with SCADA systems.  Thus, there 
are conflicting cultures and priorities and differing stances on implementing IDSs, 
firewalls, authentication, and encryption [1].  
 Operators, power engineers, and management often try to guard their operational 
systems from IT personnel, who are the smartest on network security, because of 
assumptions they can’t or won’t understand operational impacts or that they will disrupt 
working operational capabilities for unnecessary security restrictions [18].  
 Unfortunately, SCADA security discussions typically devolve to “SCADA 
personnel largely working in a vacuum and telling the IT security community that they 
don’t understand SCADA protocols” [18]. 
 Great research is being done on both sides (i.e. IT security engineers and SCADA 
engineers), but the SCADA security torch continues to be carried by a handful of people 
focused only on the control system environment. 
   2.13.18.2  Recommendations from Literature. 
 IT personnel must understand operations and the impact of security mechanisms 
to the degree that they can make them transparent to the operators and power engineers.   
It is important that the IT security community is involved.  It doesn’t take much work for 
them to extend their existing body of knowledge in order to take some of the increasing 
burden off of power engineers and operators. 
 It is important for both sides to understand that SCADA network security 
discussions are the same as any other security discussion (i.e. operating systems, services, 
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web-based, XML, SNMP, TCP/IP, UDP/IP, etc.) but with different message formats and 
very strict time constraints.  While the overall concepts are the same, it is important to 
understand that the applications and priorities are going to be slightly different in 
SCADA security versus IT security.   
   2.13.18.3  Objections and Questions from Utilities. 
 Power engineering is already a relatively small subset of electrical engineering 
and power engineers who are interested in, let alone like, understand, or are enthralled by 
information technology are even harder to come buy [18]. 
 IT personnel don’t understand SCADA systems, protocols, and operational 
requirements and may degrade or cause downtime in the 24/7 operations with their 
restrictive policies and security measures. 
   2.13.18.4  Potential  Solutions. 
 It is recommended that each organization assign an Information Systems Security 
Officer (ISSO) to maintain and monitor all security policies for control, office, and 
engineering networks. 
 Assign a small, qualified security team (reporting to the ISSO) with 
administration privileges over security systems to objectively evaluate security posture 
and effectiveness; update security systems, signatures, and rules; and analyze suspicious 
network events, logs, and security alerts. 
 Power engineers must know enough about information technology and 
information security to be effective in adhering to security policies and assisting in 
defining workable system security requirements, solutions, and operating procedures. 
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 Instead of arguing over who is more qualified to offer architecture 
recommendations and protocol design changes, all parties (i.e. SCADA, IT, and network 
security) must recognize that they each bring important skillsets and insight to the table.  
They must form a team that gains familiarity with each other’s requirements and works 
together to define, implement, and maintain a workable security policy. 
  2.13.19  Security Training. 
   2.13.19.1  SCADA Security Challenges.  
 Companies have little or no investment in security training. 
   2.13.19.2  Recommendations from Literature. 
 Management should ensure design of a specific, documented and testable security 
training plan for each user role and require initial training and qualification, quarterly 
updates, and annual refreshers.  Integrate security scenarios and responses into regular 
exercises.   A certification program should be established for security analysts and all 
who will perform administrative functions affecting network performance, security, and 
safety. 
   2.13.19.3  Objections and Questions from Utilities. 
 Financial constraints leave little money for expensive information security 
courses. 
   2.13.19.4  Trust System Solutions. 
 Organizations should develop, by experience, in-house experts (or area/regional 
support teams) that will continuously document lessons learned, best practices, and 
provide tech support and training for the benefit of all employees.   
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 Detailed traffic captures and suspicious event parameters, logged by the trust 
system, are no-cost, and can be used to train employees to recognize regular traffic 
patterns, signatures and history of the most common and most dangerous suspicious 
events, and proper trust system responses.  A spare trust system can be used offline 
connected to a single laptop (attacker) as a training simulator or test platform by which 
the laptop can launch attacks or requests to see how the trust system will respond, as 
configured by the company’s security policy.  This simulator configuration provides an 
interactive learning and testing environment. 
2.14 Chapter Summary 
Overall, the majority of the SCADA community has been quick to embrace the 
transition to IP-based standards.  In some cases it has already begun to adopt the IT 
business practices of non-SCADA corporations, such as connecting the corporate 
management LAN to the operational (i.e. production) network for updates and improved 
communications.  We have also seen the continuation of remote connections for 
administrators and operators, now over Internet and telephone connections, for business 
efficiency.  In all of these endeavors, it appears that security has taken more or less a 
back seat to functionality in SCADA design, instead of being considered in parallel at the 
outset.  As a result, it has been temporarily ignored or passively entertained but mainly 
left to vendors and research labs to figure out and recommend as an after-the-fact 
configuration, if necessary, while IP-standards documentation, testing, and deployment is 
already underway without clearly defined security standards, policies, strategies, and 
technical support at all levels of the community.   
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It is difficult to defend even the most conscientiously monitored IP networks with 
highly trained analysts, especially when the ability to dictate and monitor every crucial 
update and configuration of installations throughout the US is not available and 
determined attackers are constantly crafting and testing new ways to steal information or 
disrupt operations.  Even with its best efforts, a large, highly targeted company can 
expect multiple system compromises each year, and those are just the ones they catch.      
As a move toward an interconnected Utility Intranet is realized, a US-wide operational 
utility network, with some potential overseas offices, will only be as secure as the least 
secure organization within it.  Since these companies are currently privately owned with 
little hierarchical oversight or technical support, the chances for non-secure practices and 
backdoors from Internet and telephone connections by even a single company to allow 
viruses, worms, DoS, Trojans, sniffers, and rootkits to filter into the network and wait for 
the next opportunity to infect and disrupt SCADA operations is only a matter of time and 
nearly impossible to prevent.  
Although non-SCADA Internet-connected corporations and home computers are 
low hanging fruit for amateur script kiddies who have a plethora of online tactics, 
techniques, and procedures for manipulating cyberspace, others desire more of a 
challenge or are simply greedy enough to look for alternative targets of opportunity in 
order to improve there situation in life.  They are undaunted to make the extra effort to 
understand utility SCADA and emergency management technologies and dream of ways 
to defeat them.  Then there are those terrorist-sponsored individuals, groups, and 
organizations who simply live to control through fear, death, propaganda, and anarchy or 
nation-state military or paramilitary units that work to maintain a technological advantage 
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and have been gathering and testing every bit of communications network intelligence 
they can find, steal, or buy in preparation for the chance to take down or disrupt an 
American utility when it is advantageous to their cause.  
As computer processors have increased in speed, we have begun to quickly 
exceed the ability to humanly react fast enough to escalating, well-planned network 
attacks and must rely more and more on automated security technologies to detect and 
respond accurately in order to prevent damage, disruption, or loss and buy time for the 
decisions and actions that only humans can make to maintain continuity of operations.  
This will require ever-increasing technological capabilities and refreshes, regular system 
updates and security checks, active security monitoring of network traffic, and regular 
training to detect and respond to network reconnaissance and attacks before or at least as 
they happen, and recover in the event of successful attacks.   
Operators and administrators will have to know their own systems and their 
vulnerabilities as well as the impact of network transport and security systems in the 
same network.  IT administrators will have to understand the specific security measures 
that apply to SCADA networks versus more delay-tolerant office LANs, and security 
analysts will have to be employed and trained to provide low-level expertise and 
integration of security mechanisms that complement and don’t hinder their company’s 
operations.   Communication and between all of these roles is critical.  Above all of these 
cultural changes, will be a pervasive and necessary lack of trust, because any IP packet 
that attempts to enter the network or is received by one of its systems could be from a 
compromised system elsewhere in the network.   
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Fortunately, the cost for increased commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies 
remains the same or decreases over time making it possible for companies to 
continuously improve their network functionality, efficiency, and security.  Yet, 
technology means nothing if the humans, especially at the lowest level, are not well 
trained to select, install, configure, maintain, analyze, and improve it, since they are the 
one’s who best know their own operations and are responsible each and every day to 
supply the basic needs of millions of American citizens.
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III.  Methodology 
3.1   Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold.  First, it will explain the concept and real-
world applications of a trust system, as an integrated suite of flexible and configurable 
trust-based security mechanisms with pick-and-choose, add-on security capabilities for 
existing and future IP-based SCADA, real-time control, and Emergency Management 
networks.   Second, this chapter will explain the models and scenarios developed to 
simulate communications that would be present in a collaborative control network relying 
upon non-real-time transport protocols such as UDP and TCP.   The purpose of the 
simulations was to implement the proposed functionality of these delay-inducing security 
mechanisms and to estimate the impact of the induced delay on utility control 
communications. The goal of the experiments was to evaluate the hypothesis that 
stringent security mechanisms can be implemented in SCADA environments, using a mix 
of non-real-time protocols for communication and wide-area information sharing, while 
meeting strict real-time thresholds for emergency response.  
3.2   The Trust System Concept 
 3.2.1 What the Trust System Is. 
 The concept of a trust system is to provide a non-proprietary system, system of 
systems, or software agents that plug into an existing network, somewhat transparently, 
to perform the functions of correlating data and identifying risk levels for corresponding 
events and status updates that point to negative impacts on utility services.  The trust 
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system, at its core, is a software agent performing active security analysis and response.  
In a network where nodes have sufficient unused hard drive capacity, memory, and 
processing power, the agent would be loaded directly onto the node and provide an active 
interface between incoming messages and the node’s code, data, and applications, similar 
to other software firewalls.  It could also be set to monitor outgoing messages 
 3.2.2 What the Trust System Does. 
The trust system intercepts status messages or commands from network nodes 
destined for the master control station or other nodes in the network.  For companies with 
some legacy nodes, this would require protocol gateway plug-ins for the trust system to 
interpret and analyze packets delivered in different protocols and formats.   
The trust system validates input and identifies security risks or bad data, 
initiating appropriate alerts and response actions.  It then assigns data types to each of the 
good data elements in each message.  Next, it determines if the recipient is authorized to 
read all of the data types in the message, particularly when a recipient is external to the 
company (i.e. not a company employee or source IP address outside the company 
network).  If not, it sanitizes the parts of the message that are not allowed to be passed to 
the recipient before forwarding it or simply deletes the message altogether.  Finally, good 
data elements (i.e. those that appear legitimate because they pass all checks for corruption 
and valid data ranges/values) are transferred to database systems for company Intranet 
display and to archiving systems for historical and trend analysis.  The archived data is 
then viewable and accessible only to those with the appropriate credentials, need to 
know, and rights to access those data elements.  
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Trust systems monitor communications within the company’s SCADA network 
and between the company’s SCADA network and other organizational enclaves in the 
Utility Intranet.  The same concept can be applied to monitoring the company’s office 
LAN, DMZ, and Internet VPN connections, which should not be connected to the 
SCADA network, if at all possible.   
System status updates are communicated between SCADA and emergency 
management systems in a series of messages with potentially tens, hundreds, or 
thousands of data elements per message.  Not all of the data will be needed by every 
system or by every user that views the correlated status summaries.  Some data may be 
strictly for historical analysis or accountability reasons in the event of a resource, 
security, or safety incident.  Other data may relate to operational or financial performance 
and be considered company-sensitive and limited in release. 
Because of the wide range of users and systems involved in interconnected utility 
operations that need to share data in an effort to increase situational awareness and 
prevent emergency situations, there is also a need to restrict what data is readable, 
depending on the need-to-know of a user and the sender’s trust that the recipient is who 
they say they are and is not going to share the data with someone who does not have the 
need to know.  Hence the reason for assigning data types (e.g. operational, financial, 
network, etc.) and releasability caveats (i.e. company-sensitive, company-restricted, no 
vendors, no competitors, etc.) to all data elements (e.g. values, variables, entries, files, 
folders, etc.) in the network.  The data type and caveat must match the role and access 
operations (i.e. rights, such as read, write, copy, etc.) assigned to a specific user, in order 
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for that user to perform that specific access operation on that specific data element. This 
is defined and enforced in the trust system Access Control Matrix (ACM).   
 3.2.3 Flexibility in Implementation of the Trust System 
In today’s heterogeneous utility networks, where most legacy nodes are unable to 
provide the resources needed by a loaded agent, the trust system is a flexible solution that 
can be implemented in multiple different ways, depending on the company’s current 
architecture and needs, without jeopardizing existing control functions. 
For legacy networks, the trust system can be implemented as a trust box (i.e. a 
server in front of a group of unprotected nodes that screens incoming packets and 
generates security alerts to a security server and security analyst workstations).  The trust 
box would also act as an encryption gateway, maintaining secure tunnels with the trust 
box in front of the master control station server and other servers with which the nodes it 
protects must communicate.   This thesis investigates the functionality of a standard PC 
(desktop) hosting the trust system software. Consider, instead, if one or two distributed, 
high-speed cluster servers with processing speeds close to 200 gigaflops per second were 
assigned to the task.   At the time of this writing, priced between $20,000 and $50,000 
[27], a cluster server is not extravagantly expensive compared to the threat of lost 
revenue and respect that might result from a security incident in the operational control 
network.   
For the sake of flexibility and cost savings to utility companies, these various 
trust system functions would be implemented as separate software plug-in capabilities 
that could each be purchased separately, to perform as standalone capabilities, or installed 
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with other trust system modules for more robust capabilities.  The loose coupling of 
pick-and-choose options for the plug-in trust system modules (i.e. simple software 
installs) makes it financially palpable, scalable, and easily upgradeable over time 
The trust system can also be implemented as a system of systems.   Every 
function of the proposed trust system may not be needed by every organization.  If a 
company already has a good firewall and intrusion detection systems, it would not 
necessarily need to purchase these plug-in capabilities for their trust system.  In this 
case, the trust system can theoretically interact with the data provided by these existing 
network devices and complement them by providing its own unique capabilities in a 
synchronized conglomerate of distributed systems.  Key to the effectiveness of such a 
scheme would be an alert correlator to deconflict duplications of both data and alert 
traffic and to interpret and consolidate the protocols and information before presenting an 
integrated picture to a security analyst, network administrator, or engineer’s screen.    
Since every utility and utility company’s network will be different, each 
individual company must perform its own individual network needs assessment and 
simulation to determine security and financial feasibility and identify weak points and 
points of failure in its own network design.  It is then up to that company to implement 
the best network design with the level of redundancy and defense-in-depth that is 
economically feasible and corresponds to due diligence in protecting national 
infrastructure and utility services.  The trust system’s cost-effective, modular acquisition 
and employment options are well-suited for meeting a wide range of implementation 
requirements.  A logo for the functions supported by the trust system is depicted in 





Figure 9.  Trust System Logo with Capabilities Summary 
 
 
 3.2.4 Passive vs. Active Mode Implementations. 
Trust systems may be implemented in an active (or router) mode, where the 
trust system is implemented on a hardware device inline with all communications 
between the SCADA master control station and the nodes it controls and between the 
company’s SCADA network and its outgoing connection to the rest of the Utility Intranet 
as depicted in Figure 10.  This device may be a specialized trust box or a trust-enabled 
router which is also responsible for network routing of all packets on the link.  In this 
implementation, it may itself stop or correct malformed or malicious packets that it 
inspects.  The advantage is the ability to block malicious traffic immediately as it’s 
detected.  A block is constituted by a DENY entry being added to the firewall rules (for a 
specific IP address, interface, protocol, port, and/or message type combination) or a 
lowered trust level and/or access level (for a specific user or system). The disadvantage is 
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that the hardware device is a potential single-point of failure on that link.  If the entire 
hardware device fails, the link is down; however, alternate or redundant routes can 
alleviate this problem, as in any IP network.  The simulations and experiments for this 
thesis assume a trust system in active mode to demonstrate its blocking functionality. 
 
 




In passive mode, a trust device is connected to a hub or switch on the link 
between the SCADA master control station and the nodes it controls and between the 
company’s SCADA network and its outgoing connection to the rest of the Utility Intranet 
as depicted in Figure 10.  In this case, the trust system simply sniffs packets as they pass 
by, saves a copy to analyze, and alerts if a security or trust rule has been broken or has 
the potential of being broken.  The advantage to this mode is that the trust device is not 
in-line with the communications, so a failed trust system does not block the 
communications link.  The disadvantage is that the trust device cannot stop, only report, 
malicious packets it sees and it will do so after the packet has passed the trust system 
and is likely to already be delivered to the intended recipient.   
A way to implement blocking with a passive mode trust system is for the trust 
system to interact with a separate firewall or router ACL to block further packets by 
source_IP, interface, transport protocol, and message type combinations but there will 
still be some delay and a chance that one malicious packet will be delivered to its 
destination before other similar packets are blocked.  This is also known as half-active 
mode. 
In the case where some nodes cannot be loaded with nodal trust agents or afford 
the clock cycles required for encryption, the trust system may be implemented in either 
passive or active gateway mode as depicted in Figure 10.  In this implementation, trust 
system boxes or routers provide firewall and other security features for the nodes behind 
them.  They also create an encryption gateway between themselves to protect 
communications between trust systems.  This mode can also be referred to as tunnel 
mode, since IPsec would be implemented in IPsec tunnel mode. 
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Figure 11 depicts peer-to-peer and master-slave configurations of trust systems. 
 
 
Figure 11.  Trust System Configurations 
 
 
3.3 Real-world Applications for the Trust System 
 3.3.1 Inter-Company and Inter-Area Protection. 
 While not the norm in present day SCADA architectures, the concept of a Utility 
Intranet can make possible unprecedented situational awareness between utility 
companies, control and engineering centers, and neighboring utility control areas.  
Sharing of automatic status updates will enable near-real-time situational awareness for 
trusted ISOs, control authorities, or reliability coordinators who can, in turn, direct 
actions to prevent catastrophic overloads or underloads and ensure equity of resources 
within their areas of responsibility and oversight.   
 The trust system, when placed at strategic locations such as connections between 
adjacent utility companies, outgoing connections from utility companies to area control 
and engineering centers, tie lines between control and transmission areas, specifically 
between control centers and between engineering centers, and between reliability 
coordinators in different ISOs provides low-cost network security to traditional SCADA 
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networks with their mix of legacy, proprietary systems and protocols and newer 
standards-based solutions.  Appendix A illustrates the proposed hierarchical structure of 
information sharing, support, and command and control.  Obviously, an understanding of 
appropriate and inappropriate information flows (e.g. who, what, when, where, and how) 
is critical to network security planning and design in general but more so in the design 
and configuration.  
Just as status updates in electric power utilities are sent from field equipment via 
IEDs, RTUs, or PLCs and on to SCADA master control stations every few seconds, or 
even milliseconds, either the same updates, a subset of those updates (i.e. only significant 
changes from the previous update), or a summary report can be easily forwarded on to 
connected control area authorities and adjacent electric utility companies on the Utility 
Intranet.  When substation automation applications do not support this forwarding, the 
trust system can be configured to initiate this on their behalf whenever it sees a 
qualifying message cross its path. 
Situational updates shared between adjacent utility companies will facilitate 
automatic recognition of changing conditions that might affect their levels of generation 
or transmission.    Neighboring companies that receive reliable status updates will have 
earliest warning of creeping load changes versus current power generation levels.  Early 
warning and impact realization will prompt timely decisions on the right combination of 
load shedding and adjusted generation rates necessary to absorb or make up for the rapid 
changes in power flows from adjacent companies.  This will aid private companies in 
preserving service to their own customers while preventing potential blackouts and 
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alleviating the associated financial costs and loss of public trust that can result from 
outages.  
Monitoring systems in neighboring Utility Company Operations Centers can then 
automatically update their operational picture with a wider perspective of power 
capabilities and emergencies in the immediate area while area controllers, ISOs, and 
reliability coordinators would have a complete picture of currently segmented utility 
operations owned by private companies.  Control Areas can forward area-wide status 
updates and emergency notifications to a Regional Utility Operations Center and to their 
adjacent Area Operations Centers for improved regional situational awareness.   
Appendix B depicts the cross-flow of information within and between various Utility 
Intranet enclaves.  
The trust system can facilitate this message forwarding right now between utility 
company networks and control areas for which numerous existing SCADA applications 
do not cooperate in this manner.  When the trust system inspects and then reassembles a 
packet, it can check its own ACM for the list of recipients external to the company 
network who are authorized to receive that message type, translate the message into a 
new packet with the proper format understandable by those receivers, and then forward 
the original message internally, as normal, and the new message to those external 
destination IP addresses. 
 In the event a neighbor noticed a spike or increasingly dangerous situation, in 
what amounts to a macroscopic version of the local neighbor_trip, backup_trip, and 
intertrip messages that are proposed to occur through embedded software agents within a 
single company, a similar trip message might be generated from an adjacent neighbor 
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company to ensure the owning company is aware of the impending emergency and can 
approve or disapprove the requested action, even if its own systems are malfunctioning.   
The Northeast Blackout of August 14, 2003, the largest in North American 
history, illustrated this very scenario.  Due primarily to malfunction, accidental 
shutdown, and internal miscommunication, systems failed to report problems to the 
control center within one company, which later denied any need for concern when it 
received phone calls from a neighbor company warning they had indications of abnormal 
readings along their shared borders of the transmission grid [28].   
The controllers continued to operate, blind to the actual situation, for hours before 
the cumulative affect (there were also power lines that had sagged in the heat to where 
they contacted overgrown trees) created a system-wide point-of-no-return.  A series of 
cascading transmission line outages traveled through Ohio, around the Great Lakes in 
Michigan, through Canada, and into New York State in only ten seconds [9].  Once it 
began, the blackout that cascaded from Cleveland to the Northeastern United States took 
just seven minutes total [9].  Nearly 10 million people in the province of Ontario (one-
third of the Canadian population) were without power and 40 million people in eight U.S. 
states (one-seventh of U.S. population U.S.).  The financial losses due to the outage were 
estimated at $6 billion [29].  In a highly reliable and secure environment, trip messages 
from one company to another, especially from a trusted partner that has the interests of 
both companies at heart, might be trusted to automatically trip breakers in another 
company.  This would require a complete culture change from the way electric utilities 
are currently operated.  Today such company to company initiated actions would likely 
be rejected for fear of false trips due to technological or human errors, outside 
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hackers/crackers/attackers, or corporate sabotage/espionage.  This is where the trust 
system will assist in validating traffic and providing assurance to utility managers. 
Those companies hesitant to allow automatic actions to their systems by neighbor 
companies would be more amenable to the option to approve or deny the trip requests 
first or to allow neutral ISOs and reliability coordinators the ability to send commands to 
company SCADA systems or breakers in reaction to a growing power outage seen within 
their control area.  It is also conceivable that the control area authorities that recognize 
such a situation could contact the company to direct actions and, if granted proper 
permissions, initiate breaker trips remotely when the required reaction time does not 
allow for coordination.   Either way, shared electronic status readings are more credible 
than just word of mouth, and a master control station receiving conflicting reports from 
its own substations and its neighbor’s control center could alarm to warn the operator and 
would have prevented the 2003 blackout. 
 In the future, such security mechanisms as those investigated in the trust system 
simulations, when layered over ever-increasing bandwidth and connectivity between 
utility organizations, would enable the creation and operation of Regional Utility 
Operations (or Control and Security) Centers to ensure integrity and fair use of the power 
grid and a utility-specific capability for network security response, technical assistance, 
and law enforcement liaison for companies within its regional span of control.   
 3.3.2 Internal Traffic Protection. 
Internal to a utility company, the trust system provides firewall functionality 
between SCADA nodes and between the SCADA network and any connected office 
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environments, restricting traffic only to authorized protocols and message types, while 
compensating for bandwidth congestion and enforcing prioritization of packets.  It can 
ensure the fastest reliable delivery of important real-time and emergency traffic, 
unhindered by delay-tolerant background traffic such as routine e-mails and Intranet web 
browsing that might be present simultaneously.   
 The trust system envisioned will not only enable the sharing of automatic power 
flow status and corrections but would guard security enclaves and commercial 
communities of interest, protecting company-sensitive data from access by or accidental 
transmission to competitors, vendors, and other entities accessing the Utility Intranet that 
do not necessarily have the need-to-know, based on their duty position, or role.   
 3.3.3 Preventing Single Points of Failure. 
 The goal of the trust system is to be completely transparent to the controlled 
utility process and robust in the face of adversity.  The trust system is meant to be 
layered over the existing process and communications scheme through adding, in a sense, 
optional, independent security-layers to the network stack.   Even if the entire trust 
system was disabled, it should be completely decoupled from the industrial process such 
that nothing in industrial operations would break or slow down.   
 If a single trust system agent at a node (i.e. a nodal trust system) which inspects 
messages attempting to access enter through a device interface (at the physical and 
network layers) and monitors access operations attempts (e.g. read, write, copy, etc.) at 
the application level, should it fail, should not prevent functionality of the node in 
sending and receiving communications.  The industrial operations would perform as 
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always without skipping a beat, except the layered on security measures would no longer 
be in effect.  Review of the trust system generated security logs would indicate a gap in 
the regular entries expected (i.e. at a point in time where it is known that regular traffic 
was flowing across the link and trust system analysis detail should be present).  This 
absence of log entries for a significant period would be sufficient to quickly verify that 
the trust system is not functioning.   
 The best implementation of the trust system within an organization is in a 
distributed manner with a network-level trust system (NTS) as an overseer.  Each 
distributed trust system would be independent, but keep the NTS up to date so that it can 
maintain the big picture for the sake of correlating related events in multiple parts of the 
network.  In the face of lost communications with the NTS, a trust system agent loaded 
on a node, referred to as a nodal trust system, could operate on its own to protect its 
node and keep its neighbor nodal trust systems up to date, collaborating to ensure 
security in their interactive node-to-node communications.   The NTS might either have 
another trust system in the network pre-defined as an alternate, should it fail, or in the 
case of a leaderless situation, nodal trust systems might hold an election to designate a 
new NTS with the greatest resources available (above a minimum requirement) for that 
function. 
3.4 Trust System Concepts and Terminology 
 3.4.1 Roles and Categories. 
There are many different types of users requiring access to various SCADA and 
IT system data within the interconnected Utility Intranet.   Example user roles, for the 
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purposes of this paper, are listed in Table 8.  Several different roles may belong to the 
same category of users (e.g. for those within the same organization) that requires 
distinction as a group for the purposes of releasability.     
 






































A role could be arbitrarily defined to describe any group of individuals. For this 
thesis, the role has been specifically defined as a job position.  This role-based access 
may vary over time for a particular individual, depending on the individual’s assigned 
tasks, the data and tools they need to know and use, and the level of trust the company 
has in their experience, performance, and current level of training. 
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 3.4.2 Data Elements and Rights. 
Each user role is associated with a set of rights (i.e. permissions) for access 
operations (e.g.  view, read, write, copy, delete, move, execute, etc.) on specific elements 
of data and code available on the various systems in the network.   Potential data types 
that can be found on a Utility Intranet might include those listed in Table 9. 
      
Table 9.  Example Data Types 
Abbreviation Data Type 
OC Operations-specific (SCADA) Code 
DC Development Code 
DD Developmental and Test Data 
OD Operations Data 
SD SCADA-specific Data 
ND Network Data  (IT) 
NC Network Code and Configurations (IT) 
ED Emergency Management Data 
OA Office Automation and Common Drives 
LG Logs 
IW Internal (Intranet) Web Pages 
IC Internal (Intranet) Web Code 
XW External (Internet) Web Pages 
XC External (Internet) Web Code 
SE Security Data and Security Code 
CT Coding Tools 
 
Potential data access operations by Utility Intranet users might include those 
listed in Table 10. 
 
   Table 10.  Example Access Operations 












 3.4.3 Access Levels. 
An access level determines what data a user or device should be allowed to 
receive, see, and interact with.  More specifically, an individual’s access level is 
dependent upon two factors: an individual’s role and the Access Credentials Control 
Number (ACCN), an integer (0-4), calculated from the number and reliability of 
successful logon credentials presented for logon to the network. 
While very minute internal failures, outages, or limitations that have no effect on 
other companies or services provided to customers do not need to be known by 
competitors, when an event (or factors) are detected that could contribute to a widespread 
(outside of the company) emergency, some of these data elements, previously kept 
internal to the company, may need to be communicated.  In this event, either the access 
level of the user or device to be informed must temporarily increase or the access level of 
the data element must temporarily be decreased to make more “company sensitive” 
information available or releasable.  This also means there must be a mechanism to track 
access level state changes and a method to revert to the original level once the emergency 
situation is resolved.  The easiest way to deal with this is at the trust system when 
assigning access caveats to data elements.  Normally, some data elements might have 
company-sensitive or company-restricted caveats assigned. Data given a restricted caveat 
can never be sent to an external agency that is not authorized to see this caveat (financial 
reports might be an example).  Sensitive data (caveat = sensitive) may not be released, in 
general, to external organizations, except in certain circumstances.  If, for instance, all of 
the following conditions are met:  emergency = true & external_impact = possible & 
caveat = sensitive, then the data is releasable to a particular list of authorized IP 
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addresses.  There is no need for raising or lowering access levels of users or access 
caveats for data because once data is released it is then known and present outside the 
company network and cannot be taken back.  Another tag for released = true could also 
be set with a release date traceable to the release list so it is always known to whom and 
when sensitive information elements were released.  If not released, then released = false 
and it is understood that this information has never (deliberately and electronically) been 
made available to anyone outside the organization without the need to know.  
Access levels and access caveats are not the same as security classifications or 
security clearances assigned to government data and personnel, respectively.  Data of 
varying security classifications (e.g. Confidential, Secret, Top Secret) traditionally has 
not been maintained on the same physical network or connected networks and must 
maintain physical separation.  Although this has been the procedure to date, in the future, 
technology may provide strict logical separation control, for data of different 
classifications on the same storage media, that prevents any chance of remanence, bleed-
over, tapping, theft or inadvertent access by anyone not holding the appropriate security 
clearance for the data they attempt to view or access.  Research in this area is not the 
purpose of this thesis. 
Data, folders, and files could have an associated data type as well as a release 
restriction, or access caveat, such as “company sensitive” applied to them.  In this case, 
authorized access to both parameters and the proper read and execute rights would be 
required to view and use the folder, file, or data.  
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 3.4.4 Trust Levels. 
In addition to access levels, there are trust levels for both users and systems.  
Trust levels designated for the purposes of this thesis are depicted in Table 11. 
 




-0 Full trust (i.e. High) Control Area (CA) employee, Reliability Coordinator (RC), or 
Independent Systems Operator (ISO) 
-1 Cautious trust (i.e. Med) Employee of a partner company 
-2 Suspicious (i.e. Low) Employee of a partially-trusted competitor company 




The trust level is an integer to be subtracted from (or a negative integer that is 
added to) the ACCN (a positive integer from 0 to 4) of a user or system.  A trust level of 0 
is good and a trust level of -1 to -3 means something has occurred to cause the trust 
system to begin regarding further traffic from a particular source with greater suspicion.  
A lowered trust level decreases the ACCN, and, therefore, the access level of the user or 
system.    
If the trust system detects false or corrupted data from a node (e.g. a malformed 
or spoofed packet, DoS attack, or corrupted data), it must decide if it should initiate a 
maintenance trouble ticket or security alert, lower the trust level for that system, initiate a 
switchover to a redundant backup system (if available), or change its priorities for 
primary and backup sources of information for particular data elements that were 
originally supplied by that system?   
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 3.4.5 Multi-level Access.  
The assignment of access levels and rights over data elements can prevent 
unauthorized disclosure of sensitive data or even the existence of such data for multiple 
users at different access levels. 
Each individual’s account is tied to specific rights (i.e. permissions) over specific 
types of data by its assigned role (and category, if applicable).  One right would be for 
reading operational status message data elements.  Another might be for executing a 
diagnostic program. This applies not only to a utility company’s employees and systems 
but to partners and competitors, which would normally have no authority to initiate 
actions on that company’s systems.  User and system roles prevent a user from viewing 
data, files, folders, or systems in the network for which they are not authorized.  Those 
they can read, are prevented from modification if the user or system does not have 
authorization according to the ACM. 
Permissions for writing and executing code or initiating actions on or by the 
utility company’s systems (tripping a breaker, increasing/decreasing generation or load, 
shutting down, switching over from primary to backup, etc.) require specific access 
levels.  Rights (i.e. permissions) not only apply to accessing data elements in messages 
and in folders but also to accessing systems and sections of code (used by the system), 
etc. 
3.5 Trust System Modules Overview 
Appendix C illustrates the primary functions of the trust system in a flowchart of 
operations.  White blocks indicate functions simulated to illustrate the trust system 
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capabilities.  Gray objects indicate servers that are important to the SCADA network and 
comprehensive security monitoring that are assumed, but not simulated, in experiments 
for this thesis.  Gray diagonally shaded blocks indicate trust system functions not 
necessary to be simulated in the research for this thesis yet important to the overall trust 
system capability. 
3.6 Firewall Rules Module  
 3.6.1 Firewall Rules Check. 
The trust system is configured with signatures for authorized communications 
traffic, similar to a firewall whitelist. This is the opposite approach to blacklist firewall 
rules, which specify unauthorized traffic.  The trust system firewall rules filter incoming 
packets on the combination of source and destination IP pairs, message type allowed, 
protocol, source and destination ports, and trust system interface receiving the packet.  
In the firewall rules depicted in Table 12, only port 500 (IPsec) is allowed, to ensure all 




Table 12.  Firewall Rules and Outbound Routing Table Excerpt 
 
 
3.6.2 Encryption Check. 
 
All messages sent and received between systems on the SCADA network should 
use encryption, such as network-layer (i.e. layer 3 of the OSI model) IPsec, if it does not 
prevent delivery within time-constrained thresholds.  The SCADA network nodes 
simulated this thesis were assumed to communicate only over a single encrypted source 
and destination port (port 500 for IPsec) for inbound and outbound messages.  
Incoming messages are decrypted by the trust system with its private key and the 
sender’s public key.  If a message was both sent and received on port 500 and 
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successfully decrypted, the message passed the firewall rules encryption check.  If, 
however, the message was received unencrypted, the firewall rules encryption check 
failed immediately.  If the message was encrypted, but the trust system did not have the 
proper key to decrypt the message, the firewall rules encryption check also failed, 
because either the sender or the trust system had the wrong key.   
 3.6.3 Firewall Rules Scorekeeper. 
 If a message does not pass the firewall rules, the passed and failed parameters, 
known as labels, are updated in the firewall rules scorekeeper (FWR-SK) with the label 
name, value, and score (0=passed or 1=failed).  At this point, if one of the firewall rules 
labels failed, the packet has failed the firewall rules check and the packet may be 
discarded and ignored; however, for the purposes of search into maximum delay, the 
trust system is allowed to fully analyzed every packet, forwarding it through all trust 
system checks (i.e. firewall rules, format, and ACM checks) before documenting all 
passed and failed parameters and discarding bad packets. Therefore, the updated firewall 
rules scorekeeper is forwarded to the next trust system module, the format module.  
3.7 Format Module 
 3.7.1 Input Validation and Format Checks.  
If a message passes the firewall rules check within the firewall rules module, the  
firewall rules scorekeeper is forwarded to the format module component of the trust 
system for format and input validation. The trust system differs from a standard firewall 
(which usually looks only at lower-level IP addresses, ports, and protocols) in that it also 
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inspects a message’s packet and header sizes and contents as well as its application data.  
Data that does not meet expected types, values, or ranges is recognized by the trust 
system as a suspicious event and rejected.   
By checking packets against expected size, field content, or data ranges, the trust 
system identifies corrupted or malicious packets.  It may then auto-correct (if the proper 
value is known), discard, or discard and poll the sender for a resend. Such efforts can 
help to prevent database contamination and improper or erroneous actions by the 
intended recipient.  The trust system uses the following rules to analyze packets in the 
scenarios designed to support this thesis:  
1. Compare message payload length to the expected length for that message type 
2. Compare content and values to expected values or range for that message type 
3. Compare message source_IP to logged_on_IP of that system_name 
4. Compare message source_IP to logged_on_IP of that username (if message was 
user initiated and not strictly system-to-system)   
 If there is an expected value for overall packet length for the message type, this is 
checked first.  If no overall length is set for that particular message type, or if the overall 
length is correct, the trust system separates the packet into its individual components by 
reading and assigning each header and data value to label variables, specific to that 
message type.  The variables are then compared to the expected values for that specific 
message type.  If values are within expected ranges, or exactly match the expected value 
or list of values, the label passes the format check.   
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 3.7.2 Format Scorekeeper. 
 Similar to the firewall rules check, a format scorekeeper (FOR_SK) keeps track of 
which labels passed or failed and is forwarded with the FWR-SK to the next trust system 
module, the Access Control Matrix (ACM). 
 By forwarding along all scorekeepers from the previous checks (IP addresses, 
ports, protocols, etc. in the case of the firewall rules check and header and payload values 
in the case of the format check) to the next module (in this case the ACM), that next 
module has documentation of the previously evaluated parameter names and values that it 
might need for its own checks and also, when it comes time to create a log entry of the 
results or to re-assemble the original packet for forwarding onto the destination, all of the 
data and header information is maintained 
 3.7.3 Data Tagging. 
Before the FOR-SK is forwarded to the ACM, each label is tagged with a 
particular data element type and caveat.  This tag is used by the ACM for access control 
and can also be used for data archiving in a historical database or on a server, so that later 
access by users and systems can be checked against a trust system ACM (either at the 
network level or on the database/server itself) for authorization.  The data element type 
tag (i.e. OD, ND, OC, etc.) and other metadata parameters (such as creation date, original 
name, author, and data types/caveats; copies made by date and username, changed name 
and/or type/caveat; etc.) can also be carried along with the data (or file) when it is copied, 
pasted, modified, and attached to e-mails.  This metadata can allow the trust system to 
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evaluate access authorization for attachments in e-mails or access from the LAN, even as 
an original document is renamed or modified over time.   
3.8 Access Control Matrix (ACM) – Logon Security. 
 3.8.1 Initial Network Logon Control.  
The trust system Access Control Matrix (ACM) maintains the current name 
(username or systemName), role, and access level entries for all authorized network users 
and systems that it, or the nodes it protects, may need to interact with on the network.  
While the values for these entries are pre-configured and usually do not change very 
often, the logon ACCN, effective ACCN, and logon IP are initialized at zero until a user 
(or system) logs on to the network.  After an approved logon, the IP address from which 
the logon occurred is entered (i.e. the logon IP) and the calculated values for logon 
ACCN and effective ACCN are updated in the ACM.   
When the user (or system) logs off, the values are reset to zero again.  In this way, 
the trust system always knows the users (and systems) that are logged on and from 
which location (the logon IP), at any given time.  The trust level is normally zero (i.e. -0) 
at initial logon, and is only changed by the trust system if it detects behavior that lowers 
its trust in the user (or system).  
It is recommended that communications between the logon server and network 
trust system be via a dedicated (i.e. directly connected) and encrypted connection.  The 
purpose of a dedicated connection is to prevent spoofed network logon_evaluated 
messages being sent to the network trust system.  In this way, for the trust system to 
receive spoofed credential analysis, either the logon server must receive a spoofed 
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logon_request message, authenticate the false credentials and forward the results to the 
trust system or the logon server must be compromised in order to send incorrect 
messages to the trust system.     
No group accounts should be allowed, instead all users should be required to 
logon and authenticate individually with username and logon credentials to gain access to 
network resources. 
When a user (or system) attempts to logon to the network, a logon_request 
message, containing the user-supplied logon credentials (e.g. password, smart card, PIN, 
biometrics, etc.), is sent to the network logon server.   The logon server evaluates the 
credentials and informs the network trust system of which credentials passed or failed, 
in a logon_evaluated message.  
For a logon server capable of hosting a nodal trust system agent, the trust 
system functionality could be performed on the logon server itself and the network trust 
system informed, after-the-fact, of the results. 
The trust system uses the analysis of successful and failed credentials, provided 
by the logon server, in the logon_evaluated message, to calculate a logon ACCN, using 
the criteria outlined in Table 13.  The greater the number of credentials provided and the 
greater the reliability of those credentials, the greater the logon ACCN (LACCN).   For 
full administrator (i.e. root-level) access, at least two credentials with a total effective 
ACCN (EACCN) of at least 4 must be provided.  This is to lower the possibility of simple 




Table 13.  Example Logon ACCNs Assigned Based on Supplied Credentials 
Credentials Logon 
ACCN 
Summary of Access Granted 
Authorized username, incorrect 
password 
0 No Access 
Authorized username, correct password 1 Basic access, unless elevated by another logged-on 
user (same role) with a higher access level 
(effective ACCN of 2, 3, or 4) 
Authorized smart card, incorrect PIN 2 Basic access, unless elevated by another logged-on 
user (same role) with a higher access level 
(effective ACCN of 3 or 4) 
Authorized smart card, correct PIN  
or 
Authenticated biometrics 
3 Intermediate access, unless elevated by another 
logged-on user (same role) with a higher access 
level (effective ACCN of 4) 
Any combination of the above 
successful credentials for which the sum 
of the individual logon ACCNs is > 4 
4 Full (root) access 
 
After calculating the logon ACCN, the trust system then adds the current trust 
level for the user (or system) to the logon ACCN to give the effective ACCN.  The trust 
level is a negative integer indicating the level of trust that has been lost, normally -0.  If 
the effective ACCN is zero, the logon is denied.  If the effective ACCN is not zero, the 
trust system checks its Access Control Matrix (ACM) to determine the role assigned for 
that username.  This is essentially role-based access.  The trust system also determines 
the authorized combination of access operations on data types, based on the effective 
ACCN for that role.   
As an example, if user John R. Smith attempts to logon with the correct username, 
jrsmith, and with the following credentials: the correct password, smart card with PIN, 
and one biometric credential (i.e. fingerprint, eye scan, voice recognition, etc.) his 
assigned logon ACCN would be calculated from Table 13 using 1+3+4=7.  According to 
Table 13, he needs an effective ACCN of 4 to achieve root level access if the ACM affords 
that to his role.  The trust system checks the ACM to find that the username jrsmith is 
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assigned the role of SCADA_engineer and a trust level of 0. It then calculates the 
effective ACCN (effective ACCN =  logon ACCN + trust level = 4+0 = 4).  
The minimum amount of successful credentials supplied (i.e. only username and 
password) provides only the lowest level of access, equivalent to a basic_office_user for 
the purposes of this paper.  It is assumed that this might be a secretary or other office 
worker that has access to office automation tools and inter-office communications but no 
need-to-know regarding operational data or code. 
 3.8.2 Work Schedule Restricted Access.  
The trust system can also check each logon attempt for certain positions against a 
work schedule of authorized users.  This way it could detect unusual activity such as an 
employee coming in after hours or when they are not scheduled to work, in order to 
attempt something malicious.  If no malicious actions were performed (e.g. someone 
came in on a weekend to catch up on some office work) the log entry could be verified 
and ignored/annotated/deleted. This type of check would also alert for malicious logon 
attempts by an outside attacker that has compromised a username and password and after 
hours, on weekends, or during the shift the person with that username is not scheduled to 
work attempts to use the stolen/cracked username and password to gain access to the 
network.  This would be easily detected by matching the logon attempt against the 






 3.8.3 Simultaneous Logon Control. 
If a user, already logged on at one IP address, attempted to logon from a second 
IP address, the trust system would check its simultaneous_logon_limit parameter to 
ensure that the maximum number of simultaneous logons for a single user would not be 
violated before issuing a logon_approved message.  It would also verify that it was 
reasonable for the user to be logging on from the source IP by comparing the 
time_from_last_activity = current_time – time_of_last_activity for the IP address of the 
original logon to the time required to travel between the physical locations of the two 
logon IP addresses, to ensure it is reasonable for the user to have traveled to the new 
location to logon.  A query message would also be sent to the screen of the computer at 
which the user first logged on, displaying a message requesting that they approve or deny 
the simultaneous logon.   In this manner, if the simultaneous logon was spoofed, and the 
original user was at their workstation, they could click to DENY the logon.  If the 
response was APPROVE ,or if no response was received within 15 seconds and the trust 
system had no other reason to believe the simultaneous logon was not legitimate or 
reasonable, the logon would be approved and a second entry with the same username, but 
different logon IP and ACCN values, would be entered into the ACM.  If at any time the 
DENY query_response was received, or activity was observed from the keyboard or 
mouse of the original IP address, it would indicate a suspicious event.  The trust system 
also maintains a record, while a user is logged on, of the credentials used to logon at each 
location.  If, for example, a user logged on with a smart card at the first location, and 
attempted to logon with the same smart card at the second location, the trust system 
would query the system where the first logon occurred to ensure the smart card had been 
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removed.  If not, this would obviously be a suspicious event prompting a logon_denied 
for the second logon attempt. 
Logging off from either the first or second location, deletes one of the 
simultaneous entries from the ACM.  Then, logging off from the other location, doesn’t 
delete the last entry, but returns ACCN and logon IP values to zero. 
3.9 Access Control Matrix (ACM) - Access Operations Security 
 3.9.1 Distributed Access Control Matrices. 
The systems themselves (also referred to as nodes within this thesis) are 
authorized to only send certain message types to and receive only certain message types 
from specific other systems, and only on specific interfaces that match their routing 
tables.  All of these restraints are enforced by the ACM.  The primary network-level ACM 
is hosted on the network-level trust system (NTS).  Table 14 depicts an example portion 
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Each node (IED, RTU, PLC, data concentrator, SCADA master control station, 
etc.) that has the necessary hard drive storage and processing capacity available could 
maintain a local software ACM hosted on the node itself (in the form of a nodal trust 
system), or in the case of legacy systems, have a network device installed in front of the 
node to host the trust system software and protect one or more nodes behind it as 
depicted in Figure 11.  An example nodal ACM is depicted in Table 15. 
 
Table 15.  Example Nodal Access Control Matrix 








jhadams John H. Adams SCADA_operator Standard 3 -0 3 
hrlincoln Harry R. Lincoln vendor_engineer 3 4 -0 3 
dktruman Daniel K. Truman SCADA_engineer 3  3 -1 2 









Standard 4 -0 4 
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In this case, the node does not allow access to everyone that is able to logon to the 
network and instead maintains entries for specific individuals (usernames) and systems 
(IP addresses) authorized to logon through the node’s terminal interfaces or to access the 
node’s data or code via the SCADA network.   
For the purposes of this thesis, it is assumed that local (i.e. nodal) ACMs at each 
node send an update to the network-level ACM on the SCADA network trust system 
each time the node approves an update to its local ACM.  A node would only need to 
approve an update to its own ACM if connectivity to the network-level trust system and 
logon server were lost and the nodal trust system needed to act independently.  In this 
case, if a user attempted to logon directly to the node (for instance at a laptop or terminal 
connected to a remote substation IED interface or substation controller), the node would 
have to use its current ACM version to verify the username and password.  A successful 
logon results in adding a logon and effective ACCN to the local ACM to maintain the state 
of logged on users.  The node will also send a logon_request message to the logon server 
and ACM_update to the network-level trust system as soon as connectivity is restored, 
in order to update the network-level ACM.   
In normal circumstances, the network-level ACM always sends an update message 
to each of the appropriate local nodal ACMs whenever it approves a change to its own 
network-level ACM based on a network-level logon and verifies the nodal ACMs match 
the network-level ACM.     
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 3.9.2 Standard Access Levels.  
The SCADA network-level ACM has entries for all individuals authorized access 
to the SCADA network.  A nodal ACM maintains entries for all individuals authorized to 
access the node and all systems authorized to communicate with it.  Most access levels 
here are categorized as Standard, in which case the trust system will refer to its own 
Standard Access Levels Table (SALT).  Table 16 shows an example of a few SALT 
entries.  Using the Standard Access Levels Table, the trust system performs a lookup of 
the user’s (or system’s) authorized access operations based on their role and ACCN. 
  




Note from Table 16, which has been extracted from an overall Standard Access 
Level Table, that an operator with the highest access level (ACCN=4) is granted read (i.e. 
r) and execute (i.e. x) privileges (i.e. user access operations) for operational SCADA 
code and logs, but not the ability to change (i.e. write) them.   
The operator can also read operational data (e.g. SCADA status values) and 
emergency data (e.g. operational alerts) and execute SCADA code (e.g. sending OPEN 
and CLOSE commands to breakers).  The operator can only read, not modify, network 
data (e.g. congestion statistics, server health, links up or down, etc.). Table 17 depicts 
data types that might be available on various systems in the network. 
 







Only data elements that are readable to the operator would be visible when the 
operator explorers the network and system directories, folders, and files.  For example, 
suppose that the complete SCADA network file structure for the company is depicted in 
Appendix E. 
Because there is a data element assigned to each saved directory, folder, and file, 
when logged onto the company’s segment of the Utility Intranet, the file structure the 
operator sees might look like that depicted in Appendix F. 
In this fashion, the SCADA operator is only allowed to see the files for which the 
SCADA_operator role is granted access to read (i.e. has the need to know) and for which 
the proper logon credentials were provided. 
When logged onto the separate office network from an office computer, the 
operator (or any other user) is granted access to the office LAN and shared drives.  Read-
only access is granted to network data, the company intranet, and the external website. 
Note also that an IT network administrator has a very different set of authorized 
data elements and access operations as shown in Table 18. 
 
 






With an effective ACCN of 4, the network administrator can read and append logs 
but only has read access to security data (i.e. security alerts, packets blocked by the trust 
system or firewall, etc.).  Network administrators also have full read, write and execute 
privileges for network data and code, allowing them to modify configurations for IT 
components (routers, switches, servers, etc.) and write scripts as necessary to improve 
network performance; however, they do not have access to operational data or code, as a 
SCADA operator or SCADA engineer does.  Only a security analyst can modify security 
code (such as firewall and trust system rules).  Also in the example, the IT network 
administrator was given read, write, and execute privileges for the internal intranet and 
external website code to backup the webmaster and assist in responding to cyber attacks 
to the company’s web-accessible resources. 
While this is only a theoretical example, data categorization and user access levels 
could be tailored to provide more or less restriction to the various user access roles 
depending on company and utility needs. 
 3.9.3 Manually-Entered Access Levels. 
Manually-entered access level entries in the ACM assign a specific maximum 
effective ACCN to an individual.  The manual entry allows the security administrator (or 
trust system) to assign a specific ACCN, different from the Standard Access Level, to an 
individual user.  For instance, suppose new operators undergo a one month on-the-job 
training regimen and evaluation before being allowed to work unsupervised.  During this 
time, the company may assign a permanent maximum access level of 3 to the username, 
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allowing the new operator, with no further trust level restrictions, to only read but not 
modify operational and emergency data until fully qualified in their position. 
Suppose a particular vendor supports its products by providing in-house trouble-
shooting assistance to the company.  For this reason the vendor’s engineers are permitted 
to logon (on-site or remotely) to the utility company’s SCADA nodes that were 
purchased from the vendor in order to analyze performance and install system updates. 
 The last two times a particularly grumpy engineer named Harry Lincoln logged-
on remotely for routine updates, he did not request that the system be taken offline or 
inform the control center that his troubleshooting could kick off test alerts that might be 
mistaken for real events.  In addition, when he finished, he updated (appended) the logs 
with the problem and fix action in a less than professional manner. After explaining the 
company’s expectations and operational impact the first time, and seeing the same 
behavior again, the utility company security administrator manually entered an access 
level of 3 (Table 19) so that the next time the vendor engineer logged on remotely he 
would only have read access to operational data and code.  In this way, modifications 
would only be allowed when he was supervised on-site with access temporarily elevated 
to a full Standard Access Level (i.e. maximum effective ACCN of 4).  Later, when it is 
deemed that the individual has been performing satisfactorily, the Standard Access Levels 






Table 19.  Example Nodal Access Control Matrix Entries. 








hrlincoln Harry R. Lincoln vendor_engineer 3    
dktruman Daniel K. Truman SCADA_engineer 3 4 -0 3 
smwashingt Sally M. Washington SCADA_administrator Standard 4 -0 4 
 
 
Suppose a particular disgruntled employee, Daniel Truman, has given notice that 
he is quitting and Friday will be his last day.  His role is SCADA_engineer, so he 
normally has access to documentation of network configurations, SCADA code and 
production statistics, as well as other sensitive operational information.  
Based on an open display of anger yesterday, the utility company decides to 
manually enter an access level of 3 which allows him to read SCADA data and code as 
he passes continuity on to another engineer over the next few days, but prevents him from 
copying or modifying any sensitive data or code that might be sold to give another utility 
company a competitive advantage, used destructively against the company’s SCADA 
network, or taken out of the company to start his own enterprise.  
 In this way, the utility company regains control of its own network while 
maintaining a degree of flexibility in a dynamic environment. 
In addition, specific access can be configured in the trust system ACMs if an 
employee’s actions are suspicious.  For example, an employee or vendor with a 
SCADA_engineer role, normally able to see and use operational data and operational 
code, can be restricted from access to operational code based on two times when they 
have not followed the company policy of developing and testing code on a development 
system before porting it to the operational system.   
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 3.9.4 Access Level Elevation. 
If John Smith had forgotten his smart card or was somehow unable to provide 
biometric credentials, he would only be granted a logon ACCN of 1 with a correct 
password and username combination, which would authorize him basic_user_access.  If 
John Smith as SCADA_engineer needed to perform root-level functions, he would have 
to provide the proper credentials or he might be elevated to a higher access level as a 
result of being vouched for by another member of the company with at least the level of 
access John Smith wants to attain. Note also that all users authorized root level access 
must be authenticated by at least two credentials (for ACCN = 3 or higher) to gain this 
access.  
One purpose of the elevation function is to enforce security control, based on 
visual identification, while offering multiple logon options in emergency situations. This 
prevents a single forgotten or mistyped credential from resulting in an account lockout at 
a critical moment.  It also provides a secure alternative to leaving accounts un-protected 
(without passwords) to prevent lockouts.   
The goal of the network logon method is to provide a one-time logon, with access 
to all the systems and data a user needs and only at the appropriate, or necessary, level.   
It does not, however, conform in a straightforward manner to the IT security principle of 
Least Common Privilege but could be modified to enforce it more strictly.  Making the 
logon process faster, to prevent logon delays with the associated credential checks and 
ACCN calculation can be critical to responding to real-time emergencies, but optimizing 
calculations and search routines is left to follow-on research. 
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Note that an effective ACCN of either 1or 2 equates to basic_user_access for all 
roles unless vouched for and escalated by a user with the same role that has been 
authenticated at the higher privilege requested.  It is recommended that a user whose 
access has been elevated by such an elevation_request not be allowed to then elevate 
another user.   
This concept embodies two-credential integrity, where one credential can be a 
person that can visually vouch for the one requesting elevation.  Note the 
recommendation of visual confirmation vice phone calls.  Company security policy 
would have to deal with or disallow the potential phone call dilemma where an attacker 
uses social engineering techniques to pretend to be or copy/record the true voice of a 
legitimate user and replay it over the phone stating “I forgot my <credentials>, can you 
vouch for me?” to try to gain higher-level access after compromising a password and 
logging on at a lower access level. 
When a password is incorrectly entered, the trust system would also execute an 
algorithm to determine how close the entered password is to the X previous passwords, 
represented by a percentage.  Off-by-one might render a 95% depending on the overall 
password length.  A “close” password might indicate a legitimate user that mistyped the 
password.  Other characteristics such as trying the password again or changing the case 
of one or two letters in the next attempt might indicate a legitimate user that has forgotten 
the exact password.  In the same way, monitoring the entries could also indicate a 
dictionary attack when each attempt is completely different and does not come close to 
matching any previous passwords, especially if a single character changes in alphabetical 
or numerical order.  In this manner a potential legitimate user might be afforded five 
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logon attempts before locking out the password, whereas a dictionary attack might be 
detected in as few as two attempts.   
Combining known password attack signatures from a network IDS with the trust 
system algorithm would provide an even more intelligent analysis.  Analyzing host- and 
network-based IDS alerts with trust system security alerts would provide a significantly 
improved picture of attack attempts from outside the network, successful bypassing of the 
firewall, continuation of the attack once inside the company’s outer security defenses, 
and data returned to the attacker. 
 3.9.5 Message Sanitization.   
 When a particular recipient (system or user) is authorized, per the ACM, to 
receive a particular message type, but only allowed to receive a subset of the data 
elements contained in the message, the trust system can sanitize the message before 
forwarding it to the intended recipient.  In this way the code of the system sending the 
message does not have to be changed to send different messages to different destination 
users or systems.  This is especially usefully in cases where legacy systems and systems 
of different protocols are in use in the same company’s SCADA network or in the 
destination network.  The trust system in each network provides sanitization and can 
bridge communications between dissimilar networks with a protocol gateway capability 
as described in Section 3.12.1.  The trust system can maintain a list of multi-cast 
addresses for particular message types and situations to implement multicast on behalf of 
sending nodes that do not have this capability, and sanitized multicast to recipients that 
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can benefit from the message information (e.g. a status update) but who are restricted 
from receiving some sensitive parts of the data in the message. 
As an example of the sanitization process, suppose a status update from a node to 
the SCADA master control station contains the following data elements: OD, ED, ND. 
Also suppose that status messages are also to be relayed to neighboring company 
control centers so they have a clearer picture of adjacent voltage drops or rises that may 
affect their contracts or require an adjustment on their part to maintain balance in the 
power grid. Now suppose that under normal conditions, there is no need for a neighbor 
company that is a competitor to know if a single bus is undergoing maintenance.  The 
trust system can be configured to filter out certain data elements (in this case network 
data, ND) from messages to another company.  All that the node has to know is to send 
duplicates of the regular status reports it has been designed to send to its SCADA master 
control station and other recipients.  The trust system checks the access level (i.e. role 
and effective-ACCN) of each recipient IP address (and username logged on at that IP), 
each data element type of each label in the message, and the caveat of the data element 
types, against its ACM.  By doing so, it ensures unnecessary or company-sensitive data 
elements are removed from the message before sending it to an IP address or user that is 
not authorized the need-to-know, or in which there is less than full trust. 
Sanitization prevents unauthorized information leakage of company-sensitive 
information and is ideal for an environment with legacy systems or continually evolving 
requirements.  Simple changes to the trust system sanitization rules and ACM can 
accommodate routing and sanitization changes quickly.    
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In the same manner, even e-mail attachments could be checked for files not 
authorized for the intended recipient. 
For the purposes of demonstration in the simulations for this thesis, sanitization 
was implemented by replacing each to-be-sanitized character with a space character, to 
effectively blank-out the original information, in the sanitized output message.  A real-
world implementation would not allow recipients to have any indication that information 
was even missing. 
 3.9.6 Access Violation Attempts. 
 If a user or system attempts an access operation (i.e. an operation_request 
message is received), the data type of the data for which access is requested and the 
access operation on that data type is checked against the ACM for the individual (or 
system’s) current role and effective ACCN.  If the requestor is not authorized to access 
that particular data type, or is authorized access to the data type but not authorized to 
perform on that data type the operation requested, the attempt will be denied by the trust 
system and initiate a suspicious event. An operation_denied warning message will be 
sent to the screen of the source IP address.  Figure 12 depicts a sample denial warning. 
 
 




 3.9.7 ACM Scorekeeper. 
 Similar to the FWR-SK and FOR-SK, the ACM scorekeeper (ACM-SK) keeps 
track of failed logon, simultaneous logon, and elevation attempts. It also updates failed 
access operation attempts. When the ACM has completed all ACM checks, if any check 
has failed in the scorekeepers, all three scorekeepers are forwarded to the Suspicious 
Event Handler (SEH) module. 
 3.9.8 Supplemental Access Control Policies and Procedures. 
Another threat to critical infrastructure might come from a state-sponsored or 
terrorist source.  If online attempts to gain access are sufficiently thwarted, the only 
network access method may be kidnapping or armed assault.  If a company employee 
were held at gunpoint and forced to logon remotely to the network at escalated privilege, 
company security policies might require a beeper or cell phone message to a specific 
beeper number and beeper ID or cell phone number and phone ID to which the requestor 
must confirm the access attempt, deny, or confirm but send distress with GPS location.  
The problem here would be the possibility of stealing beeper and cell phone numbers for 
administrators from the company’s phone bills at the phone company or through a 
compromised online account. 
Despite all these efforts, the greatest threat is often from the inside.  Policy 
(security and termination) plays an important role in ensuring that network access is 
discontinued as soon as an employee is no longer to be employed by the company.  In the 
event of a disgruntled employee or corporate espionage, before the situation is realized 
and a decision is made to separate the individual, all actions by that individual are logged 
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by username and timestamp.  Later, these records can assist the company in holding the 
individual accountable for any damage or malicious intent.   
 3.9.9 Maintaining a Secure State.  
Before a change to the ACM is authorized and implemented, the trust system 
should auto-check the proposed ACM policy change to ensure both a proper domination 
relationship and a secure state are maintained using such methods as the *-property and 
Simple Security Principles for mandatory and discretionary access control [30].  These 
methods have not been simulated for this thesis. 
3.10 Suspicious Event Handler (SEH) Module.  
 3.10.1 Alert Counter. 
After the trust system evaluates a message according to its firewall, format, and 
ACM rules, if any parameter failed, the firewall rules, format, and ACM scorekeepers are 
forwarded to the trust system Suspicious Event Handler (SEH) component.  The SEH 
uses the failed parameters to determine when to generate a security alert and of what 
type.  Some types of suspicious events (SE) will create an immediate security alert.  
Others will start an alert counter.   
The alert counter is set in order to continue to monitor suspicious events that the 
SEH cannot yet determine to be a security issue (e.g. a failed logon that might be a 
legitimate user that has forgotten or mistyped a password).  The SEH increments the alert 
counter for each occurrence until the configured threshold for that type of alert is 
reached.  Once the counter threshold has been reached, the SEH generates a 
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security_alert message.  It may also lower the trust level of a particular message type, 
protocol, interface, username, system, or any combination of these parameters as a result.  
A lowered trust level may lower the effective_ACCN  in the ACM and may also require a 
blocking (i.e. deny) action in the trust system firewall rules. 
As an example, suppose the alert counter threshold is set to 3 with a duration of 
60 seconds for bad data packets detected, as shown in Appendix C.  The alert counter for 
the suspicious event is initially 0.  When the first bad data packet is received, the alert 
counter is incremented to 1.  After the second bad data packet, the alert counter equals 2.  
If three packets are received from the same source in a 60 second period, with data values 
that do not conform to the expected range, a security alert is generated and further 
messages on that interface from that source are blocked by updating the firewall rules. 
 3.10.2 Tracking Suspicious Events by Suspicious Event ID. 
When a suspicious event notification is received by the SEH (i.e. when the SEH is 
forwarded scorekeepers containing failed parameters) it initiates a new suspicious event 
ID (SEID), characterized by its SEID number, which is the date-timestamp that the event 
was first detected (i.e. when the first packet was received by the trust system), and two 
or three parameters known as trackers taken from the scorekeepers.  The SEID is an 
object containing all of the scorekeepers, the SEID number, and the trackers.  Table 20 
summarizes the tracker values assigned for different suspicious event types, indicated in 






Table 20.  Trackers for Possible Trust System Suspicious Events 
Suspicious Event (SE) 
Type 
Trackers 
















The purpose of the trackers is to be a reference point for correlating similar 
packets that may be part of a larger event.  Each time the SEH receives a suspicious 
event, before creating a new SEID, it compares the trackers for the incoming 
scorekeepers to the trackers of currently open SEIDs.  If there are no matches, it checks 
recently closed SEIDs as well. If any of the trackers match, the SEH will determine if the 
new activity is part of a previous SEID and, if so, update a currently open SEID or re-
open a closed, related SEID. 
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 3.10.3 Blocking. 
When a blocking action is required, the firewall rules allow the trust system to 
deny packets based on any combination of message type, protocol, interface, username, 
or system IP address.  If the traffic was previously allowed by a whitelist rule in the 
firewall rules, the Deny column is simply changed from false to true.  If the necessary 
granularity for the blocking rule does not already exist, a new rule is added for the 
activity experienced and the Deny column is set to true.  
 3.10.4 Trust Assignment and Authorization.   
By recognizing bad or malicious packets from a particular source, especially if it 
occurs more than once, the trust system can begin to lower its trust in further packets 
from that source and even switch to another more trusted source as its primary, trusted 
input for particular data elements, alerts, or status updates. 
Lowering the trust level for users or systems lowers their effective ACCN, 
restricting some of their access to critical data and restricting their privileges (i.e. 
operations on the data to which they still have access). 
3.11 Outgoing Message Handling  
 3.11.1 Re-encryption.   
If a message passes all trust system checks and is to be forwarded on to the 
original destination, after any required sanitization takes place, the trust system 
reassembles the payload in the original order and must re-encrypt it before forwarding it 
on to its intended destination. 
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Messages created by the trust system (i.e. queries, control messages, alerts, 
warnings, logon_approved/denied, operation_denied, etc.).  An exception is made in the 
case where original message was un-encrypted and it is believed that the source may not 
be encrypting properly.  In this case, UDP messages will simply be blocked and ignored 
and TCP messages will result in a RST/ACK to close the connection.   A 
query_encryption message may also follow, to the closest trust system to the source IP, 
requesting an investigation and confirmation of the encryption problem and actions taken 
to prevent further unencrypted traffic from the source. 
 3.11.2 Addressing and Routing. 
 For a trust system to be able to perform format and ACM checks, it must be able 
to decrypt packet payloads to inspect the data inside.   
 This is simpler if the encryption is accomplished solely by trust systems.  If the 
encryption is performed by a nodal trust agent on the source or a gateway-mode trust 
router along the path, that trust system will know the next trust system down the line, 
closest to the destination (i.e. a trust router or trust agent on the destination system), 
and be able to encrypt the packet with its own private key and the public key of the 
down-range trust system, then apply an IP header with its IP address as a source and the 
down range trust system’s IP address as the destination, before forwarding it on. The 
down-range trust system will strip the IP header, decrypt and inspect the contents.  If it 
is a trust router, and the packet passes all checks, it will apply another IP header with its 
IP address as the source and forward the unencrypted packet to the destination system. If 
the down-range trust system is a nodal trust agent on the destination system, the agent 
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will decrypt the packet, complete its checks, and if the packet passes, deliver the 
unencrypted original packet to the operating system.  
 If the source operating system applies IPsec encryption to its packets, this requires 
the source to encrypt the packet payload with the public key of the next trust system 
along the path and with its own private key, in order for the trust system to be capable of 
decrypting and inspecting its contents.  Then that intermediate trust system, after 
inspecting the packet, will repackage the original packet (with its original IP header), 
encrypt the packet with its private key and the public key of the next trust system closest 
to the destination, and add a second IP header to route it to that trust system. 
 The other option is for the sender operating system to encrypt the packet with 
IPsec and when the packet is received at the destination, the trust system  there performs 
decryption on behalf of the operating system, checks it, and passes it up to the next layer 
in the OSI stack if it passes all checks.  Although this requires fewer trust system checks 
and reduces end-to-end delay, the time to stop a bad packet is the greatest, only occurring 
at the destination. 
3.12 Other Required or Augmenting Capabilities Not Simulated 
 3.12.1 Protocol Gateway. 
Legacy RTUs, PLCs, and IEDs were developed with proprietary protocols and 
prior standards such as MODBUS, DNP3, Fieldbus, etc. This may require specific 




 3.12.2 Summary and Full Reporting Modes. 
To eliminate network traffic over bandwidth-constrained communication lines, a 
message from the trust system could toggle between full reporting (when all seems 
normal or there is good bandwidth and un-necessarily delayed traffic flow) or summary 
reporting (in the event of high congestion or when the node is involved in an emergency 
situation).  If necessary, based on bandwidth congestion or lines down, the trust system 
could send a squelch message to less important nodes to send minimal update info and 
not overwhelm the line.  Integrating security alerts with network management alerts 
would provide a more intelligent view of the impact of an attack in progress to bandwidth 
usage, although the trust system has an inherent bandwidth calculation algorithm used to 
determine TCP and UDP connection capacity.   
 3.12.3 Key Management. 
There is the potential for packets to be sniffed and the key cracked, enabling an 
attacker to spoof messages to and from nodes internal to the utility company or from 
outside utility entities.  Changing keys often can help to prevent this.  Especially when a 
compromise is detected or a suspicious event that might have resulted in a key 
compromise is suspected, the key should be automatically changed.  For this reason, it is 
recommended to have a key change and distribution process, initiated at random times at 
least once per week, potentially once per day, and if congestion is not a problem, per 
message via a reliable means (i.e. TCP).     
If an emergency is initiated in the middle of a key update, some nodes will have 
changed over to the new key and some may be in transition or not have received the 
 
151 
update yet.  Both the old and new key would need to remain valid until a response is 
received from all recipient nodes that the new key has been updated. 
 3.12.4 Node Discovery.  
All nodes on the network are required to logon on to the network logon server in 
the same way that a user must, in order to participate on the network.  A system provides 
its own unique credentials, such as IP address, MAC address, a unique node ID or node 
name, and IPsec authentication.  When the logon server evaluates the node’s 
logon_request message, it forwards a logon_evaluated message to the trust system, 
which then identifies if there is any security reason to mistrust or deny the logon and 
reports back to the logon server with a logon_approved or logon_denied message.  The 
trust system also calculates an ACCN (equal to 4 if there is no reason to mistrust the 
system) and updates its ACM to show the node_name and IP address as logged on to the 
network.  Whenever information is received indicating the node has gone down or is 
disconnected for an extended period of time (e.g. expected messages are not received and 
a subsequent ping or status check with the nodal trust system receives no response), the 
logon entry is deleted, and the logon server is sent a logon_denied message, requiring the 
node to logon once more to join the network when it comes back online. This realization 
would also prompt a maintenance_alert message. 
 3.12.5 Alert Correlation.  
Very often network security, network management, and the operators impacted 
the most by configuration changes are physically separated, hindering timely 
communications between these parties.  Ideally, all would be co-located in the same 
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control center room.  Whether this is the case or not, correlating network management 
system (NMS) and security alerts can facilitate a network management and security 
synthesis that, together, provide instant awareness of the impact of security 
configurations and cyber attacks on network performance and operations and the impact 
of network outages on operator capabilities and network security posture.  
By gathering all alerts from SCADA, EMS, network management, and network  
security platforms, an alert correlator can convert them to similar formats to display to a 
company, CA, or RC control room.  The alerts could be easily filtered to show only a 
subset of the total alerts (i.e. just the operational alerts, only emergencies, only network 
security alerts, or any combination or subset).  In this way, a control room could be 
properly staffed with operators, engineers, network security analysts, and network 
management experts that can operate in real-time off the same sheet of music and 
understand the complete impact of outages and emergencies on availability, performance, 
security, and safety of the entire network.   
 The trust system should include or work in conjunction with a network security 
correlation tool that would evaluate network security alerts from other security 
mechanisms (i.e. network and host-based intrusion detection systems and firewalls) in the 
network and initiate (or recommend to a human analyst) corrective or mitigating actions 
based on a simulation or estimation of network and utility service impact of such actions 
(whether automated or human-in-the-loop).  In fact, if malformed packets, bad or 
corrupted data, or DoS indicators were detected, the cause could be a system (i.e. 
software or hardware) malfunction or malicious attack, so evaluation of alerts from both 
security and engineering/maintenance perspectives is essential, further justifying the 
 
153 
integration of alerts from a network security, capable of informing and interacting with 
the trust system, with an overall alert correlator which is fed network security, network 
management, and operational alarms.  
3.13 Assumptions for Development of Experiments 
 3.13.1 Protocols and Standards.   
For the purposes of this paper and its experiments, an IPV6, TCP- and UDP-
compliant structure was used for messages.  UDP was the protocol-of-choice for non-
real-time updates and trust system queries, to alleviate network congestion.  TCP was 
used for emergency traffic and real-time or near real-time traffic that either required 
reliability or would be implemented as TCP by its manufacturer.  For example, it can be 
assumed that network logon operations would be designed as standard TCP/IP traffic by 
an IT vendor.  Furthermore, it was assumed that in an emergency situation a logon should 
be a high priority event (warranting reliability and confirmation) to ensure engineers and 
operators gain fastest access to the network to implement response actions.  For 
simplicity, even in non-emergency situations, logons are deemed high priority.  
Previous work by Birman, et al., demonstrated the feasibility of UDP messages 
for sending breaker trip messages between peer nodes on a SCADA network, within just 
a few seconds, when there is no network delay.  Delivery times were only a few seconds 
longer in the face of network congestion or communication links.  It is, however, 
necessary for some emergency situations to be resolved in fractions of a second, often in 
100ms or less.  Hard real-time notifications might even need to be made in 4ms or less.  
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For such messages to be received, processed, and reacted to, these UDP techniques do 
not provide the necessary reliability and transit time guarantees.   
In an attempt to resolve the more real-time requirements, the SCADA network 
was simulated as capable of UDP messaging for non-emergency traffic, and dedicated 
TCP bandwidth for emergency traffic.  For example, normal status updates are sent as 
UDP datagram packets.  Walled-off TCP bandwidth is reserved for emergency 
commands, including neighbor trip attempts and emergency status updates.  Criteria for 
emergency handling would be defined in the trust system specification and would 
typically be indicated by protocol (TCP) and message type.  A dangerous security event 
might also warrant the trust system sending an emergency alert notification.  The trust 
system implements a prioritization of each packet in its incoming and outgoing queues to 
ensure that only the highest priority packets are checked first and sent first.  Less 
important data that is moved to the back of the line, so to speak, would be checked 
against a staleness factor for the message type and queue.  It would only continue through 
the trust system process to be checked and forwarded if the time delay from waiting in 
the queue for higher priority packets to be processed did not make the data stale or 
obsolete, in which case it would be discarded because a more current update has already 
arrived.    
 3.13.2  Encryption Delay. 
For this thesis, IPsec encryption is assumed for all messages between nodes on the 
SCADA network in order to assess its impact.  The SCADA network nodes modeled for 
this thesis only communicate over a single encrypted port (port 500 for IPsec) for 
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inbound and outbound messages.  Nested application-level encryption would add 
additional overhead and require the trust system to update and cache application specific 
keys, but would greatly increase the security of transmissions.  Only IPsec was simulated 
for the purposes of this research effort but application-layer encryption would be useful 
to investigate in follow-on research. 
 3.13.3  Network Message Formats.  
 Various packets can be expected to traverse the Utility Intranet.  Commands from 
HMIs to SCADA master control stations, commands and polls from SCADA master 
control stations to substations (i.e. data concentrator, RTUs, PLCs, and IEDs), file 
transfers for IED configuration and PLC programming, and status updates and alerts from 
substation power systems, network management systems, and network security systems 
(e.g. firewalls and intrusion detection systems).  Even low-priority corporate e-mail and 
file sharing has been allowed to traverse some utility networks.   
Packet sizes for messages vary depending on purpose, payload, and protocol.  For 
the purposes of the simulations and experiments for this thesis, example message types 
selected for the model network are defined in Table 21.  The format for each message 








Table 21.  Message Types Defined for Simulations  
Type Message Description 
1 get_status Request for power status from a node. 
2 status Contains power status.  Response to a get_status or sent by a node to 
inform others of its status.   




Command to trip (i.e. open) a breaker. 
7 logon_request Generated by a workstation, terminal, or node when a user attempts to 
logon to the network. Sent to the logon server along with credentials 
supplied by the user.  Also sent by a node reconnecting to the network. 
8 logon_evaluated Generated by the logon server after receiving a logon_request.  Specifies 
logon server’s analysis of the user’s credentials (which were authenticated 
and which failed).   
9 logon_denied Response to logon_ request and logon_evaluated messages.  Relays the 
verdict that the logon is disapproved.  Includes the ACCN (0 because 
access is denied) and any ACM or trust level changes regarding that 
username.  May also inform the node’s ACM to locally deny any further 
attempts  if the network trust system’s SEH detected a dictionary attack 
and believed the logon attempts to be malicious. 
10 logon_approved Response to logon_ request and logon_evaluated messages with the 
verdict that the logon is approved.  Includes the user’s ACCN and any 
ACM or trust level changes regarding that username. 
11 security_alert Warning of suspicious event that violated the security policy. Includes 
actions taken by the trust system and a link to further detail. 
12 ACM_update Identifies most current ACM settings. Sent from network trust system to 
nodal trust systems (and vice versa) to promulgate ACM changes. 
13 suspicious_event 
_log 
Historical log entry record (or update) of a suspicious event. Contains per-
packet detail, trust system evaluation, and trust system response.   
14 query_packet Query by the trust system to find out if the source IP actually sent a 
packet believed to be spoofed. 




To prevent malicious logon.  Sent by the trust system whenever a 
currently logged-on username attempts to logon-from a second IP address.  
Creates an alert to the screen at the IP address where the initial logon 
occurred, prompting for an APPROVE/DENY response from the user.  
17 query_response Response to a query from the trust system. 
18 elevation_request Occurs infrequently when a user, who is authorized to perform duties at a 
higher level, but on this occasion does not have enough of the credentials 
present to authenticate at the higher level to perform a duty they are 
required to perform.  The request is sent by the user, after a successful 
logon at a lower than desired access level, to another user currently logged 
on with the same role but higher effective ACCN, requesting they vouch 
for their authorization and approve the trust system granting a higher 
effective ACCN than they provided credentials for.  Typically only an 
emergency measure. 
19 elevation_approved Sent by the network trust system to the node that originated an 
elevation_request with the verdict that the elevation is approved.  Includes 
the user’s new effective ACCN. 
20 elevation_denied Sent by the network trust system to the node that originated an 
elevation_request with the verdict that the elevation is denied.  
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Figure 13.  Format for Scenario Message Types 
 
 
 3.13.4 Background Traffic. 
Besides operational traffic, other company network traffic, including office 
automation (e.g. e-mail, web, etc.) and network management traffic (i.e. SNMP, etc.), 
might be present simultaneously on the same external communications links between 
organizations (even between internal offices).  Here again, exact network loading and 
bandwidth consumption will be company-specific.  The capability to inject large volumes 
of random background traffic into the scenarios was a limitation of the simulator and 
would be a good follow-on test of the robustness of the trust system.    
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the calculations and simulation results for 
trust system interception, evaluation, and response to real-time and non-real-time traffic 
expected in a Utility Intranet that includes substation automation, wide-area notifications, 
and malicious actions by a determined and intelligent foe.  The primary results are delay 
estimates of the time required for trust system checks, encryption mechanisms, end-to-
end delivery per packet, and scenario resolution, to include attack mitigation.  The second 
goal of this chapter is to estimate the potential applications for these security technologies 
and honestly evaluate limitations in defensive capabilities and real-time response. 
4.2 Investigative Questions Answered 
This chapter indicates that IPsec encryption can be used carefully in a SCADA 
environment to provide security and that a trust system, properly configured and 
maintained, will either prevent, quickly detect and mitigate, or provide sufficient 
evidence after-the fact to determine where and how malicious activity occurred in the 
network.  It supports the hypothesis that TCP and UDP can be used with bandwidth 
guarantees to meet real-time delivery requirements. This chapter also shows that the 
automated actions of the trust system can provide comprehensive, all-in-one, layered 
security, reducing the need for a large team of security analysts while giving those few 
security analysts required the exact tools they need to answer difficult questions 
regarding intrusion footprints. 
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The following sections of this chapter explain the measurements, foundational 
calculations, simulation scenarios, and resulting delays determined in bringing to life and 
supporting the trust system concept.   
4.3 Scenario Files 
 4.3.1 Input Files. 
 A text file comprised of the firewall rules was read in by the trust system 
main.cpp program prior to processing a scenario packet.  The number of rules in this file 
was kept to a minimum, including only the rules that applied for the scenarios.  This 
required the least firewall rules check delay, allowing the trust system simulation to 
avoid the low level of accuracy (i.e. 10ms increments) of the Microsoft Windows® 
system clock and reasonably substitute the average trust system check delay values 
measured for each message type and transport protocol.  
An input scenario text file was created to specify IP packet details for each 
scenario to be read into the trust system. Specifically, each component (i.e. label) of 
each packet’s headers and data were specified as variables and assigned the appropriate 
value for that scenario.  An actual IP packet would be received as a sequence of digital 
bits (i.e. ones and zeros) for which the trust system would need to strip off the 
appropriate number of bits for each component in turn and assign it to the appropriate 
variable to be evaluated.  However, for simplicity of generating and reading the 
scenarios, the components (i.e. labels) in each packet in the input file were represented 
from the start as a mix of integers, floating point variables, or doubles for numerical 
values and as hexadecimal or ASCII values for string or character equivalents. 
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Some of the more complex scenarios required multiple interactions between 
network servers, SCADA nodes, and the trust system.  In some cases, the trust system 
was required to send and receive multiple packets to and from other systems in the 
network.  This was required either to query for additional information needed to improve 
the accuracy of its decisions, block unauthorized activity, respond to logon server 
evaluations of logon credentials, or send updates such as changes to ACMs, access 
control lists, firewall rules, and assigned ACCN values, each of which defined 
improvements to the overall network security posture.   
To account for the end-to-end delay that would be experienced by these packets 
as they traversed the network, their message type (indicating message size in bits) and the 
source and destination IP addresses (indicating total distance to travel) were read into the 
simulator and used to calculate their impact on received time of the next message and the 
overall scenario’s completion time.  It was assumed that as soon as the trust system 
completed its processing of one packet, it was immediately ready to read in and begin 
processing the next packet, calling this the received plus queue time at the trust system.  
Packet sent time was then determined by subtracting the calculated transmit and 
propagation delay on the link from source to trust system and estimated queuing delay in 
the trust system input queue from this received plus queue time.  Any delays for sending 
packets due to human response time (i.e. in typing a password or reading an elevation 
request before responding) could easily be tacked onto the total transit time to account for 
delays at the source before the packet was sent. 
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 4.3.2 Output File.  
The output file entry generated for each scenario demonstrated an alert for 
suspicious activity, a log of the results of each of the trust system the checks (i.e. the 
passed or failed parameters), a log of actions taken by the trust system in response, 
documentation of the time to complete each check, and the total time to complete all 
trust system functions for a packet. 
It was assumed that the trust system was able to provide small network security 
alerts (i.e. with only minimal, summary information), either directly to the screen of a 
network security analyst or to an alert correlation system, on the network, where 
combined security and network management alerts could be evaluated for further action 
required or dismissal of false positives (i.e. verifiably legitimate events the trust system 
algorithms categorized as suspicious).  This was simulated by the trust system code 
writing the text of these entries to the output file under headings for each scenario and 
each packet in the scenario.  A more detailed log of the parameters that passed or failed 
the trust system checks and the values of those failed parameters were posted to the 
same output file to simulate logs sent to an archive for historical purposes.  The same 
detailed data would, then, be available for analysts to request if they needed further detail 
in their evaluation of a security alert, without automatically overwhelming their screens 
with potentially unnecessary excess data.  And easy way to implement this is a link in the 
summary alert allowing the analyst to then open and drill down into the related, more 
detailed historical record available on a separate data store.  Event and packet statistics 
(such as estimated bandwidth available on the link, response times, etc.) could also be 
calculated and posted to log entries. 
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4.4 Delay Measurements and Calculations Approach 
To simulate the operational feasibility of a network, two factors are of paramount 
importance: delay and congestion.  Both are contingent upon the bandwidth available 
throughout the network, propagation characteristics, store-and-forward operations (i.e. 
queuing delay) by individual devices within the network, the presence or absence of 
redundant paths and systems, system or connectivity failures, and the time required for 
trust system checks.   
 4.4.1 Trust System Delay. 
The trust system is able to measure statistics on delay for each received packet 
and each trust system check, to include the time to complete a firewall rules check, 
format check, logon check, access control check, and sanitization.  Summing these values 
gives the total time to complete all trust system checks necessary before forwarding the 
packet on to its destination (i.e. if it is a good packet) or throwing away a bad packet.   
It was discovered, however, that the Microsoft Windows XP® system clock 
updates in 10ms increments, which did not provide the microsecond granularity 
necessary for the small execution times of these individual functions. To estimate overall 
trust system check times, time trials for the various message types were conducted 650, 
000 times, for both TCP and UDP, to determine the minimum, maximum, and average 
delay for each message type.    For each trial, two different firewall rules files were used, 
the first with the matching rule at the top of the list, so that it would be found 
immediately, and the second with the matching rule at the bottom of a list of 2000 
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firewall rules, giving the slowest times for rule matches.  These results are depicted in 
Appendix D. 
It was hypothesized that dividing the firewall rules times by the number of rules 
in the firewall (i.e. 2000) would provide the cost per rule, which could then be 
extrapolated to estimate delays for smaller and larger rules lists.  It was also thought that 
dividing the format check times by the number of packet elements checked would 
provide an accurate cost per value, however the trust system format checks 
implementation was sufficiently different for each label, that the results varied greatly 
and were not easily extrapolated to estimate the required time for messages with greater 
or fewer data values.  It was, therefore, necessary to run time trials for each message type 
and average the results.   
The measurements were conducted using a PC with Intel® Pentium® 3.00GHz 
CPU and 3.50GB RAM, running the Microsoft Windows XP Professional® operating 
system with Service Pack 2.  Each message type ran through complete trust system 
checks 50,000 times and the results were average for each trial.  Each trial was repeated 
15 times for a total of 650,000 samples taken per message type.   
Minimum, average, and maximum values were recorded.  These results, using 
both UDP and TCP versions per message type, are depicted in Appendix D.      
 4.4.2 Network Transit Delay. 
Processing delay is the measure of the time required to examine a packet’s header 
and determine where to route the packet.  Processing delay would also include the time 
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required to check for bit errors in the packet that occurred in transmitting the packet’s bits 
from the source node to the router, trust system, and destination node [31]. 
 The total processing delay within the trust system from the time the first check 
begins on a packet to the time it is ready to be forwarded on to its destination is 
designated as dproc(TrustSystem).  This value is derived from actual measurements of 
execution time of the code’s checks.  
Queuing delay, dqueue, is the time while a packet sits in the output queue to be 
transmitted onto the link by the source node and each router or trust system along the way 
[31]. 
                    dqueue(node) = 3(sizequeue)sizepacket)/(rateincoming_link)        (1)  
where: 
                                             sizequeue = queue size of router, node, trust system (B) 
                                             sizepacket = packet length including headers (bits)  
                                   rateincoming_link = incoming link rate (bps) 
It would also include the time waiting in the input queue to be processed, which 
depends on the priority it is assigned and the quantity and size of higher priority packets 
that are processed ahead of it.  In the case of the trust system, dqueue has been divided 
into two parts: an incoming queuing delay, which is the time a packet waits in the 
incoming queue before processing of the packet begins by the trust system, and an 
outgoing queue delay which is the time the same packet waits to be transmitted onto the 
link by the trust system.   
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Transmission delay, dtrans, is the amount of time required to push (i.e. transmit) all 
of the packet’s bits onto the communications link at the source and each router or trust 
system along the way [31].  
                 dtrans = lengthpacket / rateoutgoing_link                    (2) 
where:  
                       sizepacket = packet length including headers (bits)                   
               rateoutgoing_link = rate of the link (bits/sec)  
The rateoutgoing_link can vary due to link congestion and dynamic bandwidth assignment 
algorithms.  
Propagation delay, dprop, is the total time required for the packet to propagate from 
the outgoing interface of one node in the link to the incoming interface of the next node, 
for each node along the path traveled by the packet.  If distancelink(i  -> i+1)  is the link 
distance (in meters) between a network device or system, node(i), that is about to transmit 
a packet onto the link, and the next device or system, node(i+1), poised to receive the 
packet and, if speedprop(i -> i+1)  is the propagation speed of the signal across that link (in 
m/s), then the propagation delay (in milliseconds) across a series of n links, dprop(end-to-end), 
is given by Equation 3 [31].  
 
               
        
 
For simulation experiments, the fiber cabling between each node within a company’s 








(1000) n (3) distancelink(i -> i+1)         
  speedprop(i->i+1) dprop(end-to-end) = 
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distance between the source and the destination nodes, could be used to approximate the 




∑ distancelink(i -> i+1), so that Equation (3) reduces to 
Equation (4) for LAN communications within a single company.   
 




Higher speed links were used for most inter-organization (i.e. company to company or 
company to CA) communications, requiring use of Equation (3) for their propagation 
delay. 
The propagation speed is dependant upon the physical medium of the link.  For 
these experiments, all internal company links were assumed to provide a total 100Mbps.    
The distances between fixed nodes were maintained in the trust system’s firewall rules 
with their traffic rules and were used to calculate available throughput and the legitimacy 
of receive times for incoming packets, especially when certain packets were expected 
only at regular intervals.  Values were adjusted within reasonable boundaries, for 
calculated current congestion values.   
Device processing delays are specific to each uniquely manufactured device in the 
network and can be expected to continue to decrease over the next several years as better 
and faster network technologies are developed.  In this simulation, reasonable delay 
estimates were used for network components such as routers, switches, and fiber optic 





dprop(end-to-end) =  (4) (1000)    
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per second was assumed.  Processing delay for routers and switches was assumed to be 
approximately the same.  A minimum value of 0.09 milliseconds and a maximum value 
of 2 milliseconds were used.  Constant queue size for all nodes was estimated to be a 
medium range of 300B. The greater the queue size, the greater the overall processing 
delay per packet. 
 
Table 22.  Network Device Delay Figures for End-to-End Calculations 
Device Delay Type Delay Estimate (ms) 
source dtrans lengthpacket / rateoutgoing_link 
dproc(router) min=.09ms, max=2ms 
dqueue(router) 3(queue_size)(message_size)/(rateincoming_link) 
router 
dtrans lengthpacket / rateoutgoing_link 
dproc(switch) min=.09ms, max=2ms 
dqueue(switch) 3(queue_size)(message_size)/(rateincoming_link) 
switch 
dtrans lengthpacket / rateoutgoing_link 
ddecryption 3(queue_size)(message_size)/(rateincoming_link) 




dencryption message type- and processor-specific, use 
Appendix E 
trust system 
dtrans lengthpacket / rateoutgoing_link 
fiber optic cable dprop(link) distancelink/(2.0*108 m/s)*1000  
dqueue(destination)  destination 
dproc(destination) min=.09ms, max=2ms 
total: dend-to-end sum of the above values 
 
 
End-to-end delay, dend-to-end, is the one-way latency of a packet from source to 







 dend-to-end = dtrans(source) + (dproc(switch) + 2*dqueue(switch) + dtrans(switch))(quantityswitches)        (5) 
+ (dproc(router) + 2*dqueue(router) + dtrans(router))(quantityrouters) + (dproc(TrustSystem)  
+ dqueue(TrustSystemIncoming) + dqueue(TrustSystemOutgoing) + dtrans(TrustSystem))(quantityTrustSystems)  
+ dtrans(source)  + dprop(link) + dqueue(destination) + dproc(destination) 
 
 4.4.3 Encryption Delay.   
 All packets in the SCADA network simulated were assumed to be encrypted and 
authenticated for greater data security.  The trust system simulation code does not 
actually perform any encryption or decryption, so, to estimate IPsec encryption delay, the 
research of Niedermayer, Klenk, and Carle  [32] was used as the basis for extrapolating 
values for each message type.  Their work indicated much better performance of IPsec as 
compared to SSSL.  Of the multiple IPsec Authentication Header (AH) and 
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) variations that they measured, the best, worst, and 
mid-range performers were selected for use in this thesis.  The results of their 
measurements demonstrated minimal difference between the performance of AH-only, 
ESP-only, and AH plus ESP; therefore, the obvious solution, for maximum security was 
to use both AH and ESP. 
128-bit Encryption Standard (AES-128) with SHA-1 authentication was the 
fastest performer with average security.  Unfortunately, SHA-1 has been cracked and a 
128-bit key is not nearly as secure as a 192- or 256-bit key.  Triple (3DES) with the 
stronger SHA-256 authentication was the worst performer, according to their 
measurements, creating a huge encryption time delay that also proved problematic with 
meeting real-time requirements for the scenarios.  192-bit Blowfish with SHA-256 
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performed in the middle range overall and appeared to be the best fit for both better 
security and lower delay.  Plotting the rise and run for their results, within the range of 
message sizes used for this thesis’ experiments, yielded the slope and general equations 
for extrapolating IPsec encryption delay with both AH and ESP (for maximum security) 
listed in Table 23.  
 






Encryption Delay (ms) # 
AES-128/ 
SHA-1 
trans            dAES-128/SHA-1(transport) = 1000((10.253)(sizepayload)+19337.5)/speedCPU 
                           sizepayload = size of message payload to be encrypted (bits)   




tunnel                dAES-128/SHA-1(tunnel) = 1000((10.52)(sizepayload)+19698)/speedCPU (7)
Blowfish-192/ 
SHA-2(256) 
trans       dBlowfish-192/SHA-2(transport) = ( 1.17)(1.146) dAES-128/SHA-1(transport) 




tunnel           dBlowfish-192/SHA-2(tunnel) = (1.3408) dAES-128/SHA-1(tunnel) (9)
3DES/ 
SHA-2(256) 
trans                      d3DES/SHA-2(transport) = (2.75)(1.17) dAES-128/SHA-1(transport) 
                                          = (3.2175)dAES-128/SHA-1(transport) (10)
Blowfish-192/ 
SHA-2(256) 
tunnel                          d3DES/SHA-2(tunnel) = (3.2175)dAES-128/SHA-1(tunnel) (11)
 
 
 Appendix E lists the results of these calculations for each message type traversing 
the simulated network. 
 4.4.4 Concurrency. 
Although the trust system C++ code for this simulation did not implement 
concurrent processes, a realistic implementation would use pipelining to increase the 
speed of execution.  Separate measurements of completion time for each check (i.e. 
firewall rules, format, and ACM with sanitization) on each packet traversing the path of 
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the trust system allow calculation of best case performance with concurrent processing 
of more than one packet at a time.  
4.5 Scenarios Approach and Simulation Network 
The escalating scenarios in Chapter 4 simulate IP packet traffic of various sizes 
and various message types between SCADA nodes and network servers that is 
intercepted and analyzed by the trust system.  The reaction of the trust system to each 
message, by accurately allowing legitimate traffic, blocking malformed packets and 
unauthorized traffic due to user errors or malicious attempts, or sanitizing information in 
messages that the receiver is not authorized read, demonstrated the successful execution 
of the trust system concept and supporting computer code.   Delay measurements were 
calculated based on maximum response times measured for the trust system and average 
and high-end ranges for each network component (i.e. routers, switches, and cabling) 
along the way.  The total time for each scenario was also calculated.   These delay figures 
indicate the impact of trust system operations on control system time constraints.   
 Figure 14, illustrates a simple, two-company slice of an interconnected Utility 





Figure 14.  Typical Network Diagram 
 
 
 The simple, yet realistic scenarios to demonstrate the concepts proposed in this 
thesis are based upon a fictitious electric utility company, Middletown Power and Light 
(MPL), and its personnel, a nearby utility company with some poor security habits, and 
their area control (or operations) center.  The scenarios are not intended to represent any 
particular real-life company or employee.  Figure 15 depicts the same network as Figure 
14, yet replacing the standard firewalls with more comprehensive, strategically placed 
trust systems in the network for a minimal trust system implementation.  The diagram 
shows the components and the distances used in calculations.  To illustrate applicability 
to highly remote communications, the two company control (or operations) centers are 
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100km apart from each other and 30km away from the nearest substations that they 
control.  The CA Operations Center is approximately 300km away from each company.  
Of course, the ideal trust system implementation would implement all router/switch 





Figure 15.  Scenarios Network Diagram (Minimal Trust System Implementation) 
 
4.6 Baseline Simulation Scenarios 
 4.6.1 Overview. 
The purpose of the baseline scenarios was to demonstrate trust system 
functionality in a benign environment with properly formatted traffic sent by legitimate 
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users or systems.  They indicate the delay induced by the trust system in a network 
without background or malicious traffic and estimate the associated impact on the types 
of day-to-day traffic expected on a Utility Intranet.   
 4.6.2 Scenario 1 - Legitimate Status Update.   
A legitimate UDP status update packet, Packet 1-1, was transmitted within MPL’s 
SCADA network from IED-239 (in Substation A) to MPL’s SCADA master control 
station.  The input parameters defined for Packet 1-1 (as received at the MPL network 
trust system) are depicted in Figure 16.  Note that IPv6 tunnel mode and trust system 
gateway (i.e. router) mode have been employed.  Specifically, the IED-239 nodal trust 
system encrypts the message from IED-239 using its private key and the network trust 
system’s public key then adds an IP routing header to send it to the trust system gateway 
closest to the destination, trust_router2, which happens to be hosting the network trust 
































//begin IPv6 outer header for tunnel mode 
  IP2_traffic_class  3290 
  IP2_flow_label   4E28C 
  IP2_source_address  2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4239 
      //nodal_TS@MPL_IED-239  
  IP2_destination_address 2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050 
      //network_TS@MPL_trust_router2 
//end IPv6 outer header for tunnel mode 
//begin AH header 
  … 
//end AH header 
//begin ESP header 
  … 
//end ESP header 
//begin IPv6 inner header for tunnel mode 
  IP1_traffic_class  C450 
  IP1_flow_label   13B87 
  IP1_payload_length  101 
  IP1_source_address  2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239  
      //MPL_IED-239 
  IP1_destination_address 2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3200 
      //MPL_SCADA_master_station 
 //end IPv6 inner header for tunnel mode 
 //begin UDP header 
  …  
  UDP_source_port  500 
  UDP_destination_port  500 
  UDP_length   26 
  … 
 //end UDP header 
 //begin message data 
  message_type   status 
  time_message_created  12:00:00.0000-20Jun07 
  busNumber   1006 
  busName    HUNTLEY_ 
  CAname    CA1 
  companyName   _MPL 
  nominalVoltageKV  +0220.000 
  busVoltPu   +0000.984 
  VoltKV    +0137.581 
  busAngleDeg   +0013.790 
  loadMW    +0017.610 
  loadMvar   +0320.740 
  gen_MW    -0236.740 
  genMvar    +0234.020 
  switchedShuntsMvar  +0200.000 
  actGshuntMW   +0009.110 
  actBshuntMvar   -0006.760 
  month_AMR_collect_start   0:00:00.0001-01Jun07 
  customers   20 
  month_AMR__total_usage   479,015.996     
  daily_ave_AMR_usage  24,563.731  
  AMR_usage_kWh_today  13,404.326 
 //end message data 
 //begin ESP trailer 
  … 
//end ESP trailer 
//begin ESP ICV 
… 
//end ESP ICV  
 




The trust system simulator code, at the time of this writing, did not implement 
multicast or a carbon-copy list, however this capability was simulated by sending the 
exact same message, with the same originating timestamp, to each of the other (external) 
destination IP addresses allowed to receive the message.  In this case, the same status 
message was forwarded to both the CA1 control center and a neighboring competitor 
company (adjacent company 1) control center.  In a network without a trust system 
agent loaded on IED-239, the network-level trust system (NTS) could create and send 
duplicates of the message to the CA and neighbor destinations based on its list of carbon-
copy recipients and on behalf of the IED, which could not multicast the message.  
According to the trust system firewall rules, both external destinations (i.e. 
outside the MPL SCADA network) were authorized to receive a status message, but the 
adjacent competitor company was not allowed to receive all of the same MPL status data 
that would be given to a fully-trusted organization, like the CA control center.  Instead, 
the adjacent company was only granted access to the minimal amount of performance 
parameters required for it to recognize or respond to emergency situations occurring 
within MPL’s span of control.  Although firewall rules and format checks all passed, the 
ACM identified data elements in the message, specifically financial rate and customer 
usage data (i.e. data type FN) which the competitor was not authorized to read.  As a 
result, the trust system sanitized the status message, as depicted in the packet detail of 
Packet 1-2, Figure 17.  The trust system demonstrated sanitization of the message that 
would be forwarded to the adjacent company by replacing each character of the financial 






 //begin IPv6 outer header for tunnel mode 
  IP2_traffic_class  F065 
  IP2_flow_label   C13AA 
  IP2_source_address  2392001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050 
      //network_TS@MPL_trust_router2  
  IP2_destination_address 2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:4057 
      //network_TS@adjacent1_trust_router7 
 //end IPv6 outer header for tunnel mode 
//begin AH header 
 …  
//end AH header 
//begin ESP header 
  … 
 //end ESP header 
//begin IPv6 inner header for tunnel mode 
  IP1_traffic_class  530E 
  IP1_flow_label   8B7A0 
  IP1_payload_length  101 
  IP1_source_address  2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239  
      //MPL_IED-239 
  IP2_destination_address 2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:3200 
      //adjacent_company1_master_station   
 //end IPv6 inner header for tunnel mode 
 //begin UDP header 
  … 
  UDP_source_port  500 
  UDP_destination_port  500 
  UDP_length   26 
  … 
 //end UDP header 
 //begin message data 
  message_type   status 
  time_message_created  12:00:00.0000-20Jun07 
  busNumber   1006 
  busName    HUNTLEY_ 
  CAname    CA1 
  companyName   _MPL 
  nominalVoltageKV  +0220.000 
  busVoltPu   +0000.984 
  VoltKV    +0137.581 
  busAngleDeg   +0013.790 
  loadMW    +0017.610 
  loadMvar   +0320.740 
  gen_MW    -0236.740 
  genMvar    +0234.020 
  switchedShuntsMvar  +0200.000 
  actGshuntMW   +0009.110 
  actBshuntMvar   -0006.760 
  month_AMR_collect_start   XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
  customers   XX 
  month_AMR__total_usage   XXXXXXXXXXX 
  daily_ave_AMR_usage  XXXXXXXXXX 
  AMR_usage_kWh_today  XXXXXXXXXX 
 //end message data 
//begin ESP trailer 
 … 
//end ESP trailer 
//begin ESP ICV 
… 
//end ESP ICV  
 




 In comparison, Packet 1-3 (Figure 18) was sent to the company’s CA control 
center, which was authorized to receive financial data because of its responsibility for 
regulating electrical power costs, usage, and generation, was unsanitized and had 
identical data as Packet 1-1, sent to the MPL operations center.   
 
MESSAGE UDP 
 //begin IPv6 tunnel mode outer header 
  IP2_traffic_class  DA2F 
  IP2_flow_label   1CC43 
  IP2_source_address  2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4239 
      //nodal_TS@MPL_IED-239  
  IP2_destination_address 2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050 
      //network_TS@MPL_trust_router2 
 //end IPv6 tunnel mode outer header 
//begin AH header 
 …  
//end AH header 
//begin ESP header 
  … 
 //end ESP header 
 
//begin IPv6 tunnel mode inner header  
  IP1_traffic_class  95C0 
  IP1_flow_label   B9602 
  IP1_payload_length  101 
  IP1_source_address  2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239  
      //MPL_IED-239 
  IP1_destination_address 2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:3200 
      //CA1_master_station 
 //begin UDP header 
  … 
UDP_source_port  500 
  UDP_destination_port  500 
  … 
  UDP_length   26 
 //end UDP header 
 //begin message data 
  messageType   status 
  time_message_created  12:00:00.0000-20Jun07 
  busNumber   1006 
  busName    HUNTLEY_ 
  CAname    CA1 
  companyName   _MPL 
  nominalVoltageKV  +0220.000 
  busVoltPu   +0000.984 
  VoltKV    +0137.581 
  busAngleDeg   +0013.790 
  loadMW    +0017.610 
  loadMvar   +0320.740 
  gen_MW    -0236.740 
  genMvar    +0234.020 
  switchedShuntsMvar  +0200.000 
  actGshuntMW   +0009.110 
  actBshuntMvar   -0006.760 
  month_AMR_collect_start   24:00:00.0001-01Jun07 
  customers   20 
  month_AMR__total_usage   479,015.996     
  daily_ave_AMR_usage  24,563.731  
  AMR_usage_kWh_today  13,404.326 
 //end message data 




//end ESP trailer 
//begin ESP ICV 
… 
//end ESP ICV  
 
 
Figure 18.  Packet 1-3 (Unsanitized Status Update, IED-239 to CA1 Control Center) 
 
  No suspicious event or security alert was warranted; therefore, the sanitized 
message was forwarded on to the adjacent company and the original message was 
forwarded to the MPL master control station and CA1 control center.  The packet details 
were logged to the historical database. 
 Table 24 summarizes the end-to-end delay totals for each of the three packets to 
reach their destinations, comparing IPsec mode options using Blowfish-192/SHA-2(256), 
maximum measured trust system values for a status message, and trust system 
processor speeds ranging from 3GHz to 12GHz.  Internal to the MPL network, the IED 
was able to deliver a status update within 1.62ms, well within the normal 2sec time 
constraint and sufficient for an emergency notification. External communication was also 
possible in less than 4.3ms over distances as great as 300km.  The greatest delay 
dependency resides in the routers along the path.  Routers with large queue size and high 
processing delay were simulated in conjunction with tunnel mode IPsec to provide an 
idea of worst case delivery with non-real-time routers.  Results indicated fractions of a 
second transit time, though not hard real-time.  Routers (or trust routers) that will handle 




Table 24.  Scenario 1 Delay Summary 
 
 
 4.6.3 Scenario 2 - Legitimate Area Summary and Emergency Trip.   
 A legitimate UDP area_summary message, Packet 2-1, was received from MPL’s 
CA1 control center.  These messages summarize power status for the hundreds, 
thousands, or tens of thousands of buses within the control area that would be of interest 
to a particular company.  The summary indicated rising load requirements in nearby 
towns managed by other electrical utility companies in the same control area.  Typical 
packet size is around 2.4MB and was simulated by sending 9600 status packets, similar 
to the example above, each approximately 250B in size; however in reality, maximum 
packet fragment sizes might be as large as 1500B.   
The calculated transit time, from send to receive, for a single status packet would 
have been a minimum of 4.25ms in IPsec tunnel mode with a 3GHz trust system 
processor (as determined from Scenario 1).  For 2.4MB, the estimated receive time would 
be approximately 9600 times that delay, equivalent to 40.8sec for MPL to receive and 
process the complete update from its area operations center.  At the high end of the delay 
spectrum, with large router/switch processing delays (dproc = 2ms) and larger queues 
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(1500B), delivery of one UDP status packet would have taken an estimated 37.88ms, 
requiring 363.652sec = 6min 3.7sec to receive and process the entire 2.4MB equivalent. 
However, only a few seconds after receiving the first bit of the 2.4MB 
area_status message, a legitimate TCP emergency trip message, Packet 2-4, was also 
received by MPL from the CA1 control center.  The parameters defined for Packet 2-4, as 
received at the network trust system, are depicted in Figure 19. 
 
 
 MESSAGE TCP  
 //begin IPv6 tunnel mode outer header 
  …   
  IP2_source_address  2001:6B03:105E:A993:28CA:E7BB:A4B3:4050 
      //network_TS@MPL_trust_router3 
  IP2_destination_address 2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050 
     //network_TS@MPL_trust_router2 
  … 
 //begin IPv6 tunnel mode outer header 
 //begin AH header 
  … 
 //end AH header 
 //begin ESP header 
  … 
 //end ESP header 
//begin IPv6 tunnel mode inner header   
  …   
  IP1_source_address  2001:6B03:105E:A993:28CA:E7BB:A4B3:3200 
      //CA1_master_station 
  IP1_destination_address 2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239 
     //MPL_IED-239 
  … 
 //end IPv6 tunnel mode inner header 
 //begin TCP header 
  TCP_source_port  500 
  TCP_destination_port  500  
  …  
TCP_control_flags  111000 //URG, ACK, PSH, RST, SYN, FIN 
     …      
 //end TCP header 
//begin message data 
  message_type   breaker_trip   
  time_message_created  13:00:00.0000-20Jun07     
  status    OPEN  
 //end message data 
//begin ESP trailer 
  … 
//end ESP trailer 
//begin ESP ICV 
… 
//end ESP ICV 
 





Because the packet was an emergency packet, indicated by the message type 
(trip), TCP protocol (emergency TCP bandwidth is reserved for extremely time-critical 
communications), and URG control flag being set, it was moved to the front of the trust 
system input queue, and allowed to interrupt the evaluation of the non-emergency UDP 
area_status summary packet.  The trust system processed the emergency trip message 
before completing all of the status messages, simulating the capability of the trust 
system to break evaluation of a single UDP 2.4MB area summary packet to devote all of 
its efforts to handling the emergency event.  Concurrent processes with sufficient 
memory and processing speed could allow simultaneous processing by the trust system 
with little impact to real-time response to the emergency.  The emergency packet passed 
all trust system checks, warranting no suspicious event or security alert.   
The source (i.e. CA1) was a trusted, neutral third party that MPL had given 
permission to initiate emergency actions on its systems, when warranted, so the packet 
was forwarded directly to the intended destination, IED-239.  A copy of the same packet 
was also sent to the SCADA master station for awareness in the MPL operations center.  
The MPL SCADA master station would, in turn, issue its own trip command in response 
and the node would respond to whichever message it received first and discard the 
second.   
After tripping its breaker, IED-239 replied in response with a multicast TCP 
emergency status packet to the MPL master control station and the CA control center 









 MESSAGE TCP 
 //begin IPv6 tunnel mode outer header 
  …    
  IP2_source_address  2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4239 
      //nodal_TS@MPL_IED-239  
  IP2_destination_address 2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050 
      //network_TS@MPL_trust_router2 
  … 
 //end IPv6 tunnel mode outer header 
 //begin IPv6 tunnel mode inner header 
  …   
  IP1_source_address  2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239 
      //MPL_IED-239 
  IP1_destination_address 2001:6B03:105E:A993:28CA:E7BB:A4B3:3200 
     //CA1_master_station 
 //end IPv6 tunnel mode inner header 
 //begin TCP header 
  TCP_source_port  500   
  TCP_destination_port  500    
  …  
  TCP_control_flags  111000 //URG, ACK, PSH, RST, SYN, FIN 
    …        
 //end TCP header 
//begin message data 
  message_type    status   
  time_msg_created   13:00:00.0218-20Jun07     
  breaker    1003 
  status    open  
//end message data 
//begin ESP trailer 
  … 
//end ESP trailer 
//begin ESP ICV 
… 
//end ESP ICV 
 




 The delay calculation results are summarized in Appendix F.  The emergency trip 
alone took an estimated 22-205 ms (regular TCP, tunnel mode IPsec) to execute using 
regular TCP control protocol, avoiding the blackout events occurring in nearby cities 
from spreading or affecting customers supplied by MPL.  Using an abbreviated TCP 
protocol (by eliminating an ACK from three-way handshakes and graceful closes and by 
only ACKing with data, whenever possible) would reduce the response time nearly 40%.  
The packet detail was also logged to the MPL log server and historical database.   
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After the trust system handled and forwarded IED-239’s trip response status 
packet, it immediately returned to completing its checks on the rest of the UDP 
area_summary update packet (i.e. the rest of the 9600 packets simulating a single 2.4MB 
packet).  The total time calculated for the trust system to evaluate this message was 
between 40.82sec (dproc(router/switch)= 0.9, 300B queue sizes) and 6min, 3.9sec 
(dproc(router/switch) = 2.0, 1500B queue sizes), from start to finish, including the delay in 
evaluating the emergency trip and response messages.  Of course, the trip action may 
have stabilized the overall area power status, rendering this message’s data stale and not 
worth continuing to process. 
The robustness of the trust system code created for these simulations was 
demonstrated in its handling of over 9600 packets while re-prioritizing its actions to 
handle an emergency. 
4.6.4 Scenario 3 - Successful Root Logon by a Legitimate User.   
 A logon_request, Packet 3-4, was sent from SCADA_admin_workstation1 by 
user Sally Washington, a SCADA administrator with username smwashingt.  Returning 
after a 2-week vacation, she had forgotten and mistyped her password as depicted in 






















 //begin IPv6 tunnel mode outer header 
  …    
  IP2_source_address  2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4051 
      //nodal_TS@MPL_SCADA_workstation1  
  IP2_destination_address 2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050 
      //network_TS@MPL_trust_router2 
 //end IPv6 tunnel mode outer header 
 //begin AH header 
  … 
 //end AH header 
 //begin ESP header 
  … 
 //end ESP header 
//begin IPv6 tunnel mode inner header 
  …   
  IP1_source_address  2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3901  
      //MPL_SCADA_admin_workstation1 
  IP1_destination_address 2001:A344:4DD1:F76F:D2CB:3B09:5629:1000 
      //MPL_logon_server 
 //end IPv6 tunnel mode inner header 
  … 
 //begin message data 
  message_type   logon_request   
  time_message_created   08:00:00.000-21Jun07  
  username   smwashingt   
  number_of_credentials  4    
  credential_1_type   PASS    
  credential_1   !#V8k12g4x   
  credential_2_type  CARD    
  credential_2   1D43EF3409193A389BB067867D3A80C3249B8  
  credential_3_type  PIN    
  credential_3   10465891   
  credential_4_type   FING   
credential_4  ÿØÿàJFIFdd1i=&ÿÛ„OXÖS+x°rGŽe-Ô&9|6C‡ùw?]     
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u“™Òß`é°³ÆUªTj¤Ö¼ö˜Úµ®Ê‰p®Êaµºm$<'×LhøÌbx 
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 //end message data 
//begin ESP trailer 
  … 
//end ESP trailer 
//begin ESP ICV 
… 
//end ESP ICV 
 




 The password entered, !#V8k12g4X, did not match the stored password of 
!#V8k12g$X; therefore, the logon attempt was denied.  The trust system recognized the 
similarity to the correct password and increased the threshold from three tries to five, to 
provide her more opportunities to log on.   
Sally tried a second time. The second logon attempt (Figure 22) was denied 
because the last character was a lowercase letter x instead of the expected uppercase X. 
 
 MESSAGE TCP 
 … 
 //begin message data 
  message_type   logon_request   
  time_message_created  08:00:15.000-21Jun07  
  username   smwashingt   
  number_of_credentials  4    
  credential_1_type   PASS    
  credential_1   !#V8k12g$x   
  credential_2_type  CARD    
  credential_2   1D43EF3409193A389BB067867D3A80C3249B8   
  credential_3_type  PIN    
  credential_3   10465891   
  credential_4_type   FING 
  …    
 //end message data 
… 













The third logon attempt was denied because of a typo, an @ sign instead of a 2, as 
illustrated in Figure 23. 
 MESSAGE TCP 
 … 
 //begin message data 
  message_type   logon_request   
  time_message_created  08:00:28.000-21Jun07  
  username   smwashingt   
  number_of_credentials  4    
  credential_1_type   PASS    
  credential_1   !#V8k1@g$x   
  credential_2_type  CARD    
  credential_2   1D43EF3409193A389BB067867D3A80C3249B8   
  credential_3_type  PIN    
  credential_3   1046589   
  credential_4_type   FING    
  …     
//end message data 
… 
Figure 23.  Packet 3-23 (Third Failed Logon Attempt, Typo) 
 
 
The fourth logon attempt (Packet 3-31) supplied the proper password.  Since all of 
the credentials supplied were correct, the logon server, sent the evaluated credentials to 

































 //begin IPv6 header 
  …     
  IP1_source_address   2001:A344:4DD1:F76F:D2CB:3B09:5629:1000 
     //MPL_logon_server  
  IP1_destination_address  2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3901 
      //MPL_SCADA_admin_workstation1  
 //end IPv6 header 
 //begin AH header 
  … 
 //end AH header 
 //begin ESP header 
  … 
 //end ESP header 
 //begin TCP header 
 … 
 //end TCP header 
 //begin message data 
  message_type   logon_evaluated    
  time_message_created  …  
  username    smwashingt   
  number_of_credentials   4    
  credential_1_type   PASS      
  credential_1_pass   YES    
  credential_2_type   CARD      
  credential_2_pass   YES     
  credential_3_type   CPIN      
  credential_3_pass   YES      
  credential_4_type   FING      
  credential_4_pass   YES 
 //end message data      
//begin ESP trailer 
  … 
//end ESP trailer 
//begin ESP ICV 
… 
//end ESP ICV 
 
Figure 24.  Packet 3-33 (Logon Credentials Evaluated by the Logon Server)  
 
The logon was successful, so no security alert was generated.  The trust system 
assigned an effective ACCN of 4 to username smwashingt in its ACM, granting Sally root-






















 //begin IPv6 header 
  IP1_source_address  2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050 
      //network_TS@MPL_trust_router2  
  IP1_destination_address 2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4239 
      //nodal_TS@MPL_IED-239  
… 
//end IPv6 header 
… 
//begin message data  
  message_type    logon_approved    
  time_created   …  
  username    smwashingt   
  effective_ACCN   4    
//end message data 
… 
 
Figure 25.  Packet  3-37 (Successful Logon by SCADA Administrator) 
 
 
 The trust system then generated a historical log entry for the historical archive.  
Appendix G lists the calculated end-to-end delay measurements for Scenario 3. 
4.7 Malicious Activity Scenarios 
 4.7.1 Scenario 4 – Unencrypted Remote Logon Attempts. 
 Before the trust system and other security mechanisms were installed on the 
MPL SCADA network, an attacker, intent upon disrupting MPL’s operations, first 
accessed an adjacent utility company’s network through an unsecured rogue office 
connection to the Internet.  Unknown to Sally Washington, the attacker then sent a 
spoofed e-mail to Sally’s co-worker at MPL with a Valentine’s Day card attachment 
using a compromised e-mail account and source IP address from the adjacent utility 
company.  Because the source IP address and SMTP were allowed and e-mail 
attachments were not being scanned by the firewall or by antivirus software on the e-mail 
server or workstations at that time, the e-mail easily traversed the MPL firewall and was 
loaded to the MPL e-mail server.  When the co-worker was logged onto shared 
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SCADA_admin_workstation_1 and opened the e-mail a malicious Trojan horse program 
was loaded onto the computer’s hard drive.  The malicious code could sniff and record 
keystrokes from the attached keyboard and from the Ethernet switch connecting the 
company control center workstations to the SCADA network.  The installed malicious 
code, using a non-disabled FTP service on the workstation, forwarded the results each 
evening to the compromised computer in the adjacent company to which the attacker had 
remote administrator access.  The sniffer captured keystrokes, including the username 
and local hashed password caches as workers logged on throughout the day, and reported 
them back to the compromised system for the attacker to extract.   
 Soon after this undetected incident, MPL management, concerned about 
improving the security of its operations after increasing reports of network intrusion 
attempts, had a trial trust system installed at a strategic location within its network and 
revised its security policies.   
While scanning the Internet, the attacker came across MPL’s external website 
which listed the names of company managers and technical support.  Sally Washington 
was listed as the point of contact for SCADA technical matters with her e-mail address, 
smwashingt@middletownpl.com.  The attacker then guessed, correctly, that Sally’s 
network username might be the same, or at least similar, to the beginning of her e-mail 
address. 
The next evening, the attacker attempted to logon remotely to the compromised 
MPL SCADA_admin_workstation1, with Sally’s username, in an attempt to gain 
SCADA administrator privileges.   
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The first attempt was a remote logon from the compromised computer in MPL’s 
neighboring company office using a common password, password12. The three packets 
crafted by the attacker were SYN (Packet 4-1) and ACK (Packet 4-3) control messages 
used in initiating and completing a three-way TCP handshake and the actual 




//begin IPv6 outer header for tunnel mode 
  … 
  IP2_source_address   2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:4057 
     //network_TS@adjacent_trust_router7 
  IP2_destination_address  2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050 
      //network_TS@MPL_trust_router2  
  … 
//end IPv6 outer header 
… 
//begin IPv6 inner header 
  …    
  IP1_source_address   2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:5231 
     //adjacent1_office_workstation 
  IP1_destination_address  2001:A344:4DD1:F76F:D2CB:3B09:5629:1000 
      //MPL_logon_server 
  … 
//end IPv6 inner header 
… 
//begin message data 
  message_type    logon_request   
  time_message_created  19:00:00.0000-30Jun07  
  username    smwashingt   
  number_of_credentials   1    
  credential_1_type   PASS    
  credential_1   password12   
//end message data 
… 
   
Figure 26.  Packet 4-4 (Remote Logon Attempt, Wrong Password and Unencrypted) 
 
The attempt was detected by the MPL trust system firewall rules encryption 
check and blocked closest to the MPL WAN boundary because packets are required to be 
encrypted with the proper key.  In this first attempt, the attacker was not even able to 
establish a connection with the logon server (the initial SYN packet was rejected) 
because the traffic was not encrypted.   
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In the second attempt, only packet 4-4 was sent, without establishing a 
connection, and was again rejected because it was not encrypted.   
Each time a non-encrypted packet was received and rejected, the MPL trust 
system queried the adjacent company’s trust system regarding whether the source IP 
address was properly encrypting its traffic (possibly needing to turn on encryption or 
update to the current key).  The parameters defined for the query_encryption message are 
illustrated in Figure 27.  The adjacent company’s trust system would then query it’s own 
nodes to determine the answer.  If the result was that the source had the current key and 
was encrypting its traffic (which was the case), the adjacent company trust system (on 
its own, or prompted by the MPL trust system) would then query to determine if the 
source had actually sent the packet the MPL trust system claimed to have received.   
 
MESSAGE UDP 
//begin IPv6 header 
  … 
  IP1_source_address   2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050 
      //network_TS@MPL_trust_router2  
  IP1_destination_address  2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:4057 
      //network_TS@adjacent1_trust_router7 
  … 
//end IPv6 header 
… 
//begin message data 
  message_type   query_encryption 
  time_message_created  … 
  key_ID    22:19:43.215-29Jun07 
    //end message data 
… 
 







The query_response, depicted in Figure 28, indicated that encryption was in effect 
at the node and the key was current.   
 MESSAGE UDP 
//begin IPv6 header 
  …    
  IP1_source_address   2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:3201 
     //nodal_TS@adjacent1_SCADA_master_station 
  IP1_destination_address  2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:4057 
      //network_TS@adjacent1_trust_router7 
  … 
 //end IPv6 tunnel mode inner header 
  … 
 //begin message data 
  message_type   query_response 
  time_message_created  … 
  encryption_on?   yes  
  key_current?   yes 
       //end message data  
Figure 28.  UDP Response to Encryption Query 
 
 
Next the adjacent company trust system queried the node to see if it had actually 




 MESSAGE UDP 
 //begin IPv6 header 
  … 
IP1_source_address   2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:4057 
      //network_TS@adjacent1_trust_router7 
  IP1_destination_address 2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:3201 
     //nodal_TS@adjacent1_SCADA_master_station 
  … 
 //end IPv6 header 
 … 
 //begin UDP header 
  … 
destination_port    500 
  protocol    UDP 
  … 
 //end UDP header 
 //begin message data 
  message_type    query_packet    
  time_message_created  …  
  rcvd_queryPacket_type  control    
  queryPacket_dest_IP  2001:A344:4DD1:F76F:D2CB:3B09:5629:1000 
  queryPacket_dest_port  500 
  queryPacket_protocol  UDP 
 //end message data 
 …  
 





In a third attempt the source IP address was spoofed to look like an MPL address. 
The query_response from the system in the adjacent company’s network that the attacker 
had pretended to be, indicated that it had not sent the packet, as depicted in Figure 30. 
 
 MESSAGE UDP 
 … 
 //begin message data 
  message_type   query_response 
  time_message_created  … 
  query_type   query_packet 
  query_time   … 
  response_1   no  
    //end message data 
 … 
  
Figure 30.  UDP Response Identifying Source Did Not Send the Packet 
 
In this case the source IP address in the attacker-generated packet was spoofed, so 
the trust agent of the system at that IP address responded to its network trust system 
that it had not sent the packet.  Note that it is also possible in a network where logging of 
all transactions occurs to a historical database, for the network-level trust system to 
simply query this database without having to create unnecessary traffic to be processed 
by individual nodes and their trust agents.  Now trust systems in both companies 
realized that malicious activity was occurring and began the process of tracking down the 
originating node for the traffic in order to block it closest to the source.   
No trust level change was required because the real node was performing properly 
and existing trust system rules would block unencrypted traffic.  Obviously, security 
responses that lower the trust level for any IP address or user could be leveraged by the 
attacker as a DoS against the adjacent company, by sending further spoofed packets to 
lower the trust level for a legitimate IP address or user.  In this manner, it might be 
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expected that the trust system would eventually block all traffic, even legitimate packets, 
from the adjacent company IP address. 
 As an aside, note that this is where the advantage of multiple, collaborative trust-
enabled routers can be brought to bear in increasing the intelligence of the overall trust 
system.  The trust system realized that the actual system in the adjacent company 
configured with the source IP address it was seeing in the spoofed packets, was not 
actually creating and sending the spoofed packets it was seeing and correlated these 
events with the first attempts using the adjacent company’s IP addresses.   
 The next step would be to track down the source of the spoofed packets. By 
sending a track_source packet out the interface from which the spoofed packets were 
being received, the MPL and adjacent company trust system’s would query other trust 
systems (i.e. trust routers, systems, and agents) it was aware of down-the-line, to 
determine which other trust systems had also seen the packet and on which interface (i.e. 
link or links) it had arrived.  The track_source would also inform them to block (i.e. 
update specific firewall rules to not allow the unauthorized traffic to a particular 
granularity) and initiate their own track_source for any further traffic of this type.   
As the next trust system down the line received the track_source packet, it would 
check to see if that packet had crossed its path.  Recognizing the packet and incoming 
interface, it would then send a track_source on that link to the next trust system or 
systems, which would in turn check to see if they had processed the same packet and, if 
so, track the source.  Eventually, a trust system would respond back to the previous trust 
system that queried it.  In the best case, it would state it had found the originating source, 
blocked the traffic, and alerted to the activity.  In the worst case, it would indicate it had 
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no more reachable trust systems to query or those it could query all responded 
negatively and the trail had run cold. Even in this case, the updated firewall rules would 
block further similar activity at the level closest to the source and a better picture of the 
incoming avenue of attack could be determined.  The event detail was logged to the 
historical database. 
 
In addition to the log entry, a suspicious event was initiated, generating a security 
alert to the screen of security analysts and network administrators as depicted in Figure 
31.  Further event detail could be accessed and drilled into from the analyst GUI to the 
security database and historical databases. 
 
SECURITY ALERT: 
 SEID-13:30:34.1756-30Jun07   
 
INFRACTION/S  1) Encryption error—unencrypted connection attempt.  
2) Attempted logon from external IP not allowed for 
username smwashingt, role MPL_SCADA_administrator. 
3) Malicious packet—packet-listed source_IP encryption 
current and did not send packet. 
 
 ACTION/S  Denied by MPL Firewall Rules. 
    Queried adjacent1 trust system. 
    Tracked source to 2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:5231. 
   //adjacent1_office_workstation 
    Adjacent trust system generated alert. 
 
 PACKET DETAIL 
 type   control (SYN) 
 time_message_created …  
source_address 2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3905 
//MPL_SCADA_admin_workstation1 
source_port  9593 
 dest_address  2001:A344:4DD1:F76F:D2CB:3B09:5629:1000  
//MPL_logon_server 
 dest_port   
 protocol   TCP 
 
 






4.7.2 Scenario 5 - Encrypted Remote Logon Attempts with Compromised Key. 
Realizing this would not be as easy as he thought, the attacker began capturing 
and analyzing network traffic outgoing from and incoming to the adjacent utility 
company’s network.   He recognized the communications between the two companies 
were all encrypted, so the only way he would be able to read packet data or connect to the 
MPL network would be to crack the encryption or get inside the network itself.  The 
traffic captures previously reported by the installed sniffer on MPL 
SCADA_admin_workstation1 had also showed encrypted port 500 interactions between 
systems on MPL’s network, indicating the use of IPsec.  He began work to crack the key. 
After considerable time he was able to crack the private encryption key for 
external communications and recognize the signature of key update packets.  He also 
optimized the algorithms for encryption cracking so that shortly after a key change, the 
new key could be cracked in a matter of minutes.  As he sniffed, decrypted, and studied 
traffic between the two companies, the attacker began to learn typical utility message 
types, node names, addresses, and common status values of MPL’s equipment.  After 
even more work he was able to crack the private key needed to spoof and encrypt packets 
that would be interpreted as either coming from the MPL or adjacent company networks.   
Shortly after MPL had installed trust systems and conducted a complete security 
policy review, just prior to the attacker’s latest attempts, the company had locked down 
unnecessary FTP services on its systems and denied external FTP connections.  All 
systems were scanned to remove viruses and rootkits, including the attacker’s Trojan.  As 
a result, the attacker could no longer receive reports from the now deleted program that 
had been installed on MPL’s SCADA_admin_workstation1. 
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Fortunately for the attacker, he still had the keystroke captures and encrypted 
password cache from an earlier time when Sally had logged on to the MPL network.  He 
was able to run a cracking program against the hashed password and keystroke dumps he 
had captured when the Trojan was still active.  After a few minutes, he was able to 
extract the decrypted password and waited for the opportunity to try again.   
In the attacker’s fourth attempt, the same packets were sent, this time properly 
encrypted.  The encryption check passed but the firewall rules module noted a rules 
mismatch in its scorekeeper, because logon attempts from an external IP address (i.e. 
outside of the MPL network), indicated by the incoming interface and the source IP 
address in the packet, were not allowed by the MPL security policy.  The activity was 
blocked at the MPL trust system and the adjacent company trust system was notified to 
update its firewall rules to block further logon attempts from its network into the MPL 
network.  The firewall_rules_update request might have initiated an alert to the screen of 
the adjacent company’s network security analysts to either approve or deny the requested 
rules change, in this manner providing a human-in-the loop review, instead of completely 
automated inter-company security configuration changes. 
Finally, in a fifth attempt, the spoofed source IP was changed to reflect a 
legitimate MPL address from which user smwashingt might realistically attempt to logon 
internally to the MPL logon server.  In this case, the packet was not received on the 
proper internal interface for that IP address (i.e. received on an external interface when 
MPL logon traffic should have been all internal) and was again rejected by the MPL 
trust system firewall rules at trust_router3.  
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Consider if trust router3 had not been there.  The network trust system at 
trust_router2, receiving TCP control packets and a logon_request from an MPL corporate 
office IP address, might have been tempted to assume the activity to be legitimate (by its 
IP address and interface) and allowed the packets into the network, routing them to the 
logon server. 
A quick trust system comparison of the actual traversal time of the packet (from 
send to receive timestamps) to the estimated travel time for a packet from the corporate 
office to reach the trust_router2 (based on distance and last congestion measurement) 
would have indicated the packet likely originated a much further distance away and 
would have been watched as suspicious. 
Without the attacker being able to insert himself in the middle of the 
conversations, the logon server responses were routed to the source IP listed in the 
packets, an MPL node, which would have dropped them because it was not expecting 
them (i.e. it had no active connection with the logon server and had not sent a 
logon_request).  A trust agent at that node would have recognized this activity as 
suspicious and alerted the network trust system.   
Even if the attacker had gained physical or virtual access to MPL switches or 
links, and could perform a man-in-the middle attack, he needed the correct credentials for 
the logon to be approved.  
What he did not know yet was that even with the correct username and password, 
he would not be granted a high enough ACCN to gain root-level access.  Had MPL’s 
security policy allowed Sally to simply logon with a separate root account password for 
higher level privileges, the attacker’s captures and password cracking program would 
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have provided the tools necessary to steal her password and gain root access.  In contrast, 
with the trust system’s credential credibility based access control, the quantity and 
credibility of logon credentials is used in determining a user’s access level. The attacker 
had no easy way to spoof Sally’s biometric or smart card credentials and could not use 
these to gain root-level access. 
 4.7.3 Scenario 6 – False Status Update. 
Having failed at a logon attempt, with the intent to still exhibit remote control of  
the MPL network, the attacker turned his attention to studying SCADA protocol 
documentation gleaned from numerous technical papers and vendor websites on the 
Internet.  From his review, and after sniffing and cracking MPL’s inter-company traffic, 
the attacker recognized the communications protocols for MPL’s SCADA updates and 
other operational messages.   
 The attacker crafted a false status message, Figure 32, to test his newly found 
expertise and attempt to direct emergency actions on the MPL SCADA network.  He 
spoofed the adjacent company’s master control station IP address and sent the message 























//begin IPv6 outer header for tunnel mode 
  IP2_traffic_class  11A0 
  IP2_flow_label   124C7 
  IP2_source_address  2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:4057 
      //network_TS@adjacent1_trust_router7  
  IP2_destination_address 2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050 
      //network_TS@MPL_trust_router2 
//end IPv6 outer header for tunnel mode 
… 
//begin IPv6 inner header for tunnel mode 
  IP1_traffic_class  32EF 
  IP1_flow_label   AA89C 
  IP1_payload_length  101 
  IP1_source_address  2001:DC99:31AC:9AAD:FC29:6C1A:80EA:3200  
      //adjacent1_SCADA_master_station 
  IP1_destination_address 2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3200 
      //MPL_SCADA_master_station 
 //end IPv6 inner header for tunnel mode 
 //begin TCP header 
  …  
  TCP_source_port  500 
  TCP_destination_port  500 
  … 
 //end TCP header 
 //begin message data 
  message_type   status 
  time_message_created  09:00:00.0000-1Jul07 
  busNumber   3378 
  busName    PARKVIEW 
  CAname    CA1 
  companyName   C 
  nominalVoltageKV  +0211.000 
  busVoltPu   +0001.084 
  VoltKV    +0137.581 
  busAngleDeg   +0013.790 
  loadMW    +0017.610 
  loadMvar   +0320.740 
  gen_MW    -0236.740 
  genMvar    +0234.020 
  switchedShuntsMvar  +0200.000 
  actGshuntMW   +0009.110 
  actBshuntMvar   -0006.760 
 //end message data 
 … 
Figure 32.  Packet 6-1 (Status Message with Spoofed Adjacent Source IP) 
 
The packet looked legitimate and passed all trust system checks except the time 
check. Status updates from that company were normally forwarded every 4 secs.  This 
one was early.  For reliability, the input was matched to the last status from the company, 
which indicated a tremendous jump in values.  Input from CA1 was also expected.  The 
last area_status from CA1 indicated no such emergency conditions.  The final straw was 
an actual status from the adjacent company, on-time, indicating no emergency situation. 
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The MPL trust system then queried the adjacent company’s trust system to 
verify its master station had sent the first emergency status message.  It replied negatively 
and together they began tracking and blocking the source. 
The attacker could see this interaction and, though not successful in causing the 
reaction he’d hoped, now he had the means to initiate connections to the MPL network, 
but had to re-crack the key after each daily key update.  The trust systems were also 
blocking his activity now from the compromised adjacent company workstation.   
 4.7.4  Scenario 7 - Work Schedule Mismatch. 
The next evening, the attacker traveled to a nearby remote, unattended substation 
owned by MPL.  MPL had purchased security cameras and motion detectors to monitor 
for break-ins to the substation yard but had not yet installed them.  The attacker was able 
to climb the fence into the substation with his laptop and found an unlocked door through 
which he could access one of the company’s IEDs and the data concentrator.  MPL was 
still in the process of implementing its security policy and the SCADA administrators 
were currently disabling all dial-up connections and logons previously allowed through 
terminal ports on substation equipment.  In this manner, vendor representatives or MPL 
administrators were now required to either physically log on to a computer within the 
MPL network or be granted access (i.e. after a terminal port was re-activated) by an 
administrator from the operations center, to allow a direct computer connection to IEDs 
and other SCADA nodes.   
After attempting the first terminal port, which had been disabled by the SCADA 
administrator, the attacker found another port that had not been disabled.  He was able to 
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connect his laptop to the IED but found he was not allowed to logon directly to the 
system, instead the IED nodal trust agent displayed a banner explaining that he was 
required to first logon to the network to gain access to the data and code on the IED.  An 
IED trust agent was capable of forwarding logon_requests, on behalf of a connected 
user, to the network logon server for authentication and accountability of actions.  The 
attacker’s first attempt failed because MPL was now using a different key for internal 
communications than it used for external communications between MPL and other utility 
organizations; however, it was using the same authentication and encryption protocols 
and mode.  
The attacker was prepared, and had the encryption cracking program loaded on 
his laptop.  After a few minutes of effort in cracking the internal encryption key, the 
attacker crafted connection requests and a logon_request message, Packet 7-4, displayed 
in Figure 33.  He then encrypted it, and forwarded it to the MPL network logon server in 
an attempt to logon with Sally’s username and password.  He did not have any other 


























/begin IPv6 tunnel mode outer header 
 …    
 IP2_source_address  2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4239 
     //nodal_TS@MPL_IED-239  
 IP2_destination_address 2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050 
     //network_TS@MPL_trust_router2 
 … 
//end IPv6 tunnel mode outer header 
//begin AH header 
 … 
//end AH header 
//begin ESP header 
… 
//end ESP header 
//begin IPv6 tunnel mode inner header 
 …   
 IP1_source_address  2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3908 
     //attacker_laptop_with_spoofed_MPL_IP_and_MAC 
 IP1_destination_address 2001:A344:4DD1:F76F:D2CB:3B09:5629:1000 
     //MPL_logon_server 
 … 
//end IPv6 tunnel mode inner header 
 … 
//begin message data 
 message_type   logon_request   
 time_message_created  20:00:00.000-2Jul07  
 username   smwashingt   
 number_of_credentials  4    
 credential_1_type   PASS    
credential_1   !#V8k12g4x 
//end message data 
//begin ESP trailer 
… 
//end ESP trailer 
//begin ESP trailer 
… 
//end ESP trailer 
 
 
Figure 33.  Packet 7-4 (After Hours Logon Request from Substation IED) 
 
The logon server validated the two credentials and notified the trust system.  The trust 
system checked the logon time against Sally’s work schedule, depicted in Table 25, and 
identified that she was not scheduled to work during that shift.  As a result, a suspicious 
event was initiated and a security alert generated, as depicted in Figure 34.   
 
Table 25.  Trust System Work Schedule File Entry. 
Username Date Start Stop (+/-) 






  SEID-20:00:03.0207-2Jul07   
  INFRACTION/S    Logon not authorized—work schedule mismatch. 
  ACTION/s   Denied by NTS ACM. 
  PACKET DETAIL 
   type   logon_request 
   time_message_created 20:00:00.0000-2Jul07  
   source_address  2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239 
source_port  500(ISAKMP) 
   dest_address  2001:A344:4DD1:F76F:D2CB:3B09:5629:1000 
   dest_port  500(ISAKMP) 
   protocol   TCP 
 
     SUSPICIOUS EVENT LOG: 
------------SEID-20:00:03.0207-2Jul07(NETWORK TRUST SYSTEM)------------- 
UPDATE-20:00:03.5341-2Jul07 (All times in seconds) 
  tracker/s   2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239 
      smwashingt 
  message_type   logon_request 
  _____________________________________________________________________ 
  ACTIONS 
  Logon denied by ACM 
  _____________________________________________________________________ 
  TIME CHECK 
 
  sent    … 
  received   … 
  incoming delay   …    [PASSED] 
  _____________________________________________________________________ 
  FIREWALL RULES CHECK 
 
  rule_matched …  
  source_IP   2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239 [PASSED] 
  dest_IP   2001:A344:4DD1:F76F:D2CB:3B09:5629:1000  [PASSED] 
  destPort  500      [PASSED] 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 CHECKSUM CHECK 
 
  checksum   010111010101111  [PASSED] 
  ___________________________________________________________________  
  FORMAT CHECK 
 
  message_type   logon_request   [PASSED] 
  time_message_created  20:00:00.000-2Jul07  [PASSED] 
username   smwashingt   [PASSED] 
  number_of_credentials  4    [PASSED] 
  credential_1_type   PASS    [PASSED] 
  credential_1   **********   [PASSED] 
  _____________________________________________________________________ 
  LOGON CREDENTIALS CHECK 
   
time_logon_attempted  20:00:00.000-2Jul07 
username   smwashingt   [PASSED] 
  password   **********   [PASSED] 
  logon_ACCN   2 
  _____________________________________________________________________ 
ACM CHECK 
 
  work_schedule_day  2Jul07    [PASSED] 
  work_schedule_time  07:25-18:35   [FAILED] 
  trust level   -0    [PASSED] 
effective_ACCN_assigned 0 
  _____________________________________________________________________ 
  SANITIZATION  Not required. 
 




During the day, a message would have been sent to a logged on network 
administrator, requesting approval or denial of the logon; however, with no logged on 
administrators (or if a timely response was not received), the logon was denied by the 
trust system with an effective ACCN of 0 assigned.  The attacker would have to try 
again when Sally was scheduled to work. 
The security alert and log results would be sufficient to indicate malicious 
activity, especially if Sally were questioned the next day to verify if she had tried to 
logon to the substation IED after hours.  Recognizing the malicious attempt would 
prompt the network administrator to require an immediate password change for her 
account before allowing her to logon again, further complicating the attacker’s attempt to 
use Sally’s account.  However, let’s assume that the event was not caught or reacted to 
quickly enough.  
The attacker left the substation in a fury and stormed through the empty parking 
lot toward his car.  Noting something on the ground, he picked it up, and squinted reading 
the small print of the card, depicted in Figure 5.  
 




4.7.5 Scenario 8 - Malicious Simultaneous Logon. 
The next morning the attacker attempted access from the substation once again.   
Sally was working that day and the attacker’s logon occurred after Sally had already 
logged onto the network from SCADA_admin_workstation1 with the correct password 
and fingerprint scan.  With these credentials, the trust system had assigned her an 
effective ACCN of 4, root-level access, as a SCADA_administrator.    For some 
unknown reason, she hadn’t been able to find her smart card that morning and assumed 
she may have accidentally left it at work or dropped it during her trip to the substation the 
afternoon before.   
That morning the attacker again supplied the correct username and password 




//begin IPv6 header 
 …     
 IP1_source_address   2001:A344:4DD1:F76F:D2CB:3B09:5629:1000  
    //MPL_logon_server  
 IP1_destination_address  2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239 
     //MPL_IED-239  
 … 
//end IPv6 header 
//begin AH header 
 … 
//end AH header 
//begin ESP header 
 … 
//end ESP header 
//begin message data 
 message_type   logon_evaluated    
time_message_created  08:45:00.000-3Jul07  
 username    smwashingt   
 number_of_credentials   1    
 credential_1_type   PASS      
 credential_1_pass   YES    
//end message data      
//begin ESP trailer 
 … 
//end ESP trailer 
//begin ESP ICV 
… 
//end ESP ICV 
 




In addition, the trust system recognized a previous and still active logon by the 
same username at another IP address, SCADA_admin_workstation1.  The simultaneous 
logon attempt prompted the initiation of a suspicious event and a query_simultaneous_ 
logon message (Figure 37) forwarded to SCADA_admin_workstation1, where the same 




//begin IPv6 header 
 … 
 IP1_source_address   2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3210 
     //network_TS@MPL_trust_router2 
 IP1_destination_address 2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4051 
     //nodal_TS@MPL_SCADA_Workstation1  
//end IPv6 header 
//begin AH header 
 … 
//end AH header 
//begin ESP header 
 … 
//end ESP header 
//begin UDP header 
 … 
 destination_port   500 
 protocol    UDP 
 … 
//end UDP header 
//begin message data 
message_type    query_simultaneous_logon   
 time_message_created  …  
 username   smwashingt 
 logon_IP   2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239 
     //MPL_IED-239 
 on_behalf_of   2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3908 
     //attacker_laptop_with spoofed_MPL_IP_and_MAC 
 effective_ACCN_assigned 2 
//end message data 
//begin ESP trailer 
… 
//end ESP trailer 
//begin ESP ICV 
… 
//end ESP ICV 
 












Figure 38.  Simultaneous Logon Alert Displayed at SCADA_admin_workstation1 
 
 
At that instant, Sally was away from her desk and did not see the message.  When 
no response was received within the trust system’s time-to-wait threshold (set to 15 
seconds), the simultaneous logon was allowed and a logon_approved message was sent 
to the source IP address from which the attacker’s request was initiated.    
However, with only username and password supplied, the trust system assigned 
an effective ACCN of 2 to this second logon attempt by username smwashingt, granting 
only basic user access and not the SCADA administrator role the attacker desired.   
The IED-239 trust agent updated its nodal ACM with the approved username and 
effective ACCN, then granted access to the attacker.  The attacker was thrilled when his 
logon was approved but soon found he was only granted full access to office automation 
tools and e-mail and read-only access to web pages, as a basic user, but no administrative 
rights.  Furthermore, as he perused directories he could view network common drives, but 
he was prevented from viewing any of the node’s operational data and code files or any 
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other SCADA network systems or tools, the folders of which were all denied read access 
(including viewing their existence) due to his low effective ACCN. 
Even if the attacker had attempted to use the smart card before Sally notified the 
network administrator she had lost hers (and the network administrator disabled smart 
card logon credentials until it was found or replaced), without the PIN, the attacker could 
only be assigned a logon ACCN of 3 with the correct username, password, and card, 
which, according to the MPL trust system ACM of Table 14, would allow him read-only 
access to operational and emergency data and code and execute access to tools, but not 
the ability to modify, copy, or delete either data type.  Although this limited administrator 
privilege is primarily to allow a legitimate non-elevated employee to perform basic 
administrator/operator functions quickly in emergency situations, it does not allow full 
administrative privileges which would be much more devastating in the hands of an 
attacker.   
Denied his desired administrative privilege on the SCADA network, the attacker 
quickly perused the MPL intranet pages and discovered the name of another MPL 
SCADA administrator.  He sent an elevation request (i.e. a query_elevation message) 





















//begin IPv6 tunnel mode outer header 
 …    
 IP2_source_address  2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4239 
     //nodal_TS@MPL_IED-239  
 IP2_destination_address 2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050 
     //network_TS@MPL_trust_router2 
 … 
//end IPv6 tunnel mode outer header 
//begin AH header 
 … 
//end AH header 
//begin ESP header 
 … 
//end ESP header 
//begin IPv6 tunnel mode inner header 
 … 
 IP1_source_address   2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239 
     //MPL_IED-239  
 IP1_destination_address 2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3905 
     //MPL_SCADA_admin_workstation5 
//end IPv6 tunnel mode inner header 
//begin UDP header 
 
 … 
 destination_port   500 
 protocol    UDP 
 … 
//end UDP header 
//begin message data 
 message_type    query_elevation    
 time_message_created  …  
 username   smwashingt 
 effective_ACCN_assigned 2 
 requested_ACCN   4 
 note    I forgot my card today. Thanks. 
//end message data         
//begin ESP trailer 
 … 
//end ESP trailer 
//begin ESP ICV 
… 
//end ESP ICV 
 
 
Figure 39.  Elevation Request Message from the Attacker to a SCADA Administrator 
 
 
When the second SCADA administrator received the elevation_request message 
on his desktop, he had not visually identified Sally.  Since she was in a different building 
but he could recognize her voice, he called her desk to make sure it was really her 
attempting to elevate her privileges without supplying all of the required credentials.   
 
211 
When the phone rang, Sally was just returning and picked up the call.  She 
confirmed she had not initiated the request.  The second SCADA administrator promptly 
denied the elevation request as depicted in Figure 40. 
   
MESSAGE UDP 
  … 
//begin message data 
   message_type   query_response 
   time_message_created  … 
   query_type   query_elevation 
   query_time   … 
   response1   no  
//end message data 
  … 
 
Figure 40.  Message Denying Attacker’s Elevation Request 
 
 
The trust system initiated a suspicious event and continued monitoring for any 
more related suspicious activity.  Meanwhile, Sally noticed the simultaneous logon 
message still displayed on her screen.  She immediately selected DENY, which sent the 
message shown in Figure 410 to the trust system. 
 
  MESSAGE UDP 
  … 
  //begin message data 
   message_type   query_response 
   time_message_created  … 
   query_type   query_sim_logon 
   query_time   … 
   response1   no  
  //end message data 
  … 
 
Figure 41.  Denial of Simultaneous Logon by the True User 
 
  
The trust system notified the logon server to logoff the second logon by 
username smwashingt, disconnecting the attacker and updating the network-level trust 
system ACM and that of IED-239 not to allow further logon attempts by that username 
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SEID   …  
ACSE   Simultaneous logon denied.  
INFRACTION     Username smwashingt at SCADA_admin_workstation1 denied 
    simultaneous logon at IED-239.  
Simultaneous logon active for … sec. 
ACTION      Second logon disconnected by network_TS@trust_router2. 
Automated simultaneous logon by smwashingt denied in ACM 
until reinstated. 
PACKET DETAIL 
type   query_response 
source_address  2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3901 
   //MPL_SCADA_admin_workstation1 
source_port  500(ISAKMP) 
dest_address  2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:4050 
dest_port  500(ISAKMP) 
protocol  UDP 
sim_logon_IP  2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:0239 
   //MPL_IED-239 
on_behalf_of  2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3908 
   //attacker_laptop_with spoofed_MPL_IP_and_MAC  
    
Figure 42.  Security Alert for Malicious Simultaneous Logon 
 
 Failing at all attempts over the last few days, the attacker abandoned his plot to 
disrupt MPL’s operations and turned his attention to easier targets in other companies 
that had not implemented such comprehensive rings of defense. 
 4.7.6 Scenario 9 - Disgruntled Employees. 
Installation of IEDs, high-speed fiber optic links, and the trust system’s 
additional security measures had increased MPL’s efficiency and security, reducing the 
need for as many SCADA administrators.  As a result, two employees with poor 
performance records (who were only kept around because of their close-held knowledge 
about the legacy systems) were notified in advance that they would be let go.  This was to 
be their last day.  Angry, they had been plotting together, over the last week, to steal 
company-sensitive financial and network configuration data they could sell for profit.  
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They also planned to sabotage the SCADA network with false data, hoping to cause a 
local blackout that might cost MPL hundreds of thousands of dollars in revenue this 
month.  The individuals were aware that the company security policy required their 
accounts to be immediately disabled the very afternoon of their last day, just after leaving 
the building.  As administrators, still in possession of a smart card and able to provide 
biometric credentials in addition to a PIN, on their final day they were still authorized to 
logon with full root-level privileges.   
One individual, an IT_network_administrator, attempted to steal a particularly 
negative quarterly financial forecast and overdue maintenance records, which if made 
public, might hurt the company’s reputation and potential value of company stocks.  He 
also planned to download network diagrams, password files, and configuration settings 
that would be valuable to US or international hackers seeking to exploit utility networks.  
He searched the common drives and found the quarterly report data which was 
viewable to his role.  He then attempted to copy it to a thumbdrive, whereby his 
workstation sent the packet shown in Figure 43, a copy request message, to the common 




//begin message data 
 message_type  operation_request 
 time_message_created … 
 username  bearnold  
 operation_type  copy 
 file   L:\Finance\QuarterlyReports\Jul-Sep\FinancialForecast.ppt 
//end message data 
… 
 





The trust system, checked the administrator’s role and effective ACCN against 
the ACM and found he was authorized to read but not copy this data.  In addition, as an 
IT network administrator, he did not have permissions to change the trust system ACM 
settings, as a security administrator role would have had.   Figure 44 illustrates the denial 
message displayed to the disgruntled employee’s screen. 
 
 
Figure 44.  Denial Message for Copy Attempt 
 
Next he found the folders containing network diagrams and the logon server’s 
password cache.  He did have authority, by his role, to copy these and was able to 



































 //begin message data 
  message_type   operation_request 
  time_message_created  … 
  username   bearnold  
  operation_type   copy 
  from_file   L:\IT\Diagrams\LAN_Diagram(current).vsd      
//common drive 
  from_file_data_type  ND  
//network data 
  from_file_caveat  company-sensitive 
 //end message data 
 MESSAGE TCP 
 … 
 //begin message data 
  message_type   operation_request 
  time_message_created  … 
  username   bearnold  
  operation_type   paste 
  from_file   L:\IT\Diagrams\LAN_Diagram(current).vsd     
//common drive 
  to_file    F:\Copy of LAN_Diagram(current).vsd       
//removable drive  
 //end message data 
 






 //begin message data 
  message_type   operation_request 
  time_message_ceated  … 
  username   bearnold  
  operation_type   copy 
  from_file   C:/etc/passwd\MPLpw.txt 
  from_file_data_type  ND     
//network data 
  from_file_caveat  restricted-release  




 //begin message data 
  message_type   operation_request 
  time_message_created  … 
  username   bearnold  
  operation_type   paste 
  from_file   C:\etc\passwd\MPLpw.txt   
//logon server password file 
  from_file_data_type  ND 
  from_file_caveat  restricted-release  
  to_file    F:\Copy of C:\etc\passwd\MPLpw.txt   
//removable drive 
 //end message data 




However, all actions were logged to the historical database for which he did not 
have permissions to modify.  Next he attempted to e-mail them to his home e-mail 
account, sending the Packet depicted in Figure 47.   
 
 MESSAGE TCP 
 … 
 //begin message data 
  message_type   e-mail 
  time_message_created  … 
  username   bearnold  
  To    hackersblog@yoohoo.com  
Cc    ihatemycompany@snotmail.com 
  Bcc    jwboothe@homenetwork.net 
Text m@dH@k3r, I got the initial $5000 check, so 
here’s the LAN diagram and password file for 
MPL as promised! I expect 50% of the highest 
bid when this gets posted on your site.   
-benedict  
  number_of_attachments  2 
  attachment_1   F:\Copy of  LAN_Diagram(current).vsd  
      //copied network diagram 
  attachment_1_dataType  ND  
  attachment_2_caveat  company-sensitive 
  attachment_2   F:\Copy of  C:\etc\passwd\MPLpw.txt  
      //copied password file 
  attachment_2_dataType  ND 
  attachment_2_caveat  restricted-release 
  e-mail_dataTypes  ND 
  e-mail_caveat   restricted-release 
 //end message data 
 … 
 
Figure 47.  Disgruntled Employee’s First E-mail Attempt 
  
The trust system inspected the message and found the attachments.  When it 
checked the data type against usernames associated with the sender and receiver e-mail 
accounts it determined that these files contained company-sensitive data not authorized 
for release outside the company network, so the e-mail was blocked.  The log entry and 








SEID    …  
ACSE Release-restricted data not authorized to leave 
company network.  
INFRACTION    User bearnold attempted to e-mail release-
restricted, ND attachment to unauthorized 
recipient/s.    
ACTION    Attachment stripped from e-mail by ACM.  
PACKET DETAIL 
type   e-mail 
source_address  2001:DC98:5634:2110:BD1C:BA89:7325:3901 
    //MPL_network_admin_workstation1 
source_port  500(ISAKMP) 
dest_address1  hackersblog@yoohoo.com 
dest_address2  ihatemycompany@snotmail.com 
 dest_address3  jwboothe@homenetwork.net 
dest_port  500(ISAKMP) 
protocol  TCP 
  number_of_attachments 2 
  attachment_1  F:\Copy of LAN_Diagram(current).vsd  
  attachment_1_dataType ND  
  attachment_2_caveat company-sensitive 
  attachment_2  F:\Copy of C:\etc\passwd\MPLpw.txt  
  attachment_2_dataType ND 
  attachment_2_caveat restricted-release 
  e-mail_dataTypes ND 
  overall_e-mail_caveat restricted-release 
 
Figure 48.  Security Alert and Log Entry for Blocked E-mail 
 
The administrator then changed the names of the files, re-attached them, and 




//begin message data 
 message type  operation_request 
 time_message_created … 
 username  bearnold  
 operation_type  modify 
 attribute  filename 
 from   F:\Copy of  LAN_Diagram(current).vsd     
    //copy of network diagram (original name) 
 to   F:\picture.vsd  
    //new name of file 
 data type  ND 
 caveat   company-sensitive   


















//begin message data 
 message type  operation_request 
 time_message_created … 
 username  bearnold  
 operation_type  modify 
 attribute  filename 
 from   F:\Copy of C:\etc\passwd\MPLpw.txt 
    //copy of password file (original name) 
 to   F:\moneymaker.txt //new name of file 
 data_type  ND    
    //same file, so data_type remains (un-editable) 
 caveat   restricted-release 
    //same file, so data type remains (un-editable) 
//end message data 
… 
 







//begin message data 
message_type  e-mail 
time_message_created … 
username  bearnold  
To   ihatemycompany@snotmail.com 
 Cc   hackersblog@yoohoo.com 
 Bcc   jwboothe@homenetwork.net 
 text   m@dH@k3r, I got the initial $5000 check, so here’s the LAN  
   diagram and password file for Company A as promised! I  
expect 50% of the highest bid when this gets posted on  
 your site.  -benedict  
 number_of_attachments 2 
 attachment_1  F:\picture.vsd    
//copied network diagram 
 attachment_1_dataType ND  
 attachment_2_caveat company-sensitive 
 attachment_2  F:\moneymaker.txt   
//copied password file 
 attachment_2_dataType ND 
 attachment_2_caveat restricted-release 
 
Figure 50.  Insider’s Second Outgoing E-mail Attempt with File Names Changed 
 
  
At this time the trust system was only configured to prevent inadvertent 
disclosures, however, simply changing the filename of a copy of an existing file, that had 
already been assigned a data type, did not change the file’s assigned data type. Again the 
e-mail was blocked. The administrator then removed his thumb drive.  A workstation-
level trust agent might have generated a message to the administrator’s screen asking if 
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he meant to download company-sensitive data or generating a security_alert.  In such a 
case, even clicking yes and proceeding with the theft or modifying the contents slightly 
and renaming, the file download would still be logged to the historical database. 
In this case the trust system, updated the suspicious event, generated a new 
security_alert with the second failed attempt details, and lowered the trust level for the 
username.  An analyst seeing the security_ alert event might have immediately 
recognized the potential harm and stopped the theft right away.  Let’s assume this did not 
happen immediately, but all actions were recorded and viewable after-the-fact. 
 The second disgruntled employee, a SCADA administrator, was authorized to 
successfully download current SCADA configuration files.  Had he been assigned any 
other role, he would not have had these privileges.  In this case, the trust system was not 
configured to alert for copy actions on sensitive-data by an employee on his last day, 
which would have alerted security analysts of suspicious activity, however, his actions 
were also logged by the historical database. 
 The next morning, reviews of the previous day’s logs indicated the activity by the 
administrators and they were greeted by law enforcement at their residences. 
4.8 Chapter Summary 
Chapter 4 has demonstrated trust system functionality and security enhancement 
in the face of various benign and malicious scenarios.  In each case, the trust system and 
encryption simulations performed within acceptable time threshold requirements 
indicating the potential for general implementation of the trust system on near real-time 
utility communication architectures and carefully application to some real-time utility 
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networks.  Congestion was assumed to be prevented through bandwidth management but 
was not simulated.  A successful implementation will require bandwidth and QoS 




V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter summarizes the research findings and applicability of employing 
collaborative, situationally-aware trust agents to manage security mechanisms such as 
IPsec encryption, format inspection, and trust-based access control over time-constrained 
Utility Intranet communications, both in local and wide-area interactions.  It concludes by 
recommending areas for follow-on research. 
5.2 Conclusions of Research 
This thesis indicates that the implementation of the proposed trust system 
inspections add minimal overhead to communications and can reasonably be applied to 
near real-time requirements.   These mechanisms were shown to perform well in the face 
of determined attacks.  It also shows that a mix of UDP and TCP traffic can deliver 
notifications that meet the majority of expected utility SCADA and wide-area protection 
systems.  In ideal, uncongested cases, they can even meet hard real-time response 
thresholds, but must be augmented by strict bandwidth guarantees and maintain the state 
of on-going events to prevent the negative effects of TCP congestion control and UDP 
unreliable delivery on critical communications.  While the implications of the proposed 
trust system hold great promise for the electric power grid and other utilities, they are 




5.3 Significance of Research 
In a very difficult and not well understood area of communications, where 
security solutions are still in their infancy, this research is a step forward in defining a 
unique, defense-in-depth capability for an industry that has been slow to understand and 
accept their increasing vulnerability to digital avenues of disruption.  The community has 
been even slower to learn new concepts and embrace the greater priority and corporate-
dedication required to keep operations running smoothly and prevent potential 
catastrophic consequences from network attacks in the coming years.    
This research is important in debunking the myth that security mechanisms cannot 
be applied to SCADA systems, yet it does reveal the added complexity of such 
endeavors, where mistakes are unforgiving and can cripple industrial processes and risk 
human life.  Nevertheless, the old paradigm of ignoring network security in order to keep 
process control and emergency reaction simple must be left behind and will require a 
great degree of corporate and utility community investment in technologies, unique 
network administration skillsets, network planning, testing, and routine training programs 
(covering topics such as network technologies, attacker capabilities, and security 
essentials) to continuously assess and refine the security posture of utility organizations. 
This research also points to the increased safety that can result across the grid 
through the secure sharing of information, facilitated by the trust system. 
5.4 Recommendations for Action 
It is the opinion of this author, that immediate action should be taken to develop 
an ideal security architecture for the national power grid and that a national level agency 
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should gather and manage detailed system and infrastructure requirements at levels 
higher than individual companies, enforcing both reliability and security standards at the 
same high level for all manufacturers.  A national utility communications simulator 
should be constructed to thoroughly test new configurations and industry patches before 
deploying them to the national power grid.  
An incentive must also be provided for developers of power equipment to gain the 
appropriate network security expertise and for utilities to incorporate security into their 
architectures.  One way is to enforce a certification program for utilities that ranks them 
according to their performance, efficiency, security posture, incident response and 
prevention, innovation, and environmental impact.  This program would serve to increase 
healthy competition in the areas that will benefit the country in its security, energy 
independence, and health for new generations.  A certification program should also give 
consumers a choice in their providers, increasing the incentive for companies to 
transform their operations.  
5.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
 Follow-on research is required in four main areas.  First, IP-based security 
mechanisms are highly dependent on bandwidth and QoS guarantees, which will also add 
additional negotiations and processing not accounted for in this thesis.  A study and 
incorporation of bandwidth management capabilities like Multi-Protocol Layer Switching 
(MPLS) into this scheme is required.  
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 Second, additional testing with encryption schemes at IP network, and application 
layers is needed to define which combination of software, hardware, and protocol-level 
encryption and key distribution schemes are most appropriate.   
 Third, a more detailed integration of IEC61850 protocol message formats is 
needed to accurately test exact time delays of future implementations over electric utility 
communications networks. 
 Finally, the trust system simulator code should be optimized and integrated into a 
robust network simulator such as Network Simulator 2 (NS/2) or OPNET, with more 
robust scenarios of power events and network penetration attempts incorporated into 
trust system scenarios.  As a starting point, Hopkinson, et al., have already designed a 
simulation engine known as Electric Power and Communication synCHronizing 
Simulator (EPOCHS) that integrates NS/2 with a power system simulator.   
An initial goal of the simulator development for this paper was to provide a 
generic tool into which the specific communication parameters of each individual system 
or network device could be entered and modified, depending on the actual or proposed 
topology of a company’s network.  The simulator code provided generic constant-
parameter place-holders for each device and medium (i.e. quantity of devices, link length 
and signal speed in medium, message size, parameters for propagation and transmission 
delay calculations, router queue size and processing delays) which could be modified in 
the future to accurately reflect vendor-provided performance statistics of that company’s 
network as newer technologies become available.  The implementation for these 
calculations was rudimentary (generic formulas and delay summation).  Greater 
performance granularity could be achieved with a network simulator such as OPNet or 
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NS/2, which can simulate real-world performance of specific vendor routers and other 
network devices and introduce varying background traffic loads. 
 Realistic scenarios could easily be implemented using the actual New York Power 
Pool (NYPP) bus data that has been incorporated into EPOCHS files.  A cascading 
blackout scenario, similar to what occurred in the Northeast US in 2003, could be 
recreated to show that the trust system is able to prevent the cascade and to measure the 
time required for breakers to trip with the security mechanisms in place, a mix of TCP 
and UDP trip messages, link drops, and varying background traffic loads.  Also measured 
should be the time required to notify and receive responses from control areas, regional 
coordinators, and regional control centers.   
 To provide a sample of realistic data, the NYPP file could be used to simulate 
multiple, interconnected SCADA networks.  Specifically the busses and loads might be 
arbitrarily divided into eight different zones (A-H) of roughly the same size, as depicted 
in Figure 51.  Each area, in this case would represent a different utility company and two 
or three utility companies would comprise a single control area (CA) with a reliability 
coordinator and ISO, for a total of three CAs.  Although, the actual NYPP is organized 
under a single ISO, the NYPP is unique in this regard.  This selection is realistic since 
most other states of comparable size are comprised of multiple ISOs overseeing one, two, 





Figure 51.  New York Power Pool Subdivided Into Utility Companies 
 
These eight subdivisions (i.e. A,B,C,D,E,F,G, and H) would represent eight 
separate electric utility companies with responsibilities for generation, transmission, and 
distribution.  Each company has Utility Intranet connections to others in its vicinity.  
These data connection edges could be modeled to parallel the actual point-to-point flows 
of electric power that currently exist between power system nodes (generation plants, 
substations, etc).  The eight companies might comprise three different control areas, 
where, for example, CA1 is comprised of three companies (A,B,C), CA2 is comprised of 
three more companies (D,E,F), and the final control area, CA3, is comprised of only two 
companies (G,H).   
Generators, step-down transformers, and other power system entities would be 
replaced in the Intranet communication model with communication nodes representing 
either an IED/switch/router combination in a substation (or generation facility) or, at the 
supervisory level, either the EMS/SCADA master station and its switch and router, the 
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company control center facility, the area control and engineering centers, or the reliability 
coordination offices.  
5.6 Summary 
  A variant of the trust system concept will enhance security and safety within the 
US Utility Intranet by the unique traffic authorization, packet inspection, access control, 
encryption, collaboration, and information sharing it enables.   
 The trust system can provide these capabilities (or a subset thereof) within the 
strict time constraints of many SCADA and protection communications and is flexibly 
configurable and modular, making it customizable and financially advantageous to any 
corporation’s specific needs and budget. 
 It is this author’s opinion that a comprehensive, collaborative, and intelligence- 
gathering approach like the trust system concept, will be the wave of the future in 
automated network security implementations. 
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